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ing of democratic attitudes and processes. 27 The confrontation between the authoritarian regime and ademocratic opposition set the stage for a political struggle that pitched Suharto supporters allied withconservative Islamists against reform-oriented secular nationalists and moderate Muslim intellectualsduring the transition.When Suharto came to power in 1966, Muslims looked with high hopes toward the new regime, havingbeen previously marginalized from national politics and economic life under the Dutchadministration and the years of Soekarno’s reign. The ‘New Order’ (1966-1998), however, did notaccommodate these high hopes. Instead, it found a middle way by suppressing Muslim organisationsand civilian politics, but encouraged Muslim piety as a ground for public morality, a shield againstWestern influence and as an antidote to communism. 28 The resurgence of political Islam in the contextof a general Muslim renewal during the 1970s and 1980s forced the regime to adopt new strategies asit sought to gain control over Muslim forces and the democratic opposition movement. AbdurrahmanWahid, head of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s biggest Muslim organisation, and MegawatiSoekarnoputri, leader of the nationalist faction and daughter of Indonesia’s national hero and firstpresident, were personal friends. 29 This made an alliance of the secular nationalists and reform-orientedreligious groups against Suharto likely.Suharto’s influence among the military and the middle class was eroding. The first family’s excessivecronyism raised hostility among the most loyal Suharto supporters. More importantly, privately-heldenterprises began to dominate the economy while state-owned industries, in which many militaryretirees found employment, began to decline, thus undermining a patrimonial system. 30 The foundationof ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, was meant to consolidate Suharto’s supportamong Muslim activists. It emerged under the auspices of Suharto’s confidant, B.J. Habibie andbecame his personal platform in his presidential aspirations. ICMI established an Islamic bank and aMuslim quality newspaper that was meant to break the hold of the leading Christian-owned newspaperson the reading public. 31 This Suharto move attempted to polarise his challengers and createcleavages within Muslim organisations. Opponents to ICMI initiatives were repeatedly labelled as“Christians” or, less frequently, as “Nationalists”, although the opposition was much more varied, inorder to establish a regime-conform Islamic mainstream. 32In response to the founding of ICMI, Wahid founded the Forum Demokrasi in 1991. It became ahighly respected multi-religious platform of high-ranking Indonesian intellectuals and members fromthe political, the military and the cultural sphere that opposed the authoritarian regime. The coalitionof moderate Muslims, Christians, secularists and representatives of other religions united in theiropposition to the Suharto regime and thus laid the foundation for the protest movements that eventuallybrought down Suharto in 1998. 33The Asian financial crisis in 1997 hit Indonesia hard and resulted in a dramatic economic downturn.The poverty rate, having fallen to less than 14% nationwide, soared up to 40% by late 1998. 34 The crisisrepresented a window of opportunity for the pro-democracy movement. Demands for far-reachingreforms came from all sides of the political spectrum. For the first time, the opposition openly united2728293031323334Hefner, Civil Islam, 2.Hefner, Civil Islam, 59.Hefner, Civil Islam, 59.Hefner, Civil Islam, 158.Van Bruinessen, Islamic State or State Islam?, 1.Hefner, Civil Islam, 141.Künkler, Zum Verhältnis Staat-Religion, 18.Hefner, Civil Islam, 198.19