State v. Proctor - Kansas Judicial Branch

conviction for any felony will automatically return him to prison for the rest of his life
without any possibility for early release. That punishment renders the sentencing scheme
constitutionally suspect as cruel and unusual, especially insofar as the triggering offense
may be a low-level felony.
But as we have acknowledged, Proctor or someone else could commit an
especially violent or otherwise heinous offense while on supervised release. If the felony
triggering an offender's return to prison for life were a homicide or kidnapping that would
weigh strongly against a finding of cruel and unusual punishment as applied to that
offender in those circumstances. In other words, we envision realistic scenarios in which
the constitutionality of the punishment measured by a grossly disproportionate standard
could pose a much closer question or might plainly favor the State.
In Solem, the United States Supreme Court found a recidivist statute
unconstitutional when the defendant received a sentence of life in prison without parole
for intentionally writing a check on a closed account. If Proctor were on lifetime
postrelease supervision, the same would happen to him for writing such a check. The
South Dakota statute at issue in Solem did not prescribe life without parole until a third
felony conviction, and the defendant actually had twice that many convictions before he
received that sentence. The Court characterized all of those offenses as nonviolent,
although some were residential burglaries. But the "triggering" offense directly bringing
about the challenged punishment would be equivalent—a felony bad check in Solem and
the felony theft we have postulated for Proctor. That suggests a gross disproportionality.
The punishments upheld in Rummel and Ewing were constitutionally distinguishable
because they entailed tangible prospects for release from prison.
In addition, Proctor's overall record, as we have constructed it for purposes of
resolving the case, would not be indicative of a repeat sex offender or an incorrigible
recidivist. As we have indicated, the United States Supreme Court has given considerable
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