P 36 world? Is <strong>the</strong>re observational evidence to ga<strong>the</strong>r?” Not so long ago, <strong>the</strong> vast majority of Western philosophers would have answered that last question with a resounding no. Philosophical common wisdom dominating <strong>the</strong> field for most of <strong>the</strong> 20th century held that ruminating in isolation was <strong>the</strong> one true way to test moral <strong>the</strong>ories. Along about <strong>the</strong> turn of <strong>the</strong> 21st century, however, some philosophers began venturing outside <strong>the</strong> discipline’s ivory tower to canvas population samples, <strong>the</strong>n using that data to draw philosophical conclusions. In contrast to 20th-century philosophy’s solitary bent, experimental philosophy lends itself to collaboration — with o<strong>the</strong>r disciplines as well as among philosophers. <strong>Princeton</strong> philosophy professor Kwame Anthony Appiah, who this year won a National Humanities Medal, is not an experimental philosopher himself, but watched <strong>the</strong> discipline’s development at <strong>Princeton</strong> from close range and wrote a book about it, 2008’s Experiments in Ethics. “Experimental philosophy is an interface between philosophy and computer science, psychology, ma<strong>the</strong>matics, economics, <strong>the</strong> descriptive social sciences,” Appiah explains in an interview. “Previous generations of philosophers would have been delighted to have access to <strong>the</strong>se tools. It never would have occurred to <strong>the</strong>m to say ‘that’s not philosophy.’ ” Most philosophers practicing x-phi are relatively young. Depending on a given university’s emphasis or po<strong>litics</strong>, you’re as likely to find <strong>the</strong>m in a psychology department as in <strong>the</strong> philosophy department. They are less given to absolute pronouncements, and more likely to accept <strong>the</strong> notion that long-held beliefs about human intuitions of right and wrong might not be as universal as we’ve been led to believe. “When I talk to people about experimental philosophy and how it got started, <strong>the</strong> answer is that it all began in New Jersey with a group of people moving this forward at <strong>the</strong> same time,” says Joshua Knobe *06, one of <strong>the</strong> field’s leading lights. Depending on whom you ask, experimental philosophy is ei<strong>the</strong>r an exciting breakthrough or a trendy, tragic dead end. The latter opinion is popular among scholars like Oxford philosopher Timothy Williamson, who asserted in an address to <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian Society: “If anything can be pursued in an armchair, philosophy can.” In a 2010 essay in The New York Times, he denounced experimental philosophy as “imitation psychology” and <strong>the</strong> work of “philosophy-hating philosophers.” The traditional, armchair model occupies <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical realm of pure abstract thought. To <strong>the</strong> traditional philosopher, real-world input is an unnecessary, unseemly distraction from <strong>the</strong> business at hand. Still, even a skeptic like <strong>Princeton</strong> philosophy professor Gideon Rosen acknowledges experimental philosophy’s appeal. “The rap against philosophy has always been that <strong>the</strong>re’s no method or cumulative development of results,” Rosen says. “So it’s not surprising that something came along that looked like scientific method, and people paid attention.” May 16, 2012 <strong>Princeton</strong> Alumni Weekly • paw.princeton.edu In fact, empirical data has had a place in philosophy for centuries. In Experiments in Ethics, Appiah claims that experimental philosophy’s engagement with <strong>the</strong> larger world makes it “really more traditional” than what today is considered traditional philosophy. “You can do good work without an MRI, but it’s an interesting question of philosophical taste or method,” says Appiah. “How important is empirical knowledge to philosophy? I think <strong>the</strong> answer is ‘hugely’ and always has been.” Twentieth-century “analytic philosophy,” concerned largely with scientific matters, was championed by Harvard professor Willard Van Orman Quine — who summarized his view of <strong>the</strong> unity of philosophy and science with <strong>the</strong> famous quip, “Philosophy of science is philosophy enough.” One of Quine’s graduate students at Harvard was Harman, who came to <strong>Princeton</strong>’s philosophy department in 1963 and helped foster an atmosphere of openness to empirical data. And one of Harman’s faculty colleagues at <strong>Princeton</strong> was someone he’d known when both were undergraduates at Swarthmore College, psychology professor John Darley. In <strong>the</strong> 1960s, Darley did a series of groundbreaking psychological studies that yielded up <strong>the</strong> “bystander effect.” Also known as “Genovese syndrome,” after Kitty Genovese, who died after her cries for help went unanswered when she was stabbed in New York City in 1964, it holds that <strong>the</strong> probability of a bystander offering help in an emergency is inversely proportional to <strong>the</strong> number of o<strong>the</strong>r bystanders present, because each person is less likely to assume responsibility for taking action. Still, it would take ano<strong>the</strong>r generation for practicing philosophers to start doing research and attempting to interpret <strong>the</strong> results philosophically. You can trace much of <strong>the</strong> current wave of experimental philosophy to a single class first offered at <strong>Princeton</strong> in <strong>the</strong> spring of 2000, “Ethics: Philosophical, Psychological and Cognitive Science Perspectives,” taught jointly by Harman, Darley, and Rutgers philosophy professor Stephen Stich *68. “For a decade before that, it had been a very depressing world out <strong>the</strong>re,” says Stich. “People working in moral psychology had little understanding of <strong>the</strong> philosophical literature, while people working in philosophy had no acquaintance with <strong>the</strong> empirical literature.” The class brought toge<strong>the</strong>r people in each discipline who were committed to understanding what people in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r discipline were doing, Stich says, and <strong>the</strong> result was “<strong>the</strong> birth of a new and now-burgeoning interdisciplinary domain — real moral psychology, as I like to call it.” Enrolled in <strong>the</strong> class, an updated version of which will be offered next fall, were students both of philosophy and of social psychology, <strong>the</strong> science of how people’s behaviors, emotions, and thoughts are influenced by <strong>the</strong> presence or absence of o<strong>the</strong>rs. The class was so successful that a form of it exists to this day as <strong>the</strong> Moral Psychology Research Group, or MPRG. An assemblage of 21 academics from philosophy and psychology, <strong>the</strong> MPRG meets twice yearly, most recently last month at Purdue <strong>University</strong>. MPRG members include Stich and Harman; Shaun WATCH: Gilbert Harman discusses morality with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Princeton</strong> Philosophy Review @ paw.princeton.edu PETER MURPHY
PRINCETON IS GROUND ZERO FOR EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, AND GIL HARMAN ITS FATHER