THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL - Air Defense Artillery

SHIPS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 259
started until it is reasonably certain that the enemy situation has taken such
definite shape as to warrant the adoption of a scheme of maneuver. "
In Chapter V (The Corps Attacks), "An early decision usually is necessary in
order to retain the initiative, or to strike the enemy before he can fully organize
his position or receive reinforcements. Before the attack can be
planned in detail, the commander must have accurate information cif the location,
strength, and limits of the enemy's position." Mechanized forces, which
combine sustained speed with tremendous hitting power, introduces a liquid
element into an otherwise stable situation. They can, as we have seen, completely
alter a situation in less than twelve hours. The Blue corps commander
decided to attack thirty-six hours before his attack could be launched-ample
time for the Reds to concentrate against him all their mechanized forces within
200 miles of the threatened point. Fairly accurate information about intrenched
enemy forces can be secured as heretofore; but how can a commander
determine the strength, location, and probable intentions of highly mobile
mechanized units that the enemy holds in reserve? Only by continuing to
ignore the powers of a mechanized force can we justify the statement, ""The
corps commander is thus assured that there will be no material change in the
enemy situation during the development and deployment of his corps." New
time and space factors, commensurate with the mobility of the new weapon,
must henceforth be applied to the movement of ground troops. Large infantry
units must accelerate their development and deployment or else gamble on the
inactivity of hostile mechanized forces.
Another passage in Chapter V of The Detached Corps reads: "Surprise is
an essential element of success. With a large force, the surprise
element of an attack generally is limited to the exact location, the strength, and
the direction of the main effort." Against an enemy who holds fast powerful
mechanized units in reserve, effective surprise by infantry becomes impossible.
The enemy can concentrate his mechanized forces at the critical point long
before our slow-moving infantry formations can apply dangerous pressure.
Power in our main effort is not in itself sufficient; we must now have both
power and speed. Unless infantry can devise ways to deliver its blows rapidly,
it must forego the essential element of surprise. The necessity for speed in developmimt,
in deployment, and in the attack indicates that the infantry must
change its present combat tactics.
How can the necessary changes be determined? First, we must have a clear
statement of the probable uses and general characteristics of a mechanized
force. The War Department can readily formulate this statement from data
now at hand. Second, the Infantry School, the Cavalry School, and the General
Service Schools can inject mechanized forces into their problems, just as is done
with Air Divisions, and thus submit the subject to intensive study. The detailed
solntion of a single map problem in which the Reds have mechanized
forces and the Blues have none would focus the attention of infantry and
cavalry officersupon the need for new defensive tactics. Third, the Tank School
can make a special study of the combat tactics of mechanized forces. This study