Impetus - Europa

IMPETUS
Bulletin of the EU Military Staff
Spring/Summer 2012 · Issue #13
EUMS, ‘Who we are,
What we do’
A civilian ‘Battle Rhythm’...
EUMC...playing its part
Lessons Learned...
The Concept in a nutshell

PERSPECTIVES
The EUMS: A Team and a Team Player
An interview with Director General EUMS, LtGen Ton van Osch
Lt Gen Ton van Osch,
Director General EU Military Staff.
The EU Military Staff has been part of the
European External Action Service for more than a
year now. What is your first impression?
My first impression is positive, though we should not
underestimate the complexity of weaving together
this innovative Service to deliver real effect for the 27
Member States. But above all I am optimistic for the
future: for the first time we are developing a truly
‘Comprehensive’ approach to crisis management
using all the integral instruments of the EU in concert.
We already see evidence of that improved
‘Comprehensiveness’ in making the EU more efficient
and consequently the military embedded within it; for
example the way the EU has begun to synchronize all
its actions in the Horn of Africa.
What is for you the most important issue?
That there are so many issues. Many of them are
interlinked. There are big issues like the financial crisis
and the huge cuts in Defence budgets, crises in the
southern neighbourhood of the EU, consequences of
climate change, cyber defence, lessons from Libya and
the new strategic focus of the US. Although this
complexity sometimes makes life difficult, nevertheless
one can view such issues as real catalysts for further
development of our Common Security and Defence
Policy. No one can deny that there is an increased need
for the European military to find innovative solutions.
Demand for security is growing and, since budgets are
decreasing, we need to improve cooperation and
2
become more efficient. We do so by implementing an
ever more ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to crisis
management, and by developing new initiatives for
‘Pooling and Sharing’. The EUMS can play an important
role in translating the political intent into concrete action.
Aren’t there also many organizational issues to
be solved?
Certainly! Remember 2011 was the year in which the
EEAS was created. This coincided with a period of a
heightened number of crises. We could not afford to
close the shop, sit back and dream-up plans for the
reorganisation. Reality intervened. We had to learn by
experience on the way. That often is not the best way,
but it was the only way open to us. We all know that
there is a long list of organisational issues to be solved.
But at least, we now have a clear understanding of
what still must be done. Let’s make 2012 the year in
which we solve most of these organisational issues. I’m
grateful to all in the EUMS, the wider EEAS and the
Council Secretariat who work hard to get this done,
knowing it is not an easy job.
Are you satisfied with the role of the EUMS after
the creation of the EEAS?
Yes, but we should not take our role for granted. For
people who are not used to working with the military,
it is not always easy to understand the military approach
to our different tasks. We therefore need to better
explain “who we are and what we do”. Critically, in
everything we do, we must show that we are team
players, thoroughly integrated with our civilian
colleagues within the EEAS. That said, what has not
changed since the creation of the EEAS, is that we also
continue to work under the direction of the EU Military
Committee. There are good reasons for this. For any
military operation, the Chiefs of Defence (represented
through the Military Committee) have to create and
deliver the military capabilities and shoulder the risks.
But they have always understood that the military can
become more effective by applying the levers of power
through a truly civilian and military ‘Comprehensive
Approach’. That is one of the reasons why the EUMS
became part of the EEAS. ‘Comprehensiveness’ is easier
to find at the lower, or ‘softer’, end of the conflict
spectrum. But ‘Comprehensiveness’ does not always
mean the application of ‘soft’ power. I see many
developments in our security environment which
demand that we, as military, also remain capable of
acting quickly with more demanding military capabilities
up to the peace enforcing scale of crisis response. The
strength of the EU is that, uniquely, we have an integral
‘Civ-Mil’ Comprehensive team; the strength of the
military in that construct is that we know how to work
as an integrated Combined and Joint military team as
well. It is great to be part of both teams! n

EU MILITARY STAFF 1
''Who we are, what we do''
We, the EU Military Staff, are the source of military expertise within the EEAS.
3
PERSPECTIVES
We work under the direction of the Military Committee of the Member States Chiefs of Defence
who deliver the military capabilities and under the direct authority of the High Representative
who heads the EEAS and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (both Foreign Affairs and Defence).
The EEAS coordinates the external actions of the EU. As the EU’s diplomatic service it is also
responsible for the development and execution of the Common Security and Defence Policy.
We are proud to be the military component of this team.
We strengthen the diplomatic leverage of the EU, because together with Member States we
ensure that the EU can act militarily being one of its instruments of power. We assure that our
preparations and actions always fit within the political goals of the EU.
As an integral element of the EU’s Comprehensive Approach - to crisis management, we
coordinate military action. We do so with a focus on operations and the creation of future
military capabilities. For this, we coordinate the military dimensions with the Member State
Defence Staffs, the European Defence Agency, the European Commission, NATO, UN, AU
and strategic partner countries. We do so in full concert with all our partners within the EAS
and specifically the Crisis Management Planning Directorate, the Civilian Planning and
Conduct Capability and our partners for crisis response.
The military can be used across the full spectrum of crisis prevention, response and
management; ranging from support to Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Protection, Security
Sector Reform, stabilization and evacuation of citizens, to more complex military operations
such as peace keeping and peace enforcement.
We have been established to ensure the availability of the military instrument with all its
domains as one integrated military organization. If called upon, we will support our civilian
colleagues with our broad range of expertise, for instance: planning, intelligence, medical,
engineering, infrastructure, transport (land, sea, air), other logistic support, communication,
IT, security, cyber, education, exercises, and lessons learned.
Still, we will not forget that the raison d’être for the military, is the ability to act quickly as one
integrated entity for the broad range of military options, including complex Combined Joint
Operations.
In concert with the EU Military Committee and EEAS-partners, we create the circumstances
in which military can conduct their missions and operations together with their civilian
partners in the field. If security reasons deny others the ability to operate, the military will
stand and act as necessary, accepting the related risks.
This gives us a special responsibility.
1 Established by Council Decision 2001/80/CFSP of 22 January 2001, amended by Council Decision 2008/298/CFSP
of 7 April 2008.

ORGANISATION
EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF
EU Cell at
SHAPE
DIRECTOR GENERAL
EUMS
CEUMCWG
CEUMC
EU Liaison
UN NY
Chairman European Union Military Committe
Chairman EU Military Committe Working Group
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
GENERAL
LEGAL
ADVISOR
NPLT
EXECUTIVE
OFFICE
CEUMC
SUPPORT
COMMUNICATIONS &
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
LOGISTICS
OPERATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
CONCEPTS &
CAPABILITIES
4
CIS Policy &
Requirements
Logistics
Policy
Military Assessment
& Planning
Intelligence
Policy
Concepts
Information
Technology & Security
Resource
Support
Crisis Response &
Current Operations
Intelligence
Requirements
Force
Capability
Administration
OPSCENTRE &
Watch keeping
Intelligence
Production
Exercises,
Training & Analysis
EUMS

“Dans les affaires diplomatiques, il faut marcher
doucement et avec réserve et ne rien faire de ce
qui n’est pas contenu dans les instructions, parce
qu’il est impossible à un agent isolé de pouvoir
apprécier l’influence de ses opérations sur le
système général. L’Europe forme un système, et
tout ce qu’on fait dans un point rejaillit sur les
autres, il faut donc du concert.” Napoléon (1804)
It could be argued that Napoleon has provided the
first known workable definition of the Comprehensive
Approach (CA). Napoleon noted that when
considering the strategic environment or “système”,
one must not act hastily or without consideration of
the consequences of such an act on the constituent
parts. He deduced that any action must be coordinated
and in concert. In today’s parlance, interrelated and
interdependent constituent parts could include inter
alia: political, diplomatic, security, economic,
development, rule of law and human rights.
From Napoleon’s principle, it is possible to develop
a tentative working definition of the CA
or in French “Approche Globale”:
“L’Approche Globale consiste,
dans une gestion de crise, à
appliquer conjointement des
méthodes d’analyse et de prise de
décision pour faire partager
l’appréhension de l’évolution de la situation par
chaque partie prenante. Celle-ci en déduira les
variations des limites de sa propre liberté d’action, afin
de collaborer à l’harmonisation continue des effets de
ses opérations et de celles des autres acteurs à travers
l’ensemble du système du théâtre stratégique, pour
atteindre l’état final recherché.”
And in English:
“A CA, during crisis management, is defined as the
joint application of analysis and decision making
methods. This builds common situational awareness for
every stakeholder, who will be able to identify their
own specific limitations and variable freedoms of
action. This will facilitate the continuous harmonisation
of their operations’ effects with those of other actors
throughout the whole system of the strategic theatre,
in order to achieve the end state.”
5
CAPABILITIES
Deconflict, Coordinate, Cooperate
and Synchronise Comprehensive
Operations Planning
By Lieutenant Colonel Dave Goulding and Lieutenant Colonel René Renucci, Concepts and
Capability Directorate.
planning is indispensible
Lieutenant Colonel René Renucci (FR) and Lieutenant Colonel
Dave Goulding (IE), Concepts and Capability Directorate.
What makes the EU unique is its possibility to react to
a complex, dynamic, interrelated crisis with a combined,
tailored and inclusive response, using the whole
spectrum of both military and civilian
assets and capabilities. This reaction
is the collective commitment to a
crisis or event. It is comprehensive
in nature and incorporates all
Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) actions. It may extend
from initiation to final conclusion, possibly
over an extended period of time, and draws all
capabilities and expenditure into a continuous
commitment.
“In preparing for battle I have always found that
plans are useless, but planning is indispensible,”
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Comprehensive Planning contributes to the
development and delivery of a coordinated and
coherent response to a crisis on the basis of an allinclusive
analysis of the situation, in particular where
more than one EU instrument is engaged. It includes
identification and consideration of interdependencies,
priorities and sequence of activities and harnesses
resources in an effective and efficient manner, through
a coherent framework that permits review of progress
to be made. This approach applies to all phases of the
planning process for a crisis management operation

