end to the military’s political role. 70 As a result, the army felt threatened and suffered a blow to its reputationin Ambon.Violent rivalries between two gangs that operated both in Jakarta and Ambon most likely played afinal prelude to the bloodletting in 1999. 71 Each gang appears to have had a religious affiliation. TheChristian “Reds” were based at the Maranatha church; the Muslim “Whites” were at the Al-Fatahmosque in Ambon. Both groups, however, reportedly did not exclude Christian or Muslim gang members.In Jakarta, both gangs controlled shopping malls and gambling facilities. 72 In November 1998, ariot emerged that targeted Christian churches, schools and houses after the Muslim population of thearea had been explicitly terrorized to provoke them into rioting. 73 Indonesian human rights investigatorsclaim to have evidence that these Jakarta riots in November 1998 were partly perpetrated bytrucked-in youth from Maluku who were paid to take part in violence. 74 Up to 600 of these gang memberswere reported to have been sent back to Maluku during December 1998. This may indicatedeliberate planning of the Ambonese riots. However, with Christmas and the Muslim fasting monthRamadan approaching, and explicit threats against the Ambonese youth not to stay in Jakarta after theriot, there exist other reasonable explications for their return to Ambon. 75 At the end of 1998, rumoursabout possible fights in Maluku were circulating. However, fights between Christian and Muslimyouth in Ambon were common. 76Violence in Ambon January 1999Violence broke out in Ambon City after an argument between a Christian bus driver and two Muslimyouth. As is the case with almost every incident of violence reported, two different stories about theexact circumstances emerged. A report by Human Rights Watch produced by a team that undertookinterviews within both communities at the end of March 1999 is the most detailed source providingboth versions circulating about almost every incident of violence that took place during these firstthree months.According to the ‘Christian version’, the bus driver Yopy was approached on the afternoon of 19 January1999 by two youth who demanded Rp. 500 from him. As he had just started his shift and did nothave any money, they let him go, only to threaten him anew on his return to the bus stop. When Yopywas threatened with a knife, he managed to escape, ran to his house to fetch his knife, and then chasedthe two attackers into the market of a predominately Muslim area. They escaped, Yopy went home,and about 15 minutes later hundreds of ‘Muslim youth’ came to attack the largely Christian neighbourhoodclose by. 77According to the ‘Muslim version’, which was later adopted by the police, Yopi was the driver of avan that was owned by a (Muslim) Bugis resident. The Bugis are one of the larger groups of Muslimsmigrants in Maluku. The conductor of the bus was also Muslim. Yopy had used the van for a charterrental, and the conductor and owner asked him for the money he had received. Yopy refused andthreatened both. Several Christian passengers then joined Yopi assaulting the conductor, who ran to theneighbouring Muslim area to get reinforcements from his friends. The two groups clashed, and “reli-7071727374757677Aditjondro, Guns Pamphlets, Handie-Talkies, 103.Aditjondro, Guns Pamphlets, Handie-Talkies, 103. HRW, The Violence in Ambon.Aditjondro, Guns Pamphlets, Handie-Talkies, 110.Aditjondro, Guns Pamphlets, Handie-Talkies, 112.HRW, The Violence in Ambon, 9.HRW, The Violence in Ambon, 10.HRW, The Violence in Ambon, 10.HRW, The Violence in Ambon, 10.24
gious and racial tensions erupted into violence”. 78 In an interview, a Muslim resident from the predominatelyChristian area that was first attacked stated that in the afternoon he had heard stone-throwing,but did not pay much attention because fights between Muslim and Christian neighbourhoods were socommon.He reported:A Muslim crowd came and attacked. They came across the bridge into the village in large numbers.He came out of the house to look carrying a Quran, so people would know he was a Muslim.He had lived in the area all his life, but he did not recognize the men leading the mob – all heknew was that they weren’t from the area. Some five people at the front were wearing a whitecloth on their arms. The attackers tossed burning rags into houses. His house was burned to theground, like every other house in the neighbourhood. People were also shouting that the mosquenearby had been burned, although it had not been touched. Eventually, the riot police came,but only after everything was already destroyed. From there, the crowd went on to a market area inthe centre of town. 79 (Emphasis mine)According to a Muslim resident of Ambon, rumours that mosques and churches had been burned circulatedduring the whole afternoon and evening of January 19. Residents heard these rumours beforeany smoke was signalled in the city. “The rumours preceded the event and, contrary to laws of nature,where there was fire no smoke had been seen”. 80 Instead, violence was fuelled by a surplus of information,misinformation, and suspicion circulating like wildfire across Ambon. 