State v. Proctor - Kansas Judicial Branch
State v. Proctor - Kansas Judicial Branch
State v. Proctor - Kansas Judicial Branch
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Justice Kennedy's concept of proportionality set out in Harmelin reflects the<br />
narrowest ground supporting the judgment there and in Ewing and, thus, may be<br />
considered controlling in that limited sense. See Marks v. United <strong>State</strong>s, 430 U.S. 188,<br />
193-94, 97 S. Ct. 990, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1977) (When no rationale commands five votes,<br />
the holding may be considered "'that position taken by those [justices] who concurred in<br />
the judgment[] on the narrowest ground.'"). Whether Justice Kennedy's position should<br />
be treated as binding authority is a matter of debate. The Marks approach presupposes the<br />
positions of the justices in the majority are compatible insofar as they recognize a<br />
common right or mode of analysis but disagree as to scope. 430 U.S. at 194 (When two<br />
justices would afford broad First Amendment protection to pornographic literature and<br />
would reverse a finding that a given book was legally obscene and three other justices<br />
adopted a more limited protection but would also reverse the judgment, the plurality of<br />
three reflects the controlling decision of the Court on the narrowest ground.). That cannot<br />
be said of the judgments in either Harmelin or Ewing, since two justices essential to the<br />
majority would reject any form of proportionality analysis, including the limited one<br />
Justice Kennedy espouses. See Nichols v. United <strong>State</strong>s, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46, 114 S. Ct.<br />
1921, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1994) (application of Marks to some divided decisions may<br />
prove difficult when a "lowest common denominator" is not readily apparent; resulting<br />
confusion of that sort suggests "a reason for reexamining" the substantive issue); United<br />
<strong>State</strong>s v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (Marks inapplicable<br />
when plurality and concurring opinions "take distinct approaches" or "the various<br />
opinions supporting the Court's decision are mutually exclusive"); United <strong>State</strong>s v. Alcan<br />
Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003).<br />
At the close of its 2011 term, the United <strong>State</strong>s Supreme Court issued a decision<br />
holding mandatory sentences of life without parole imposed on juveniles committing<br />
murder to be constitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.<br />
___, ___ S. Ct. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, 2012 WL 2368659 (2012). The decision<br />
effectively expanded the principal rationale of Graham—that juveniles as a class are less<br />
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