CAPABILITIES
conducted under the political control and strategic
direction of the Political and Security Committee under
the responsibility of the Council, and in accordance
with the established procedures for EU crisis
management.
“International systems are not integrated, respond
to disparate incentives, operate on different
timelines and budgets, and are nowhere forged
into common strategy” 1
The interim version of the Comprehensive Operations
Planning Directive 2 (COPD) is the NATO planning
guide for the Strategic level and below.
It is NATO Unclassified - releasable to
PfP/EU/ISAF for the widest possible
distribution within the
international community. The
COPD outlines the procedures and
responsibilities governing the
preparation, approval, assessment,
implementation and review of operations
plans to ensure a common approach to planning. It
supersedes the Allied Command Operations (ACO)
Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). COPD is a
set of procedures for operations planning with an
obvious NATO military focus. In order to ensure NATO’s
contribution to the CA, NATO has to reach out and
endeavour to integrate external civilian organisations
(UN, NGOs, State Departments, etc).This is unlike the
EU where the CA can start from within. COPD provides
a common framework for collaborative operations
planning when defining NATOs contribution within a
CA philosophy. It facilitates coordination with other
International Organisations (IOs) and Non Governmental
1 “Recovering from war” - Gaps in early action, a report by the NYU
Center on International Cooperation, (1 July 2008).
2 Interim Version (SHAPE document CPPSPL/4010-79/10, 17
December 2010).
‘Train the Trainer’ Course on NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning (COPD),
27 February - 02 March 2012
Centre to Right, Col Kevin Cotter (uniform, IE), Swedish Instructors - Lt Col Göran Grönberg,
Lt Col Joachim Isacsson,and Lt Col Carsten Persson.
to be perfect is
to change often
6
Organisations (NGOs) to achieve effective and inclusive
planning.
COPD is deliberately detailed to give planners the
necessary tools to fully appreciate all elements of the
most complex crisis and produce high quality operations
plans. The COPD examines a number of issues not
covered previously in the planning process, inter alia:
Civ-mil interaction in a CA, Systems approach to
knowledge development, Operational assessment and
the Process for planning at the Strategic level. In short,
COPD covers all aspects of operations planning at the
Military Strategic and Operational levels of
command. It can also be adapted to
the Component/Tactical level in
order to enhance concurrent
activity. NATO training and
education entities have already
retired the GOP and are now using
COPD. From now on, military
planners will be trained in the COPD.
There is therefore an increasing demand from
Member States (MS) to take the COPD into account.
“To improve is to change; to be perfect is to
change often,” Winston Churchill
The EU’s ability to conduct effective and efficient crisis
management operations depends on the expertise,
currency and capacity of its individual constituent parts.
Therefore it is imperative that the staff are skilled and
knowledgeable regarding existing procedures,
especially key management players who may be
involved in planning real operations.
MILEX 10 and MILEX 11 were exercises that took place
from 16 June to 25 June 2010 and from 16 May to 27
May 2011, respectively. These exercises focused on the
interaction between an EU OHQ and an EU FHQ in an
EU-led military operation without recourse to NATO
common assets and capabilities. The aims of both were
to exercise and evaluate military aspects of EU crisis

management at the military strategic and operational
levels, based on scenarios for an EU-led military
operation.
MILEX 10 Final Exercise Report 3 noted that the current
EU OHQ SOPs are based on the GOP and fail to reflect
the CA aspect at the military strategic level. It
recommends integrating the CA in future EU planning
directives and in the next revision of the EU HQ SOPs 4 .
Likewise the MILEX 11 Final Exercise Report 5 suggests
a review of SOPs and replacement of the GOP with the
COPD - as the standard tool for operations planning.
The report added that GOP based
planning tended to duplicate efforts
on the strategic and operational
levels. In order to solve this issue a
clearer distinction between the
planning responsibilities of the
different levels is required. This
distinction is reflected in the COPD,
leading to a more efficient and effective
planning process.
As a result of the above mentioned reports and being
cognisant of current best practice, a “COPD Task
Group” was established by DGEUMS in January 2012.
The group, led by the Concepts and Capabilities
Directorate, is comprised of representatives from all
EUMS Directorates. The group’s task is to analyse the
COPD through an EU lens, with a view to its use as the
main planning tool for EU operations. The resulting
analysis will also facilitate the revision of EU HQ SOPs.
The planned methodology for the Task Group is divided
into four phases:
3 Final Exercise Report MILEX 10 (13643/10, 20 September 2010)
4 European Union Operational and Force Headquarters Generic
SOPs (SN3649/10, 01 September 2010 and SN 3821/10, 20
September 2010)
5 Final Exercise Report MILEX 11 (11753/11, 20 September 2011)
thought without
learning is perilous
Left to Right, Lt Col García Ortiz (ES), Lt Col François-Régis Dabas (FR) and Lt Col Arturas Purlys (LT).
7
CAPABILITIES
• Phase I (January - 31 May 2012) - analysis of COPD.
• Phase II (01 June - 30 September 2012) - to assist MS
in their preparation and work up for EU Crisis
Management Exercise Multi Layer 2012 (ML 12).
• Phase III (01 October - 26 October 2012) - ML 12.
• Phase IV (27 October - 31 December 2011) - After
Action Review (AAR).
“Learning without thought is labour lost, thought
without learning is perilous,” Confucius
Notwithstanding the fact that all EUMS personnel have
previous training with respect to operational
planning, members of the Task Group
will be required to attend formal
COPD training. This training will
add credibility to the group’s
work, ensure a base line standard
and enhance existing expertise
and knowledge. The “Train the
trainers COPD Course” is scheduled to
be conducted here in the EUMS between 27
February to 02 March 2011. The instruction will be
carried out by members of the Försvarshögskolan
(Swedish National Defence College).
The desired end state for the Task Group is the
production of a “conversion kit” to facilitate planning
of EU operations, while using the NATO COPD as the
main planning tool. ML 12, scheduled to take place
form 01 to 26 October 2012, will provide an opportunity
to validate the work done by the COPD Task Group.
This work, together with the revision of EU SOPs,
should assist the work of future planners in an EU
environment. In conjunction and parallel, a higher level
group under the leadership of Gen Yves de KERMABON
(Retd) is currently revising the CSDP Crisis Management
Procedures. This work will take account of the new
structures post Lisbon and aim to align Civ and Mil
planning processes with a view to compressing the
planning process timelines. n

PARTNERS
Common challenges for the
Armed Forces of the European
Union Member States -
reflections on the state of play
and on the way ahead
By General Håkan Syrén, Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (CEUMC).
Responding to the Lisbon Treaty
Two and a half years have passed since the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. It is
appropriate now to assess the achievements and the
present state of play in the development of the military
dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP). I am focussing on the achievements, challenges
and opportunities ahead rather than on failures and
problems, although, of course, with a readiness to
draw constructive lessons from the past.
We are currently facing an extremely challenging period.
The shifts in the global balance of power, accompanied
by the severe economic and political strains
within the Union itself have made the general
conditions for setting the sails of the
strengthened Security and Defence
Policy within the EU very different
from what was envisaged at its
start. Furthermore, the revolutionary
changes in North Africa
and the Arab world have brought
new and urgent tasks onto the EU agenda.
Our outlook for the CSDP is global, but recent
experience has reminded us that the stability and security
of our own close neighbourhood cannot be taken
for granted.
The pressures on the formation of the EEAS have thus
been very great. On the whole I think that the pressures
have helped us to prioritise and focus our work. Much
remains to be done and the need for strategic and
thoughtful European leadership is greater than ever.
The EUMC is playing its part. It responded proactively
to the challenges raised in the Lisbon Treaty by formulating
a Strategic Plan, focusing on five priorities: Operations,
Comprehensive Approach, Capabilities, Strategic
Partnerships, and last but not least, general support to
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. By and large,
those priorities have provided relevant guidance, not
only for the work of the EUMC, but for other parts of
the CSDP structures as well. They have also proved to
EUMC is playing its part
8
Gen Syrén meeting with Officers of the Uganda Peoples
Defence Force (UPDF) during a visit to EUTM Somalia.
be a comprehensive and understandable
framework for presenting what the
EUMC is doing for ministers, parliamentarians
and others, engaged
in the EU security and defence
policy in Member States as well as
in partner countries. The Chiefs of
Defence at their meeting in Brussels in
April 2012 will review the priorities.
EU Operations and Comprehensive Approach
Supporting EU Operations is always a priority. The EU
can be proud of what has been achieved. EUFOR Althea
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EU NAVFOR Atalanta operating
outside the Horn of Africa and EUTM Somalia in
Uganda, are all evidence of how the EU is today actively
contributing to international security and stability. The
commanders are indeed delivering against their
mandates. However, reflecting on current force
generation, I see very little room for complacency.
Although the volume of the EU military engagement
remains quite limited, I am seriously concerned about
the current lack of willingness of Member States to
commit resources that match politically agreed
ambitions. This affects operations as well as the EU
Battle Groups.

