State v. Proctor - Kansas Judicial Branch

policy. The theme of deference runs throughout the authority and was most recently
recapitulated by Chief Justice Roberts: The Court has "emphasized the primacy of the
legislature in setting sentences." Graham,130 S. Ct. at 2037; see Solem, 463 U.S. at 290
("Reviewing courts . . . should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that
legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes. "); Van Dyke v. State, 31 Kan. App. 2d 668, Syl. 3, 70 P.3d 1217 (2003). But, as
both Graham and Solem illustrate, judicial deference has limits; it is not merely a
euphemism for blind adherence. The ultimate test for judging incarceration as cruel and
unusual punishment does not depend on a closely calibrated relationship between the
offense and the prison term. That sort of proportionality would contravene the broad
authority properly accorded legislatures in setting punishments for crimes based on
particularized penological policies and public-safety goals. From a practical standpoint, a
constitutional test based on a tailored proportionality between crime and punishment
would be difficult to administer given the often significant variations in sentencing
schemes and classifications of crimes across jurisdictions. The constitutional test, then,
requires a "gross disproportionality." See Van Dyke, 31 Kan. App. 2d 668, Syl. 1.
In evaluating the constitutionality of a sentence of imprisonment, those members
of the United States Supreme Court recognizing the concept of proportionality generally
consider three broad categories of information. First, the Court considers the
circumstances of the convict, the offense, and the punishment. This includes background
information on the particular individual being punished. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2037-
38 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Solem, 463 U.S. at 296-97 & n.22. The Court looks at how
the particular state punishes offenses it considers more serious. And, finally, the Court
looks at how other states punish comparable offenses. Those are considered objective
criteria measuring the challenged punishment against intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional standards.
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