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Unwilling to sit on <strong>the</strong> sidelines, <strong>the</strong> Brits and <strong>the</strong> Americans now<br />

sold Sabit as <strong>the</strong> answer to government corruption. He was being<br />

pushed as <strong>the</strong> best choice for attorney general, <strong>the</strong> top lawyer in <strong>the</strong><br />

land, a crucial job. Somehow <strong>the</strong> Afghan government needed to<br />

convince its citizens that criminals would be held accountable, that<br />

corruption would not be tolerated, and that an Afghan justice system<br />

was more eective than <strong>the</strong> Taliban’s Islamic courts. Like civilian<br />

casualties, corruption was turning into a major wedge issue. The<br />

Taliban may have been strict, but <strong>the</strong>y did promise law and order, and<br />

<strong>the</strong>y weren’t for sale. (Most of <strong>the</strong> time. In Afghanistan, <strong>the</strong>re were<br />

always exceptions.)<br />

Sabit was not an entirely new suggestion for attorney general. I had<br />

heard about this plan months earlier, from a U.S. embassy official.<br />

“Sabit? Really?” I had asked.<br />

“Sure,” <strong>the</strong> embassy man had said. “He may be an unguided missile,<br />

but he’s our unguided missile.”<br />

And maybe that was true—when Sabit visited Guantánamo Bay, he<br />

largely validated what <strong>the</strong> United States had said about <strong>the</strong> American<br />

detention center <strong>the</strong>re, even as he pushed for some allegedly innocent<br />

men to come back home. He had also sounded all <strong>the</strong> right notes about<br />

ghting corruption and following <strong>the</strong> advice of his benefactors. Yet<br />

Sabit faced an interesting paradox. Some people saw him as too<br />

conservative, given his morality campaign and past alliance with <strong>the</strong><br />

fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. O<strong>the</strong>rs saw him as a U.S. patsy.<br />

But Karzai nominated Sabit anyway, which meant that Sabit had to<br />

appear before <strong>the</strong> Afghan parliament and convince members to vote for<br />

him. This wasn’t entirely necessary—Karzai largely ignored <strong>the</strong> body,<br />

and would later even choose to keep his foreign minister when <strong>the</strong><br />

parliament sacked him. But <strong>the</strong> affirmation would give Sabit legitimacy.<br />

He gave a long speech, talking poignantly about corruption and <strong>the</strong><br />

need to fight it. The parliament overwhelmingly voted for him.<br />

“You should have seen my speech to <strong>the</strong>m,” Sabit told me later. “I<br />

won <strong>the</strong>m over. By <strong>the</strong> end, <strong>the</strong>y all loved me. They were all clapping.<br />

Some were crying, <strong>the</strong>y were so impressed.”<br />

Typical Sabit self-aggrandizement, and I believed one-third of it, a<br />

good rule of thumb for most Afghan ocials. Regardless, <strong>the</strong> wild-

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