There is now a broad agreement that the Comprehensive
Approach represents the core of the Common Security
and Defence Policy set out in the Lisbon Treaty. This is
where the EU-framework can really bring added value.
It is a very complex field but the EU is steadily and visibly
moving in the right direction. The present widening of
EU engagement in the Horn of Africa acts as a very
concrete catalyst for these efforts. An essential part of
the Comprehensive Approach is about successful
Conflict Prevention and the EUMC is actively working
to develop the military support.
EU NAVFOR Atalanta against piracy at sea is a success
in many ways. It is providing efficient protection for the
World Food Programme and for a large number of
other ships off the coast of the Horn of Africa. It is also
a catalyst for cooperation with a broad range of
partners from all parts of the world. At the same time,
it is clear that the problem can only very temporarily
and partially be solved at sea alone. Also, the costs of
the operation are extremely high. A lasting solution
must build on creating a functioning state, providing a
stable and secure environment on land, and efficiently
eliminating the freedom of action for pirates. The EU
Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa aims at just
that. In addition to Atalanta, the military parts are there
to support the build-up of Somali security forces and
to assist in future maritime capacity building in the area.
Capability Development
Enhancing European Capabilities is one of the most
urgent tasks for the EUMC. The Armed Forces of EU
Member States are now facing very complex and difficult
planning challenges. Defence budgets are cut in response
to the economic crisis. In parallel, demanding
transformation agendas, high operational wear and tear
and a relentless and costly technological development,
have to be managed. Chiefs of Defence are all aware and
deeply concerned about force generation constraints
and about serious underinvestment in future capabilities.
The recent Libya experience leaves no uncertainty about
the pressing need to remedy existing shortfalls.
The EU and its Member States are clearly in a very
different situation compared to when the European
Security Strategy was agreed in 2003. They are also in
a different situation as to when the CSDP was launched.
Priorities need to be reviewed and adapted. The
Member States´ Armed Forces are rapidly approaching
a point, where individual efforts will not suffice to
sustain essential capabilities. We are all losing out
together. This is happening now in front of our eyes.
We now have to define common capability requirements
that are affordable. We have to find ways to improve
efficiency and to make sure that we are really acquiring
those capabilities that are lacking. We cannot continue
to let traditional national sovereignty concerns dominate
our common defence policy and capability development.
Higher efficiency through closer cooperation
and coordination
The political spotlight is now very much on the potential
for increased efficiency through cooperation. Pooling
9
PARTNERS
Chiefs of Defence of the 27 Member States in Brussesls, 22 November 2011.
and sharing and Smart defence have become buzzwords
that carry a lot of expectations and support at the
highest political levels. It is a political momentum,
which the Chiefs of Defence, individually, as well as
together in the EU and NATO Military Committees, are
supporting and are trying to exploit. We are all aware
of the inefficiencies and duplications of current
individual defence efforts.
It is an illusion however, to believe that we can fix our
fundamental long-term challenges through the
cooperation projects that we are currently discussing.
They represent a good start, but the main long-term
value hopefully will be in raising the political awareness
of the impossibility to continue to treat European
defence as only the sum of the individual efforts by 27
sovereign nation states.
The international military community working within
the EU, as well as within NATO, can contribute to the
full political awareness of the situation. The Military
Committees of the EU, as well as of NATO, supported
by their international staffs, have the possibility to give
a credible voice to their common concerns. Formulating
a new way ahead clearly is a task for the EU and NATO
together. Pooling and sharing in the EU is not competing
with Smart Defence in NATO. The aims are largely the
same. All measures that can be taken to make the
European defence efforts more efficient are equally
essential. The EU framework is obviously most relevant
when defining a more common approach to European
capability building as well as to sustaining a competitive
European defence industrial base.
As we move forward it is obvious that a fresh look at
the European Security Strategy is needed. The strategy
now has to be formulated with clear common
priorities and goals. As has been repeated so many
times, Member States only have one set of forces.
Capability development must be seen in the wider
context, in the EU as well as in NATO. Continuing to
define defence policies in separate national stove
pipes will simply not be able to serve the interests
either of individual Member States or of the Union as
a whole.
My strong desire is therefore, that the EU Member
States will soon be ready to translate largely common
strategic aims into common capability goals in a much
more coordinated planning process. n

COHESION
The EU Military Staff from a
Civilian Perspective
Mr. Adam Gutkind.
By Mr. Adam Gutkind, Administrative Assistant, Executive Office.
Working hand in hand
Civilians make up some 7% of the EU Military Staff
(EUMS). Given the usual three-year turnover for
military personnel posted to the EUMS, this small
civilian “platoon” represents continuity, institutional
memory, and a permanent link to the other EU
institutions, diplomatic missions and international
organisations in Brussels. So, what makes the job
interesting for the civilian staff, and how do they
perceive life alongside their military colleagues?
Intensive interaction and an absence of routine, coupled
with constantly changing military personnel, certainly
make for an interesting scenario. Civilians certainly do
not miss out on the action in the EUMS. Personnel and
situations are changing all the time, and civilian
assistants are ready, willing and able to
provide help and support for their
military colleagues with all the
administrative aspects of daily
working life. Civilians are
ambassadors of the EU
administration par excellence! On
the one hand they are available to
ensure that the often complex and
incomprehensible administrative procedures
are followed, and on the other, they need to show
great flexibility in order to find the most effective
solutions.
First weeks in the new job are often stressful for military
newcomers, especially when it may not have been
possible to arrange a complete handover. In such
situations the EUMS assistant is there with a lifeline to
10
help the newcomer to adapt to his/her new
environment. Even for those military personnel who
might return to the EUMS, in a new appointment at a
later date, the EUMS can still offer surprises and
changes. On the whole, the EUMS is continuously
under transformation. This makes the place anything
but boring! The number of officers remains constant,
but what changes is the workload, IT-tools, structure
and institutional environment. An increasing number
of operations and missions, more players and a new
institutional framework with new procedures, have also
had a great impact on the assistant’s job. They
constantly have to update their knowledge to keep the
machinery alive. Up until 2011, and as part of the
European Council, the EUMS was dealing primarily with
the Military Representatives to the EU Military
Committee and the SG High Representative. With the
move to the EEAS in January 2011, the EUMS has new
interlocutors and cooperation partners; the EEAS
geographical directorates, and EU Delegations, as well
as Directorates General of the European Commission
(DEVCO and ECHO). To adapt to the new configuration
and ensure proper communication and collaboration
are the current challenges of the civilian team.
A military bubble?
ensure proper
communication and
collaboration
It is easy to imagine when joining the EUMS that one
enters a military bubble; mysterious and isolated from
the rest of the EEAS; serious, working under orders and
lacking any sense of humour. Nothing could be further
from the truth. The most exiting element of
working in the EU institutions - second
only to that of the policy making at
EU level of course - is the
multicultural environment which
offers a variety of languages and
different backgrounds of people
from all over the EU. The EUMS
offers an extra ingredient for the
cocktail: a Civilian-Military one. A
civilian soon stops seeing the uniforms, and
starts to recognise individuals who bring a great sense
of humour and commitment to the job. Tolerance and
a readiness to adapt, are prerequisites for both sides.
This is especially the case as EUMS procedures are often
unfamiliar to our military colleagues, whose new
counterparts are civilians, with a different
communication code. To the newcomers, at first sight,
the CSDP Crisis Management Procedures are often a

labyrinth. Also, for the civilians the constant merry-goround
of ranks, names and faces can be overwhelming.
As soon as you get to know everybody…someone
leaves, someone arrives, and off we go again!
An EUMS dialect
Aside from all the official languages of the European
Union, and regardless of whether you arrive in the
EUMS from the Council, the Commission, or any other
European institution, nothing can prepare a civilian for
the acronym-laden, military-driven EUMS dialect. The
first step will be the “Lesson Identified”. Your life would
be made considerably easier if you could manage to
absorb a 114 page heavy “Glossary of Acronyms and
Definitions” (updated every six months). If you have
familiarised yourself with this you will have achieved
your “Lesson Learned”. But even then you will need to
“enhance your cooperation” in order to apply the
“Comprehensive Approach”, developing “strategic
planning” in your daily business. You should not forget
that “pooling and sharing” of information and resources
is vital for the latter. And if you are ready with this, go
on the intranet of the EU Delegations and say “Hello”
to your new colleagues around the globe using their
own EUDEL Glossary. As you can see, it is truly a matter
of “lifelong learning” - to paraphrase the Commission’s
education programme. The civilians can only reply in
their own dialect with ARES, MIPS, SYSPER, SYSLOG,
OASIS and TSAR, and just occasionally we find that we
are all speaking the same language on MARS, SOLAN
and IOLAN networks.
A Civilian “Battle Rhythm”
The civilian “battle rhythm” within the EUMS is
influenced only partially by the opening hours of the
mess! The civilian’s calendar is guided by upcoming
events which are closely linked with military occasions.
Preparation of documents for the EU Military Committee
starts in the morning and goes on late into the evening.
Assistants therefore work overtime according to a duty
roster. This also covers weekends and holiday periods
whenever an EU operation enters its preparation phase.
Sometimes it is a “Friday night fever” rather than the
“short Friday”, known in some spots in Brussels. To
ensure coherence and high standards of work
performance, civilians in the EUMS meet regularly and
discuss administrative issues of common importance.
This is an occasion to become aware of specific aspects
of the work of other colleagues and to be prepared to
take over when necessary.
Stay fit wherever you sit
Hours spent working in front of a computer screen (of
which everyone in EUMS has at least TWO) and long
periods sitting in one place, can be detrimental to work
performance, but EUMS assistants are in a happy
situation. Just across the street they may enjoy the
hospitality of the Belgian Military Academy and, for a
small fee, use their sports facilities. They also have an
opportunity to discover their potential by attending the
11
EUMS Civilian Personnel.
COHESION
annual “EUMS Sport Day”, and to play non-political
games with their bosses.
Time for work - time for play
In order to encourage and support team spirit, the
EUMS regularly organises social events. Those occasions
truly strengthen the ties, not only among the military,
but also with the civilian staff. Every few weeks the
EUMS welcomes both military and civilian newcomers
with a glass of wine, and bids farewell to those who
are leaving. Annually on 9 May, the EU celebrates
Europe Day. Having officers from all EU countries,
EUMS also celebrates the National Days of the Member
States, prepared by the officers from the respective
countries. Once a month the EUMS Social Club gives
all hardworking members an opportunity to drop the
‘mouse’ in the office, catch a glass of beer and meet
colleagues.
City trips across Belgium and surrounding countries also
provide an opportunity to get to know one another
better. The Gala Dinner, organised every autumn for all
EUMS staff, is certainly a glamorous event not to be
missed. It is also possible to meet up and cook with
military colleagues in “civilian” mode, at popular events
such as the annual “Pizza Party”. Coming closer to the
end of the year you will experience a civilian-military
Christmas when miracles really happen. (All social
events are covered by individual members’ fees).
10 years on: emerging market for assistants
With six CSDP military operations and one military
training mission since 2003, the EUMS continues to
offer civilians the opportunity to become an active part
of crisis management and to understand the
mechanisms driving the European Common Security
and Defence Policy. Especially now, the extended
cooperation with new services, gives assistants more
opportunities to learn and to transfer their knowledge.
As long as the EU does not reach its “plateau”, aside
from demanding work, the EUMS will offer its civilians
more and more interesting insights, good memories
and friendships. n

