Other Laozi Parallels in the Hanfeizi - Sino-Platonic Papers

Tae Hyun KIM, “Other Laozi Parallels in the Hanfeizi”
Sino-Platonic Papers, 199 (March 2010)
critical questions concerning it have remained unsettled 20 : Can Huang-Lao unambiguously be
used to describe the philosophical circumstances of the middle and late Warring States periods?
What is its denotation? Does it guarantee philosophical consistency in the texts that have been
understood and classified as “Huang-Lao”? Why should Huangdi combine with Laozi? 21 etc. 22
In fact, because of these fundamental problems, it seems nearly impossible to define
clearly and correctly what Huang-Lao was. Thus, if it is necessary to continue using the term to
describe the historical entity related to the compilation of some texts and envisioning of Daoism
represented by Lao-Zhuang, I must admit that I hold a loose and hypothetical definition of that
term. 23 As for the definition of the term Huang-Lao, I adopt that given by Roth: 24
with regard to its philosophical denotation. See Ikeda Tomohisa, Rō Sō shisō 老莊思想 (Tokyo: Hōsō daigaku,
2000), 80–99.
20
A representative work by an Eastern scholar is Asano Yuichi 淺野裕一, Kōrōdō no seiritzu to tenkai 黃老道の成
立と展開 (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1992). As is well shown in this work, Eastern academia has generally assumed that
there actually was a consistent philosophical trend from the middle of the Warring States period to early Western
Han. However, in fact, the more detailed and critical questions as to its definition have not been asked, nor has a
more accurate searching for its denotation been attempted. Robin Yates attempts to point out one potential
intellectual source, Yin-Yang theory, for the Huang-Lao ideas, based on examinations of Yinqueshan and
Mawangdui finds. See Robin Yates, Five Lost Classics: Tao, Huang-lao, and Yin-yang in Han China (New York:
Ballentine Books, 1997). See also Robin Yates, “Yin Yang Texts from Yinqueshan: An Introduction and Partial
Reconstruction, with Notes on their Significance in Relation to Huang-Lao Daoism,” Early China 19(1994):74–144.
21 Li Ling gives a possible explanation for this combination in light of concerns for justifying longevity. See Li Ling
李零, “Shou ‘Huang-Lao’” 說黃老, Daojia Wenhua Yanjiu 道家文化硏究 (1994), 154.
22
The skeptical question about the definition of the term Huang-Lao, moreover, can be combined with the criticism
of the conventional categorization of philosophical schools in the pre-Qin period. Particularly, the so-called Daoism
matters: Who belonged to the Daoist group? What are the proper criteria to distinguish Daoists from non-Daoists?
The Legalist school is questionable, too: Who were the Legalists? Were the Huang-Lao scholars also Legalists? Into
what categories such as Daoism and Legalism does Huang-Lao fit? Admittedly, these questions are hard to answer
clearly. This implies that the conventional categorizations of philosophical schools cause great confusion in
understanding early Chinese philosophy, especially of the late Warring States period, whose chief characteristic was
that of synthesis.
23 By the acceptance of the term, I do not mean that the Laozi or its unique idea, which consists of half of the
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