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Ilia Chavchavadze - brainGuide

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I. The origin of the state<br />

cept is substantially based on Rousseau’s model of socially „general<br />

will“, which became the basis of agreement on the origin of the state with<br />

the last. The question is, how could the realization of the given will be<br />

achievable under those social-cultural circumstances (with no specialized<br />

meaning of the concept), on the ground of which proceeds the construction<br />

of politically organized society. If we look through the prestate<br />

epoch, it is evident that there is not any psychological basis, by which it<br />

could be possible to fulfill the discussing will. More than that, in actual<br />

case it takes place the lack of proper psychological basis even for its formation,<br />

since man of before-state era – this is an individual of stereotypic<br />

view, whose creative mentality cannot spread over such wide scales.<br />

The similar discordance manifests itself with Locke. On the one hand,<br />

he considers that the state order is the condition taken by the people’s<br />

agreement; on the other hand, he points out that the society of prepolitical<br />

„natural state“ represents a unity of „wild tribes“. But he says nothing<br />

about that, how the „wild tribes“ come to an agreement of such complexity!<br />

What about the aspect actual for us, it is obvious that Locke’s and<br />

I. <strong>Chavchavadze</strong>’s points of view basically differ from one another. While<br />

Locke explains the origin of the state essentially by its repressive nature<br />

(„restraining of violators of natural state“, „protection of already existing<br />

rights“ by the same meaning etc.), in the conception of I. <strong>Chavchavadze</strong><br />

the main accent is laid on the regulative function of the state: The starting<br />

point is the conformity of the phenomenon of state with the nature of individual<br />

(and not, restrictively, the interests of the victims of encroachment<br />

upon „natural rights“). To say better, Locke excludes the creation of<br />

social relations as state’s innate function.<br />

The predecessor of Locke, Hobbes, dealing with the origin of the<br />

state, points out the inner and the outer public necessity. According to<br />

Hobbes, as we see it later with Locke too (though, in general, Locke subjects<br />

Hobbes’ philosophy to sharp criticism), in the society, which is not<br />

stately organized is settled everlasting scare, people feel invincible threat<br />

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