GLOBAL MEMO
EU Missions and Operations
Since 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 24 missions and operations under
CSDP. 7 are military operations/missions. The remainder are civilian missions, although
in many areas, a high proportion of personnel are also military. Currently, the EU is
undertaking 12 missions and operations under CSDP (3 military and 9 civilian)
Missions/Operations EUROPE AFRICA MIDDLE EAST ASIA
Military
Civilian
CONCORDIA
(Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia)
Mar – Dec 03
EUFOR ALTHEA
(Bosnia i Herzegovina)
Dec 04 –
EUPOL Proxima (FYROM)
Dec 03 – Dec 05
EUPAT (FYROM)
Followed EUPOL Proxima
Dec 05 – Jun 06
EUPM BiH
(Bosnia i Herzegovina)
01 Jan 03 – 31 Dec 11
(01 Jan – 30 Jun 12
under consideration)
EUJUST Themis (Georgia)
Jul 04 – Jul 05
EUPT Kosovo
Apr 06 – 08
EULEX Kosovo
16 Feb 08 – 14 Jun 12
EUMM Georgia
01 Oct 08 – 14 Sep 12
Note: Missions/Operations in bold blue are ongoing.
ARTEMIS
(Ituri province, Congo RDC)
Jun – Sep 03
EUFOR RD Congo
(Congo RDC)
Jun 06 – Nov 06
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
(Chad-Central African Republic)
Jan 08 – Mar 09
EU NAVFOR ATALANTA
(Coast of Somalia)
Dec 08 –
EUTM Somalia
(Training Mission - Uganda)
Apr 10 – Dec 12
EUSEC RD Congo
(Congo RDC)
Jun 05 –
EUPOL Kinshasa
(Congo RDC)
Apr 05 – Jun 07
EUPOL RD Congo
(Congo RDC)
Jul 07 – 30 Sep 12
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau
Jun 08 – Sep 10
AMIS II Support
(Darfur province, Sudan)
Jul 05 – Dec 07
12
EUPOL-COPPS
(Occupied
Palestinian
Territory)
1 Jan 06 – 30
June 12
EUJUST LEX
(Iraq)
Jul 05 – Jun 12
EUBAM Rafah
(Occupied
Palestinian
Territory)
30 Nov 05 – 30
June 12
AMM
(Aceh province,
Indonesia)
Sept 05 – Dec 06
EUPOL
Afghanistan
(Afghanistan)
15 June 07 –
31 May 13
* as of 01 November
2011

EUROPE CIVILIAN MISSIONS MILITARY MISSIONS
BOSNIA I HERZEGOVINA (BIH)
EUPM
Type: Police mission. EUPM was the first CSDP operation launched
by the EU on 1 January 2003.
Objectives: EUPM seeks to establish effective policing arrangements under
BiH ownership in accordance with best European and
international practice. EUPM aims through mentoring,
monitoring, and advising to establish a sustainable, professional
and multiethnic police service in BiH. For the next six months,
the Mission will continue to support relevant BiH Law
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and the wider criminal justice
system in fighting organised crime and corruption, in enhancing
the interaction between police and prosecutors and in fostering
regional and international cooperation.
Mandate: Launched in January 2003, EUPM’s mandate has been
extended five times and will expire 30 June 2012 when there
will be a handover to the EUSR.
Commitment: Authorized strength: 34 international staff and 48 local staff.
Current strength: 34 international and 48 local staff. Nine EU
Member States and two Third States (Turkey and Switzerland)
contribute to the Mission.
The Mission’s HQ is in Sarajevo. The budget is € 5,250M (until
30 June 2012).
Head of
Mission:
BOSNIA I HERZEGOVINA (BIH)
EUFOR ALTHEA
BG Stefan Feller (DE) is the Head of Mission.
(Peter Sorensen (DK) is the EUSR* in BiH).
Type: Military EU-led operation.
Objectives: To conduct operations in line with its mandate: to support BiH
efforts to maintain the Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), to
provide military technical support, monitoring and advice in
specific areas to strengthen local ownership and capacities of
relevant BiH institutions and support AFBiH capacity - building
and military training.
Mandate: In December 2004, EUFOR took over responsibility to maintain
a safe and secure environment in the BiH from NATO-led
mission SFOR, under chapter 7 of charter of the United Nations.
Commitment: About 1300 troops from 21 EU Member States and 5 Third
Contributing States. They are backed up by over-the-horizon
reserves. EUFOR was successfully reconfigured during 2007
and remains ready to respond to possible security challenges.
The common costs (€19M) are paid through contributions by
Member States to the financial mechanism Athena.
Command: The operation is conducted under Berlin+ arrangements, where
NATO SHAPE is a Operational HQ and DSACEUR Gen Sir
Richard Shirreff (NATO) is appointed as the Operation
Commander.
Major General Bernhard Bair (AT) is the COM EUFOR.
13
GEORGIA
EUMM Georgia
Type: EU Monitoring Mission under CSDP framework.
Objectives: EUMM Georgia is monitoring the implementation of the
ceasefire agreements of 12 August and 8 September 2008,
brokered by the EU following the August 2008 armed conflict
between Russian and Georgia. The Mission was launched on 1
October 2008, with four mandated tasks:
Stabilisation: monitoring and analysing the situation pertaining
to the stabilisation process, centred on full compliance of the
agreements of 12 August and 8 September, 2008.
Normalisation: monitoring and analysing the situation with
regard to governance, rule of law, security, public order as well
as the security of infrastructure and the return of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
Confidence building: contributing to the reduction of tensions
through liaison and facilitation of contacts between parties and
other confidence-building measures.
Information: contributing to informing European Policy making.
Mandate: The mission was launched on 1 October 2008. Mandate has
been extended until 14 September 2012.
Commitment: Authorized strength: 333 international staff. Current strength:
284 international staff, including three Brussels Support
Element and around 110 local staff.
The Mission’s HQ is in Tbilisi with three Regional Field Offices in
Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi. The budget is €23.9 M (until 14
Sept. 2012).
Head of
Mission:
KOSOVO
EULEX KOSOVO
Andrzej Tyszkiewicz (PL) is the Head of Mission.
(Philippe Lefort (FR) is the EUSR* for the South Caucuses and
the crisis in Georgia).
Type: The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is the largest
civilian mission launched under the CSDP.
Objectives: EULEX Kosovo’s mandate is to monitor, mentor and advise local
authorities with regard to police, justice and customs, while
retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of
competence (organized crime, war crimes, inter-ethnic crime,
public order as second security responder, etc.).
Mandate: EULEX KOSOVO was launched on 16 February 2008. Mandate
extended until 14 June 2012.
Commitment: Authorised strength: 1950 internationals. Currently circa 1650
internationals in Kosovo, five Brussels Support Element and
circa 1200 local staff. All EU Member States and five Third
States (Croatia, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and USA)
contribute to the Mission.
The Mission’s HQ is in Pristina. The budget is €75 M (15 Dec
2011 - 14 June 2012).
Head of
Mission:
GLOBAL MEMO
Xavier Bout de Marnhac (FR) is the Head of Mission as of 15
October 2010.
(Samuel Zbogar (SI) is the EUSR and Head of EU Office in
Kosovo.)