81At about 20:00, a Christian group gathered and burned a few kiosks around their church before goingafter the pedicabs owned largely by Butonese and Bugi migrants. They piled the pedicabs into a hugestake, then set the stack alight. 82 During the night, Muslims were handing out white armbands andheadbands to other Muslims so that they would be able to identify each other. Christians, in turn, werewearing red head cloths, and the two sides were referred to as the “Whites” and the “Reds”. 83In the evening in another neighbourhood, a Christian mob of about twenty people per group came toattack, claiming that their church had been burned, that was in fact untouched. An Ambonese Muslimfrom the area recalled to Human Rights Watch:They destroyed houses with iron pipes and rocks, smashing everything. Some of the mob wantedto break into the houses, but he heard someone shout “Don’t go in yet!”. Then he heard thebanging on electric pole. Three times meant “Come together” and banging many times veryrapidly sent a different message, he was not sure what. There was clearly a leader giving the signals.The mob came back four hours later and went into each house, looting and stealing.Participants were encouraged to store the looted goods in the church before claimed burned, sothat they would not be accused of stealing. The police came once or twice in the midst of all thisbut not to guard the neighbourhood, only to take a look and pass by on patrol. The AmboneseMuslim witness found refugee with a priest. He said the targets of the attackers were Buton,Bugis, Minang Sumatra, and Javanese, i.e. the migrants. The Chinese neighbours were notbothered, but on the Muslim houses, obscenities against Islam and pro-RMS slogans werescrawled 84 .78798081828384HRW, The Violence in Ambon, 10.HRW, The Violence in Ambon, 13.Interview in Spyer, Fire without Smoke, 8.Interview in Spyer, Fire without Smoke, 8.HRW, The Violence in Ambon, 12.HRW, The Violence in Ambon, 12.HRW, The Violence in Ambon, 13.25
- Seite 1: Institut für Asien- und Afrikawiss
- Seite 4 und 5: SÜDOSTASIEN Working PapersISSN: 14
- Seite 7: VorwortBoryano Rickum und Eva Strei
- Seite 10 und 11: Theoretischer Zugang: Waldschutzkon
- Seite 12 und 13: Zum anderen ist ein weiteres Proble
- Seite 14 und 15: verbleiben die Landrechte beim Staa
- Seite 16 und 17: Dutschke, Michael/Wolf, Reinhard (2
- Seite 18 und 19: Many commentators perceive religion
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- Seite 22 und 23: around Wahid’s NU, Megawati’s n
- Seite 24 und 25: groups were uniting against Suharto
- Seite 28 und 29: January 20, the second day of viole
- Seite 30 und 31: When violence broke out in Maluku i
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- Seite 34 und 35: support of some elements in the arm
- Seite 36 und 37: interpretations and instrumentaliza
- Seite 38 und 39: Soei Liong, Liem (2002) It’s the
- Seite 40 und 41: Malaysia) war einer der wichtigsten
- Seite 42 und 43: Rückkehr und ReintegrationBereits
- Seite 44 und 45: NGO-Aktivist. Beide Kandidaten hatt
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- Seite 48 und 49: tergehen. Die Unterzeichner und Her
- Seite 51 und 52: 4 Remembering the dark: The Japanes
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- Seite 55 und 56: Remembering and forgettingWith thes
- Seite 57 und 58: These fragments of the social memor
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- Seite 61 und 62: ConclusionThe task of this essay wa
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angelegt wurde, so z.B. zum Kirchga
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ihrem Ehemann Joan van Hoorn an ihr
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icht teilnehmen. Die Sorge um die K
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asiatischen Familien und zum andere
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Niederländer schickten ihre Kinder
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Dies wurde allerdings verzeichnet,
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Die meisten der Mischlingskinder wu
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über das private Zusammenleben inn
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Internetquellenhttp://hadith.al-isl
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6 Freundschaft als soziale Praxis:i
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laritäten und Überlagerungen mit
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seiner Funktion auf individueller u
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zunächst grob die wichtigsten sozi
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Freundschaften „indonesisch“ od
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Die Sphären lokalkulturell (javani
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Haller Dieter (2001) Entwurf einer
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Die Dia’ang betreiben als Bauern
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tragen werden würde, die hier vorb
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den traditionellen Schutz- und Gege
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Über die AutorInnenNicola Borchard
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22. Heinz Schütte (2003) Hundred F