The American Jewish Archives Journal, Volume LXI 2009, Number 1

United Nations and the Israeli military. His relationship with Nelson Glueck
went back to his participation in the latter’s archaeological excavations in
the 1930s. 371
Although primarily an archaeologist concerned with Iron Age Israel, Biran
had a special connection to the Dead Sea Scrolls. During the Six Day War of
June 1967, Yadin served as the liaison among the Israeli Prime Minister, the
military chief of staff, and the defense minister. On Thursday, 15 June, Yadin
was informed that the Rockefeller Museum had been captured by Israeli troops
from the Jordanian Arab Legion. He contacted Hebrew University professor
Nahman Avigad and the director of the Department of Antiquities, Biran, to
go to the museum and ensure that the scrolls were in safes to protect them during
the continued mortar fire. Biran and Avigad, as Yadin notes, were the first
Israeli scholars to have access to the Cave 4 material since its discovery fifteen
years earlier. 372 Further, Biran was involved in establishing Israel’s agreement
with de Vaux and the editorial committee. Several weeks following the war, de
Vaux met with antiquities director Biran and Yadin on behalf of the Shrine of
the Book. They met at Biran’s new office at the Rockefeller, where it had been
moved from its previous location at the Israel Museum. Biran described the
meeting as follows:
De Vaux was worried that we would not honor the agreement they had with
Jordan.… We assured him that we would. We felt that we had to honor the
rights of scholars working on the material. It would be completely unfair
for us to come and say: ‘You can’t work on something’ after they had spent
years on it. 373
Despite the possibilities that Biran’s history and connections offered, the College
decided to wait until the inventory list had been received before involving him.
If the Israelis decided not to send the list because of Biran’s interference, the
College would be left with $10,000 in unidentifiable negatives. 374 The desire to
hold off in pushing for access may have also been influenced by direct contact
from Sanders in late August. The possibility remains that HUC-JIR saw Sanders
as an ally in getting the material released. Sanders informed Zafren that Broshi,
Benoit, and others had agreed to allow new negatives to be made and stored
at the Ancient Biblical Manuscript Center. Sanders turned to Zafren to get a
better idea of the quantity of negatives in HUC-JIR’s collection to delineate
which materials still needed to be photographed. 375 The discussion preserved in
the correspondence focuses on the issue of whether HUC-JIR’s 1,347 negatives
accounted for the whole collection. 376 It seems that Zafren, in particular, wanted
to make sure that when access was granted, HUC-JIR would have copies of all
the Qumran material. The discussion Sanders initiated encouraged Zafren to
approach Broshi once again for a copy of the inventory list so that HUC-JIR
might see if its collection was complete and to finally inform him that the College
Optimistic, Even with the Negatives: HUC-JIR and the Dead Sea Scrolls, 1948–1993 • 55