AFRICA
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
EUSEC RD Congo
Type: Support mission in the field of Security Sector Reform.
Objectives: Provide advice and assistance for the reform of the Congolese
Armed forces (FARDC). Focus on restructuring and
reconstructing the armed forces.
Commitment: The authorized mission strength is 50. Civilian and military
expertises include defence, security, human resources,
Education and training, logistic, administrative and financial
regulations. The HQ is located in Kinshasa with 3 detachments
deployed in the eastern military regions: Goma, Bukavu and
Lubumbashi.
The mission budget is €16 M since June 2005 plus a further
€12.6 M for 2010-2011.
Mandate: EUSEC RD Congo was launched in June 2005. The mandate of
the mission has been extended yearly until 30 September 2012.
Head of
Mission:
GLOBAL MEMO
SOMALIA
On 8 October 2010, General Antonio MARTINS (PT) was
appointed by the PSC as Head of Mission.
EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation “Atalanta”)
Type: Anti-piracy maritime operation.
First EU maritime operation, conducted in the framework of the
CSDP.
Objectives: In support of UN Security Council Resolutions calling for active
participation in the fight against piracy. The areas of
intervention are the Gulf of Aden and the Indian ocean off the
Somali Coast. The mission includes:
– Protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP)
delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; the
protection of African Union Mission on (AMISOM) shipping;
– Deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and
armed robbery off the Somali coast.;
Protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case
by case basis;
– In addition, ATALANTA shall also contribute to the monitoring
of fishing activities of the coast of Somalia.
Commitment: Initial Operational Capability was reached on 13 December
2008. EU NAVFOR typically consists of 4 to 8 surface combat
vessels, 1 to 2 auxiliary ships and 2 to 4 Maritime Patrol
Aircraft. Including land based personnel EU NAVFOR consists of
around 2,000 military personnel. Annual common costs of the
operation are €8M.
The EU Operational Headquarters is located at Northwood (UK).
Mandate: Launched on 8 December 2008 and initially planned for a
period of 12 months, Op Atalanta has been extended until
December 2014.
Command: Rear Admiral Potts (UK) is the EU Operation Commander.
Capt (N) Manso Revilla (ES) is the Force Commander of
EUNAVFOR (Dec 2012 - )
14
CIVILIAN MISSIONS MILITARY MISSIONS
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
EUPOL RD CONGO (ex- EUPOL Kinshasa)
Type: Police mission with a justice interface.
Objectives: Support the Security Sector Reform in the field of policing and
its interface with the justice system.
Commitment: Authorized strength: 50 international staff. Current strength: 42
international and 19 local staff. Eight EU Member States
contribute to the Mission. Expertises include police, judiciary,
rule of law, human rights and gender balance specialists.
The Mission’s HQ is in Kinshasa and an ‘East antenna’ is
deployed in Goma (North Kivu). The budget is €7.2 M (Oct
2011 - Sept 2012).
Mandate: EUPOL RD Congo builds on EUPOL Kinshasa (2005-2007, the
first EU mission in Africa). Launched on 1 July 2007. Mandate
has been extended, with successive modifications, until 30
September 2012.
Head of
Mission:
SOMALIA
Chief Superintendent Jean-Paul Rikir (BE) is the Head of
Mission.
(The post has been suppressed. Mr Gary Quince was appointed
EUSR for the African Union (AU) on 1 November 2011.)
EUTM Somalia
Type: Military mission to contribute to the training of Somali
Security Forces.
Objectives: Based on the already existing training of the Somali Security
Forces, conducted by the Ugandan Defence Forces (UPDF), the
EU mission compliments the training programmes by providing
specific military training to Somali recruits and appropriate
modular and specialized training for officers and noncommissioned
officers up to and including platoon level. On 28
July 2011, by Council Decision, the mission has received a
re-focused mandate and will concentrate in two six months
training periods on the training of Commanders, specialists and
staff personnel up to company level and, in addition, to conduct
a specific ‘train the trainers programme’ for Somali trainers with
a view to transfer basic training up to platoon level back to
Somalia.
Up to date EUTM Somalia has contributed to the training of
1800 Somali soldiers during the first mandate.
Commitment: Full Operational Capability (FOC) was achieved on 01 May
2010. The Revised Mission Plan was approved by the PSC on
27 September 2011. The amended mission comprises 125
personnel and the estimated financial reference amount for the
common costs of the operation is €4,8M. The training is being
conducted in Bihanga Training Camp in Uganda. The Mission
HQ is situated in Kampala.
Mandate: Launched on 07 April 2010 and initially planned for two 6
months training periods after FOC. On 28 July, by Council
Decision, the amendment and extension of the Council Decision
2010/96/CFSP was authorized and EUTM Somalia will continue
until December 2012.
Command: Colonel Michael BEARY has been appointed EU Mission
Commander with effect from 9 August 2011. The mission
commander exercises the functions of EU Operation
Commander and EU Force Commander.

MIDDLE-EAST ASIA
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
EUPOL COPPS
Type: Police and Rule-of-Law mission.
Objectives: To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective
policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in
accordance with best international standards, in cooperation
with the Community’s institution building programmes as well
as other international efforts in the wider context of Security
Sector including Criminal Justice Reform.
Commitment: Authorized strength: 70 international staff. Current strength: 52
international (most of them police experts, judges and
prosecutors) and 39 local staff. 17 EU Member States and one
Third State (Canada) contributes to the Mission.
The Mission’s HQ is in Ramallah. The budget is €4,75 M (until
30 June 2012).
Mandate: Launched on 1 January 2006 and current mandate runs until
30 June 2012.
Head of
Mission:
IRAQ
EUJUST LEX
Commissioner Henrik Malmquist (SE) is the Head of Mission.
Type: Integrated Rule of Law Mission. EUJUST LEX-Iraq is the
first EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission.
Objectives: Address the needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through
the provision of training for high and mid level officials in senior
management and criminal investigation, as well as through
strategic mentoring and advising. This training shall aim to
improve the capacity, coordination and collaboration of the
different components of the Iraqi criminal justice system.
The training activities and work experience secondments are
taking place in Iraq and in the EU with ethnical and
geographical balance.
Commitment: Authorized strength: 69 international staff in Baghdad, Basra,
Erbil and Brussels. Current strength: Head of Mission plus 46
internationals. 16 EU Member States contribute to the Mission.
The budget is € 27,25M (July 2011 - June 2012).
Mandate: Launched in March 2005. Extended until 30 June 2012.
Head of
Mission:
Mr. László HUSZÁR (HU) is the Head of Mission.
15
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
EU BAM RAFAH
Type: Border Control Assistance and Monitoring mission.
Objectives: To provide a third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point in
order to contribute to the opening of the crossing point and to
build confidence between the Government of Israel and the
Palestinian Authority, in co-operation with the European Union’s
institution building efforts.
Commitment: Authorised strength: 13 internationals. Current strength: Nine
international and eight local staff. Seven EU Member States
contribute to the Mission. The Mission’s HQ is located in
Ashkelon, Israel. The budget is €1 M (until 30 June 2012).
Mandate: Operational phase began on 25 November 2005. Current
Mandate runs until 30 June 2012. Since June 2007, operations
have been suspended but the Mission has maintained its full
operational capability and remained on standby, ready to
re-engage and awaiting a political solution.
Head of
Mission:
AFGHANISTAN
EUPOL Afghanistan
Alain Faugeras (FR) is Head of Mission.
Type: Police Mission with linkages into wider Rule of Law.
Objectives: Support the Afghan Government to move towards a civilian
police system grounded in the rule of law through policy-level
reform of the Ministry of Interior; training and capacity-building
to support Afghan police leadership; development of specialised
civilian policing skills, developing a efficient investigations and
mutual cooperation between police and judiciary.
Commitment: Authorized strength: 400 international staff (mainly police, law
enforcement and justice experts). Current strength: 346
internationals in Afghanistan, four in the Brussels Support
Element and 209 local staff. 23 EU Member States and four
Third States (Canada, Croatia, New Zealand and Norway)
contribute to the Mission. Staff is deployed in Kabul and PRTs).
The Mission’s HQ is in Kabul and it operates in 12 provinces
(located in Provincial Reconstruction Teams. -The budget is
€60.5 M (Aug 2011 - July 2012).
Mandate: Launched on 15 June 2007. Extended until 31 May 2013.
Head of
Mission:
GLOBAL MEMO
MILITARY MISSIONS
CIVILIAN MISSIONS
BG Jukka Savolainen (FI) is Head of Mission.
(Vygaudas Ušackas (LT) is the EUSR* for Afghanistan).
NOTE: European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs) and Personal Representatives* are mentioned for info only: they are not in any chain of command.
Hansjoerg Haber (DE) is the Civilian Operations Commander for all civilian CSDP missions; his Deputy is Gilles Janvier (FR). Heads of Mission exercise
command at operational level.

