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State v. Proctor - Kansas Judicial Branch

State v. Proctor - Kansas Judicial Branch

State v. Proctor - Kansas Judicial Branch

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however, goes to the mandatory life-without-parole penalty that would accompany a<br />

conviction for a new felony. So not only would <strong>Proctor</strong> have to wind up in prison, he<br />

would have to commit some felony after his release. None of that has happened.<br />

As we discuss below, the nature of the new felony could have a significant effect<br />

on the constitutional analysis as <strong>Proctor</strong> presents the issue and might be outcome<br />

determinative. Accordingly, deciding the case in this posture is, to say the least, unusual<br />

and, in some respects, troubling because of the artificiality of the circumstances critical to<br />

the decision. An appeal would present a tangible, well-formed controversy if it were<br />

asserted following the defendant's conviction on a new felony and the prison<br />

commission's initiation of revocation of supervised release.<br />

But we are reasonably sure <strong>Proctor</strong> cannot defer his challenge in light of settled<br />

authority requiring immediate appeal of sentencing issues. The <strong>Kansas</strong> appellate courts<br />

have recognized that defendants waive most potential legal challenges to their sentences<br />

if they do not appeal within the statutorily permitted time. See Bryant v. <strong>State</strong>, 280 Kan.<br />

2, 8, 118 P.3d 685 (2005) (defendant "did waive a challenge to his sentence by not<br />

appealing the sentence"); Wilkerson v. <strong>State</strong>, 38 Kan. App. 2d 732, 734, 171 P.3d 671<br />

(2007); see K.S.A. 22-3608(c) (defendant has 10 days after judgment to appeal). The<br />

statutory provisions establishing lifetime supervised release and mandating revocation<br />

plainly affix the resulting incarceration as a punishment for the underlying sexual offense<br />

and not for the new felony. See K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 21-4704(e)(2) (In a presumptive<br />

imprisonment case, the district court must "pronounce the complete sentence," including<br />

the period of postrelease supervision.). In other words, the return to prison for life results<br />

from the violation of a condition subsequent—no new felony convictions—imposed as<br />

part of the sentence for the sexual offense. A legal attack on that punishment, however<br />

contingent and remote it may be, must be lodged at the time sentence is pronounced. The<br />

return to prison for violation of postrelease supervision is not imposed as punishment for<br />

the new felony. See K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 75-5217(c) (revocation of supervised release and<br />

10

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