the_taliban_shuffle_-_kim_barker

and power brokers likely fueled the insurgency, causing some frustrated
and jobless young men from the Alikozais, from another Zirak tribe
called the Achakzais, and from the major Panjpai tribe of the Noorzais
to sign up with the Taliban. Some of the Ghilzais, meanwhile, had
turned back to the Taliban in Kandahar, but the Durranis also now
played a major leadership role in the Taliban. (The Taliban seemed to
recognize more than the government how important it was to treat all
the prickly Pashtun divisions equally, or, more accurately, that it was
important to simply ignore them. It was unclear how long the insurgent
rainbow alliance could last—the Achakzais hated the Noorzais, and vice
versa, even in the Taliban—but their collective hatred of the foreign
troops and the Afghan government probably overrode their own
Hatfield-and-McCoy disputes.)
Even then, it was not that simple. Making things more headacheinducing,
about half the Popalzais and Barakzais were also supporting
the Taliban, Khakrizwal said, part of the endless attempts to hedge bets
and exact varieties of payback. (Some of the Barakzais were still upset
about the removal of a previous governor, a Barakzai. And the pro-
Taliban Popalzais? Who knows. Maybe drugs, maybe a bad kebab.)
Being a member of the same tribe also didn’t guarantee loyalty. For
instance, the Kandahar governor was a Ghilzai—but everyone in
Kandahar saw him as an outsider from Ghazni Province, two provinces
away, practically a foreign country. And the tribes could be exible
based on self-interest. Some Noorzais supported Karzai; some were
major drug traffickers allied with the Taliban; some were Taliban; some
were everything. (The Taliban had banned poppies while in power, but
had now started charging drug trackers to transport drugs, which
helped fund jihad, sow instability, and win the support of Afghans who
depended on the drug economy for their livelihood.)
So how much did all the Pashtun tribal alliances and divisions
matter? A lot—unless something else mattered more.
The Taliban didn’t just gain strength because they understood this, or
because they exploited tribal jealousies, disillusionment with the local
government, and the rising drug trade. Pakistan’s top spy agency, the
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), had also recruited for the
Taliban, Khakrizwal insisted, in the endless ISI attempt to control
Afghanistan. Ever since ISI leaders joined the anti-Soviet jihad in the