FORCE POLICY
The Use of Force and EU-led
Military Operations
By Lt Col Neville Galea Roberts (MT), formerly EUMS Operations Directorate.
Lt Col Neville Galea Robers (MT), formerly EUMS Operations Directorate.
The term ‘use of force’ has a number of different
meanings. It refers to the rules under international
law which permit States to resort to the use of
force under certain conditions. It also refers to the use
of force by individual personnel and units of the armed
forces during operations. The link between ‘use of force’
as a conditional concession to States, and ‘use of force’
on operations, is that the former sets important elements
of the legal basis and framework, within which the
boundaries of operational use of force must be kept.
‘Use of force’ is also one distinct area of Operational Law,
which, as a result of the above relationship, is heavily
influenced by the legal basis and mandate.
With the one exception of self-defence, for which a
universal and inherent right exists to take action in an
expeditious way, deliberately planned use of force by
the military normally follows a series of principled
political decisions that allocate and authorise certain
military capabilities to deliver force in a legal manner
across agreed timelines and spatial confines.
Use of Force in Self-defence
The use of force in self-defence is a right which is rooted
in natural law 1 and the development of national law,
1 Natural law or lex naturalis is a code of rules prescribed by nature.
One such natural right, or ius naturale, is the right to self-defence.
The right and notion of self-defence are also encapsulated and
promoted in contrasting works of political philosophy. E.g. Thomas
Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651) and John Locke (An Essay Concerning
the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government, 1689) both
profess the natural right to self-defence, albeit in a different way.
16
with each State providing its citizens, including its service
personnel, precise legal limits to their possibility to
protect themselves, and in some cases, other designated
persons and property. Since the EU has no single, agreed
notion or legal definition of self-defence, any EU concept
on the use of force by the military must be able to
successfully accommodate and reflect the nuances
introduced by the legislation of 27 Member States,
whilst ensuring that adequate and homogenous selfdefence
is deliverable on operations. This is an important
consideration when contemplating and planning Force
Protection, and an issue that Force Commanders and
Component Commanders operating in a multinational
configuration need to be aware of, and to tackle. In
truth, the challenge of reflecting national law in such
matters is somewhat offset by two elements. Firstly, the
fact that, in the context of the military, when a situation
so requires, weapons are routinely available for the
purpose of legitimate self-defence. 2 This should imply
that Member States’ authorisations regarding the scope
for individual self-defence of their armed forces
personnel are not drastically different. 3 This aspect of
‘available capability’ is also important since self-defence
is only achievable to the extent of the means available
to provide it. A second source of mitigation to Member
States’ differentiated legal understandings of selfdefence
is the availability to the Commander of specific
Rules of Engagement (ROE) that may cover the gap
between various national legislations.
Rules of Engagement
For those States whose legal definition of self-defence
is limited, the inclusion of specific ROE allow the
Commander the possibility to activate a common level
of individual and corporate self-defence. However, in
general, the function of ROE is to extend the limits of
use of force beyond the restrictive concept of selfdefence.
Although ROE obviously reflect any potential
needs for lethal or less-than-lethal force, it must be
emphasised that ROE are also created for other, nonlethal
actions, not involving the use of weapons, but
2 In contrast, self-defence in an EU civilian context is far more
difficult to streamline, or approximate, since the ability to defend
is largely conditioned by the legal possibilities to bear, store and
use arms, something which varies considerably from one Member
State to another.
3 In practice, however, some differences persist, especially
concerning the question whether the different legislation of
Member States allows for use of force to protect Mission-essential
property, and foreign colleagues of the same Force and, if so, to
what extent.

that could be perceived as hostile. So ROE are not
synonymous solely with the use of kinetic and deadly
force! Through various formal messages, and based on
a compendium of options which is periodically reviewed,
ROE are requested by an Operation Commander,
authorised by the political strategic level and finally
implemented in their authorised form by subordinate
commanders at the operational and tactical levels.
Political Control of the Use of Force
Besides the broader parameters for the potential use
of force which are preconfigured in the mandate,
political approval of the force that may actually be used
by the armed forces hinges on the ability of an
appointed Commander to justify – often in advance –
his or her concept for the application of force on the
basis of the fundamental principles of necessity,
proportionality and minimum force, as they relate to
specific conditions expected in a particular operation.
This element of the military convincing the politicians,
and vice versa, if appropriately handled, provides
healthy checks and balances. Ultimately, though, ‘force’
must be considered as one possible enabler of
previously-defined national, multinational and/or
organisational political interests, and the threat and use
of such force must correspond to the respective public’s
overall will on such matters.
On a national level, use of force policy
for the military must be consistent
with a State’s obligations under
international law, and is also
conditioned by applicable national
law. Such policy must continuously
reflect any relevant shifts in the
political posture of government,
whilst taking into account any State
consent to be bound by new provisions of
international treaties, customary law interpretations,
decisions of particular courts, and relevant eminent
views.
Within a multinational context, things obviously
become somewhat more complicated in what becomes
an aggregate of national positions. Multinational use
of force policy and plans must therefore accommodate
to a high degree the political wills and legal requirements
of all participating States, whether in coalition, or
acting as an organisation. The limits or bounds of
permissible use of such force therefore require much
crafting and often contain an element or two of
otherwise unwanted compromise. Often, strong
political strategic cohesion, national caveats, and a
sense of shared urgency, can jointly resolve differences
concerning the operational use of force.
EU-led Military Operations
With the widespread increase in foreign deployments
in the post-Cold War 1990s, military forces were
required to adapt and expand their thinking on use of
force to allow for new, and often dynamic, situations.
With the important territorial defence scenario sinking
somewhat into the background, the increased use of
the military in peace support operations and non-
consistant with a
State’s obligations
17
FORCE POLICY
defence taskings, and the strategic tendency to think
in terms of combined and joint frameworks, have
invariably impacted use of force theories and concepts
at all levels. In a sense, the EU did not really fully
experience this shift since ESDP, and now CSDP, military
operations, were born in this environment, and have
consistently been geared towards collective security
activities conducted outside EU territory in a new era. 4
The Council, which authorises the ROE, and the Political
and Security Committee, which provides political
guidance and strategic direction under the authority of
the Council and the High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, are invested
through the Treaty on European Union with the
responsibility to oversee EU-led Military Operations. In
conjunction with the European External Action Service,
they play important roles in defining and directing to
what extent force plays a part.
Since the operationalisation of the ESDP in 2003, the
Use of Force Concept has provided the structure for
formulating operation-specific plans for use of force.
The document, which was last revised during 2009,
must accommodate and reflect the various permutations
available to the EU, including operations having
recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities, and
those of EU Battlegroups. With force still needed as a
top-drawer solution at times, it is
understandable that the Use of Force
Concept remains a key part of the
overall doctrine guiding EU-led
Military Operations.
The EU has launched six military
operations and one military training
mission, and in addition, stood ready
to assist in humanitarian operations in
Libya should UN OCHA request assistance.
Whether it is counter-piracy naval operations off
Somalia, or activities in support of the UN in Sudan,
Chad or elsewhere; throughout each operation, Legal
Advisors (LEGADs) and military planners at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels jointly assess the
requirements for use of force with the intent of ensuring
that each Commander has the necessary authorisations
to fulfil his mission. Although every level tends to
attract a particular focus, a similar pattern prevails with
the cycle completed through the Operation
Commander’s periodic briefings to, and guidance and
questions from, the EU political level, in which such
matters are always accorded their due prominence.
Use of Force in Future EU-led Military
Operations
CSDP is still a fairly new policy. Although it is rather
difficult to accurately predict the nature of the next
CSDP operation, there is no escaping the fact that EU
military forces and their use of force must, in all
instances, remain true to the values of the Union and
the legal requirements of Member States. n
4 The Post-post-Cold War period, which is generally recognised to
have commenced on 11 September 2001.

EUTM SOMALIA
Better Citizens - Humanitarian and
Gender Training EUTM Somalia
By Commandant Garry McKeon (IE), EUTM Somalia.
Commandant Garry McKeon (IE), Visitor, Protocol and Gender
Advisor Officer EUTM Somalia, during instruction on ‘education’.
December is a time when most Europeans gather
with families and loved ones for Christmas
cheer. However, for EUTM Somalia, in Bihanga
Training Camp Uganda, no such opportunity existed. It
was business as usual. For two weeks over the Christmas
period, EUTM Somalia delivered a series of lectures that
covered humanitarian law, human rights law and
gender rights of women, families and children. In
addition to teaching the Somali trainees the skills of
soldering, EUTM Somalia engaged with the Somali
trainees to deliver better citizens for Somalia.
The syllabus covered a wide range of topics listed
underneath:
• To defend the government and all the people of
Somali
• Protect the constitution of Somalia and the
government
• Create a stable society for people to live a normal life
• Establish the Rule of law
Getting started
Interpreters were required to translate this content to
the Somalis. Initially, the interpreters were briefed on
what exactly the message was and to ensure they were
familiar and comfortable with the complexities of the
concepts so that no ambiguities arose during the
instruction to the Somalis. It was essential that in
translation from English to Swahili the lectures were not
diluted or misinterpreted. Once the interpreters were
comfortable with the concepts and the language, the
instructors confident, and no ambiguity of language
existed, the training on this important aspect of good
citizenry commenced. It was heartening to witness the
engagement of the trainees in these important subjects.
The Somali trainees were keen to learn these new
concepts and engage in debate.
18
Background
The lessons started with explaining the history of
Somalia back to the days when the British and Italians
controlled the country, including French Djibouti. It was
interesting to note that some were unaware of where
on the map they actually lived. Each trainee was given
time to see and understand where they had come from.
Factual consideration and explanations were given to
relay the history and how the country had now found
itself embroiled in its current conflict.
Giving context
Thereafter, a comprehensive overview of the history of
humanitarian law was given and followed on with
specifics of what the various laws and conventions
actually stood for. Some time was dedicated to explaining
the Geneva Conventions, Hague Convention and the
United Nations Charter on Universal Declaration on
Human Rights. This was necessary in order to give some
historical context, rather than give too much detail in
conceptual arguments, process and procedures. All
students were made aware that any infringement of
these rights could lead to soldiers - irrespective of
nationality, rank or who actually issued the order - being
interned by the ICC (International Criminal Court).
Pictures were then used to convey what the concepts
were and in the follow up questions, students were able
to relate the message to the picture. Each concept was
then given a scenario from which the students were
asked to effectively determine what the “right thing to
do” was. Certainly, not all answers were completely
right, but within class discussion and after class discussion,
they quickly understood the concept in its basic form.
The Somali constitution was discussed with emphasis
on the 1960 constitution and the most recent TFG
(Transitional Federal Government) 2004 constitution.
Various articles from the constitution were read out,
explained, and again, a questions and answers session
followed. This was to insure, or indeed reassure them,
that what was being discussed was not in a vacuum
and that as representatives of the government they had
a responsibility to the constitution. Interestingly, they
requested a copy of the constitution and one was
supplied in the Somali language to each trainee.
Dealing with fundamentals
Following this, the trainees were given classes on human
rights. The specific focus here was on firstly identifying
what human rights were and identifying the core
principles, regardless of who you were, or from where

you came. Again, the EUTM Instructors crossed referenced
the Universal Rights with those listed in the Somali
constitution to highlight the necessity to understand
them and be able to apply them on their return to Somalia
as trained responsible and professional soldiers. Questions
and answers followed with robust inquiries from the
Somali trainees related to their experiences at home.
Answers were given to their questions within the
framework of the legislation and best practice between
the Law and good governance. Occasionally, a suggestion
of a revenge attack was made, but interestingly the other
trainees of the class would correct the individual. They
would advise that he must follow the rule of law and why
he must follow that same rule, otherwise he could be
considered a common criminal.
EUTM Instructors explored the nature of the lawful order,
and who could give it, and when was an order not a
lawful order. This was quickly understood and appreciated
by the class. They understood that they did not have to
blindly follow an unlawful order and how they could
avoid following an unlawful order. This was further
qualified as to when they could open fire; in defence of
their own lives, comrades life, and what degrees of force
should be used prior to opening fire, for example, weight
of numbers, batons, disperse or ‘we fire’.
Family and loved ones
The trainees were brought through the
various aspects of gender. The focus
was on the rights of women, family
and children. Brief mention was
made to homosexuality which is
an alien concept to them. Mention
was also made to Female Genital
Mutilation. The trainees were informed
of UNR 1325 and 1820 1 give context to post
conflict situations as approved by the International
community. Gender main streaming was also discussed
as a broad inclusive concept to bring society completely
a long the road to recovery. Issues effecting women,
such as domestic violence, was also discussed. Education
was a special topic that was engaged in and appreciated,
but acknowledged as sadly lacking for many Somalis,
both male and female. Examples were given of gender
issues caused by the conflicts in Afghanistan, Sierra
Leone, Liberia and Bosnia.
The subject of the use of child soldiers was discussed at
length. The trainees were unanimous in their contempt
of the use of child soldiers by Al-Shabaab. Their upset
was clear when shown pictures of injured child soldiers.
The empathy they had with these children was tangible,
considering quite a lot of them had young children
themselves and indeed had witnessed a lot of turbulence
1 The first resolution on women, peace and security, Security Council
Resolution 1325 (SCR1325), was unanimously adopted by United
Nations Security Council on 31 October 2000. SCR1325 marked the
first time the Security Council addressed the disproportionate and
unique impact of armed conflict on women; recognized the undervalued
and under-utilized contributions women make to conflict
prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building.
It also stressed the importance of women’s equal and full
participation as active agents in peace and security.
professionalism,
leadership, commitment’
19
EUTM SOMALIA
Col M. Beary, MCdr says farewell to EUTM Somalia trained
soldiers as they return to Mogadishu in November 2011.
in their own lives. They seemed determined that their
children would not be subjected to the same ordeals. In
essence, they wanted their children to grow up in a
carefree society, able to attend school and enjoy the
normalities that most communities around the world
take for granted. Liberal use of graphics, throughout the
presentations, greatly enhanced the learning curve.
Issues regarding the rights of women were interesting
and illuminating. There was a heavy emphasis on the
traditional aspect to the Somali way of life. Many had
difficulty reconciling the modern with what they see as
absolutely normal. Group discussion was encouraged
to understand the concept of freedom to choose, as
opposed to conform. There was consent that women
should be respected and supported to
continue in their education in order to
advance their chance in society 2 .
The module finished with a round
table discussion on all topics
discussed. This proved invaluable
in that it was able to confirm that
the message had been received and
understood in the Somali way. Many
aspects were reinforced such as their professionalism,
leadership, commitment to the TFG, appreciation of the
need to be aware of the various gender issues as apply
within Somali society.
And finally…
In conclusion, an impression that while these students
had experienced the horrors of conflict they had
humanity and empathy in abundance. They wanted to
learn in order to restore their country to a place where
all peoples live in harmony, tolerant of diversity, and
where their children can run, skip and sing on their way
to school. A place that stands proud among the
international community. EUTM Somalia is playing its
part in creating better soldiers and citizens for Somalia.
Certainly a worth while way to spend Christmas. n
2 Security Council of UNSCR 1820 which confronts sexual violence
in conflict and post-conflict situations. Key provisions of the
resolution recognize a direct relationship between the widespread
and/or systematic use of sexual violence as an instrument of
conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security;
commit the Security Council to considering appropriate steps to
end such atrocities and to punish their perpetrators; and request
a report from the Secretary General on situations in which sexual
violence is being widely or systematically employed against
civilians and on strategies for ending the practice

OPERATIONS
Non Combatant Evacuation
Operations”, No Way Out!
By Commander Chris Schrumph and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur STAM, Operations Directorate.
NO way out!
EU Military forces should be capable of conducting
operations derived from five illustrative scenarios.
One of these, “Evacuation operations”, assumes
that a significant number of EU citizens, and possibly
others, are threatened in a country where the local
authorities are no longer able to guarantee their safety
and therefore the EU decides to take action to protect
them. Depending on the threat and level of violence,
these operations could range from the deployment of
combat forces at the high end of the violence spectrum
to benign situations in which there is still
a need for assistance with military
capabilities. The latter operations
are known as “Non- combatant
Evacuation Operations”,
abbreviated as NEO. This article
discusses what this means in
practical terms for the EU and the
EUMS in particular.
Scenario:
Imagine you work for a multinational company
somewhere outside the EU. Alternatively, you might be
married to someone who doesn’t hold EU citizenship
and you have decided to take residence in the country
of your spouse. Or, you might be travelling to a holiday
resort, far away from Europe. What would you do if a
conflict situation develops which might threaten your
personal safety or health?
If this type of situation develops slowly and you are
knowledgeable enough to monitor your home country’s
Cdr Chris Schrumph and Lt Col Arthur Stam, Operations Directorate.
Consular Online
20
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) “Travel Advice”
,which may be warned about the increasing instability
or political turbulence and be able to take action.
Normally, MFAs issue travel advice for each and every
country in the world. This advice could range from
“none”, which means “safe to travel”, to “caution” or
“avoid certain areas” to “leave immediately”. In the
latter case, travel into this country should obviously be
avoided in all circumstances. If you are staying in that
country you are strongly advised to leave as soon as
possible ,if conditions still allow you to do so.
But what happens if this dangerous
situation happened suddenly, such as
a natural disaster like an earthquake
or flood or a military coup? Public
order may have broken down,
infrastructure may be destroyed
and the public health system may
not be accessible to you. So, you are
stranded and you may have no idea how to
leave the country .
In principle, your home country will try to support all
its citizens within its means and capabilities, and
generally EU Member States (MS) would deal with the
evacuation of their citizens unilaterally. But what if
those capabilities are too limited, or not available?
Despite the fact that all EU MS are responsible for the
wellbeing of their citizens, the EU has also made
arrangements to assist in these circumstances. On a
routine basis the Consular Unit of the European
External Action Service (EEAS) Situation Centre
(SITCEN) provides a central focus for all MS’ consular
issues. Besides administering the MS’ travel advice,
the SITCEN aims to monitor the numbers of EU citizens
in each country of interest at regular intervals. This is
mainly done through the “Consular Online” (CoOL )
system, a web-based information exchange hub to
which all interested parties within MS, Brussels or EU
Delegations have access to. However, the means by
which the SITCEN has to help citizens to leave a
country, are limited.
Save haven!
As mentioned above, MS exercising their constitutional
duties are responsible for moving their own citizens to
safety. But at the same time where some MS are
simultaneously trying to organise a rescue mission,
there might be other MS which do not have the
necessary capability in the country to help their citizens.
To better coordinate all those efforts in these

Members of the NEOCC in Valetta, Malta, end of Feb 2011.
circumstances, a number of states took the initiative to
come together to informally coordinate their evacuation
efforts. Nine MS 1 together with the United States of
America, Australia and Canada formed a NEO
Coordination Group (NCG) in 2000. This ad hoc group
ensures that information is shared between them, that
efforts are well coordinated; and if needs be, sets up a
NEO Coordination Centre (NEOCC) if an evacuation of
country is necessary. The EU, with representation from
the SITCEN Consular Affairs unit and the EUMS, are
part of the NCG as observer members
The principle role of the NEOCC is to act as a nonexecutive,
multi-national liaison cell operating through
each nation’s own national chain of command to
coordinate both effort and assets to where they are
most needed during an evacuation. The goal of the
NEOCC is to provide a single focus for shared situational
awareness and coordination among those nations
conducting evacuation operations, in order to increase
the efficiency of the partnering Nation’s assets.
The NEOCC concept has been developed by the NCG,
which meets every 6 months, and is based experience
gained during previous evacuation operations, in
particular from Lebanon in 2006. During this evacuation
the liaison between the different nations was
uncoordinated; many evacuation assets left Lebanon
half empty, without the spare capacity being offered
for use by other nations. In 2010, the NCG developed
a contingency plan for the employment of a NEOCC
which was finalised in December 2010.
Organising rescue from Malta.
The Libya crisis provided the first opportunity to employ
a NEOCC to coordinate a multinational evacuation effort.
Shortly after the Libyan revolution started in mid
February, a large number of states began to consider
organising to evacuate their people from Libya it became
clear that space onboard of aircraft or ships for the
thousands of people to be evacuated was limited. At the
same time there were large numbers of EU citizens
needing to be brought out of Libya. After setting up the
NEOCC the EUMS was invited to support the evacuation
by liaising with the Brussels authorities. From 22 February
to 06 March one action officer from the MAP Branch of
1 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, The
Netherlands and United Kingdom.
21
OPERATIONS
the EUMS was permanently based in the NEOCC in
Valetta. His duties included liaising with the SITCEN and
Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) 2 of the EU
Commission, having up-to-date numbers of EU citizens
available, coordinating EU wide military transport
capabilities via the EU Movement Planning Cell of the
Logistics Directorate of the EUMS, and liaising with
ECHO (Humanitarian Assistance) on the military details.
How did the NEOCC function in practice during the
Libya crisis? The NEOCC working routine is quite simple.
A situation room is created by all or some of the NCG
member at a location outside the conflict. In the case
of the Libya crisis, this was in the British High Commission
at Malta. Regular meetings each day with participation
by all NCG members, liaison personnel from the hosting
nation and also other nations if so requested, provides
an opportunity to exchange information on available
assets and the whereabouts of citizens. This allows a
coordinated plan for the evacuation operations to be
prepared the next day. The real strength of the NEOCC
is proven by the fact that a number of representatives
of the NCG members could have a direct link with the
evacuation ships and aircraft and could provide tasking
information at a very short notice allowing a timely
response to a constantly evolving situation.
The role of the EU liaison officer in the NEOCC was to
coordinate with the EU Movement Planning Cell that
was collocated with the MIC and to represent those EU
Member States that were not represented in the
NEOCC. Through the information provided by MIC and
the SITCEN through the EU MPC, the EUMS liaison
officer was able to provide details on citizens from all
27 MS, thus providing a real added value to the NEOCC.
An internal evaluation by the NCG concluded that the
NEOCC concept has been very successful, mainly
because of its informal status, and will be applied in the
future crisis situations.
The NEOCC coordinated the evacuation by military
means of 4,529 people of 78 different nationalities over
a period of 13 days, utilising ships and aircraft from a
variety of different countries. This was done by 54
evacuation sorties to 13 different locations across
Libya. n
Refugees waiting to be flown out of Djerba.
2 The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), operated by the
European Commission in Brussels, is the operational heart of the
Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. It is available on a
24/7 basis and is staffed by duty officers working on a shift basis.
It gives countries access to the community civil protection platform.
Any country affected by a major disaster – inside or outside the
EU – can launch a request for assistance through the MIC.

TRAINING
Lessons Learned -
Everybody’s Business
By Commander Charlie Robinson and Lieutenant Colonel François-Régis Dabas, Concepts and
Capability Directorate.
Preamble
The EU Member States recent endorsement of the
EU Military Lessons Learned Concept was a
significant step towards improving the
development of Lessons Learned - but, argue
Commander Charlie Robinson and Lieutenant-Colonel
François-Régis Dabas, from the EUMS, there is more to
be done if we are to optimise the potential in this area
and there are many actors who have important roles
to play if this is to be achieved.
Introduction
The recent agreement by all EU Member
States to endorse the EU Military
Lessons Learned (LL) Concept
highlights the increasing
importance being placed on the
need to efficiently capture and
learn from lessons from across the
CSDP spectrum and beyond. The agreement
of the Concept was the culmination of 10 months
work, involving a Food For Thought Paper, informal and
formal workshops (involving both EU and non-EU
participants) and extensive discussion at the EU Military
Committee Working Group level.
The Concept in a nutshell
In broad terms the aim of the
concept is to provide an
overarching LL Concept, the core
of which is a revised process,
which develops and improves the
military contribution to CSDP. In
addition to including a revised LL
process the document covers the
key areas of impact or contribution
that the lessons organisation
should play, highlights the
important principles which
underpin a successful LL
organisation and emphasises the
linkages which the LL process
should have with other related EU
projects.
Drawing on the experience and
knowledge gained from existing
LL structures from Member States
information pushing
22
and other international organisations, the EU Military
LL Concept includes a revised process which seeks to
convert verified lessons observations, through a series
of analysis, endorsement and development action into
fully resolved and implemented lessons learned. The
overall process (outlined in Figure 1) is focused in 4
Phases: Collection and Verification; Analysis;
Development; and Outputs - with each of these
phases linked directly to Lessons Observations,
Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned, which are all
separately defined in the Concept. The revised process
supports the overall aim of shifting the emphasis of
LL as driver for transformation, by proving to be an
informative command tool, fully
integrated into the operational cycle
and providing real benefits to
CSDP activities. There are many
ways to achieve this including
expanding the range of the
collection effort, adopting moves
towards a more ‘information-pushing’
rather than an ‘information-pulling’ system and
lastly conducting the lessons process in parallel with
the planning, conduct and recovery phases of specific
military CSDP operations.
Figure 1: The EU Military LL Process (ELPRO).

Foundations for a successful LL organisation
Whilst at first glance this may sound easy enough to
achieve, the reality is somewhat different and each
phase of the process can be complex and challenging.
It is therefore vital that the overall structure is founded
on some key principles. Included amongst these are
leadership direction, engagement and support;
committed stakeholder involvement and quality
assurance. Each of these issues provides the bedrock of
a successful LL organisation and without them the
structure is doomed to failure. Leadership engagement
offers strategic direction, creates incentives and provides
guidance and support on lesson collection priorities.
Stakeholder commitment is key from all military levels
and we all have role to play in this regard; in order to
guarantee continuous improvement in all that we do,
we all have a responsibility to report shortfalls in
capability. Lastly, whilst the LL structures and organisation
may be fundamentally sound, this will count for nothing
without the input of rational, quality lesson observations
which are based on operational experience and
accompanied by supporting evidence that assists the
downstream analysis and development work.
Lessons Synergies with EU civilian agencies
The unique structures of the EU provides
the perfect backdrop to improve the
lessons understanding and
awareness between the civilian
and military domains and there is
a real opportunity to create a
‘community of interest’ across the
EU to explore potential benefits from
adopting a more collegiate approach to this
issue. In practical terms we have already made some
progress in this regard with the recent Member States
agreement for the introduction both of the CSDP
Lessons & Best Practices Portal - which will allow the
collection, management and development of both
civilian and military lessons observations - and the
Common (civ-mil) Annual Lessons & Best Practices
Report. Both of these initiatives should result in
enhancing civilian-military synergies, streamlining
processes and developing overall capabilities to support
CSDP activities.
Un “système d’armes” pour résoudre les
problèmes
Placé sous l’autorité de l’amiral Bruce Williams, adjoint
au directeur général de l’EMUE, le comité directeur du
retour d’expérience est composé de l’ensemble des
directeurs de l’EMUE, qu’assiste la cellule retour
d’expérience, à la manière d’un secrétariat permanent.
Le comité organise, supervise et soutient la bataille
collective menée par ces officiers de l’EMUE,
sélectionnés pour représenter l’ensemble des domaines
fonctionnels, contre un adversaire insidieux et diffus,
constitué des problèmes variés rencontrés tout au long
des opérations, exercices ou autres activités.
l’efficacité globale
de l’ EMUE’
23
Lt Col François-Régis Dabas, and Cdr Charlie Robinson,
Concepts and Capability Directorate.
TRAINING
Conçu comme un véritable “système d’armes” pour
faire face aux problèmes de toute sorte, trouver leurs
causes, apporter et mettre en oeuvre des solutions
appropriées, le retour d’expérience stratégique est
résolument orienté vers le résultat et la transformation.
Il permet ainsi une amélioration continue, à la fois sur
le plan collectif de l’efficacité des structures
et des processus et sur le plan
individuel de la connaissance, des
compétences et des savoir-faires.
A cet égard, les observations tirées
de la gestion de la crise libyenne,
des opérations civiles et militaires
de la PSDC, ainsi que de l’exercice
CME11 constituent potentiellement une
plus-value considérable pour l’efficacité globale
de l’EMUE.
Ceci est également valable pour les autres acteurs de
la PSDC. En effet, même si ce processus de retour
d’expérience est essentiellement d’origine militaire, il
suscite un intérêt important dans les enceintes civiles,
comme en témoigne la récente étude du Parlement
Européen et le besoin émerge de standardiser ce
processus parmi tous les acteurs civils et militaires de
la PSDC/PESC. Une première étape pourrait ainsi
consister à standardiser le retour d’expérience
stratégique au sein du SEAE. Par ailleurs, le retour
d’expérience stratégique permet aussi de s’approprier
des pratiques vertueuses identifiées par d’autres
organisations, comme l’ONU ou l’OTAN, ou de se
prémunir de problèmes déjà rencontrés par ces
dernières. Il existe donc une opportunité à saisir dans
l’échange d’information, en termes de retour
d’expérience, avec les partenaires stratégiques de l’UE.
En conclusion, processus vertueux et véritable outil de
commandement, le retour d’expérience stratégique
comble désormais le vide laissé entre la théorie (les
concepts) et la pratique (les opérations) par les
changements réguliers de l’environnement
stratégique. n

CONTENTS
2 Lt Gen T. van Osch
4 Organization
Chart
5 Deconflict, Coordinate,
Cooperate and Synchronise
Comprehensive Operations
Planning
By Lieutenant Colonel Dave Goulding
and Lieutenant Colonel René
Renucci, Concepts and Capability
Directorate
8 Common challenges for the
Armed Forces of the
European Union Member
States - reflections on the
state of play and on the way
ahead
By General Håkan Syrén, Chairman of
the European Union Military
Committee (CEUMC)
10 The EU Military Staff from a
Civilian Perspective
By Mr. Adam Gutkind, Administrative
Assistant, Executive Office
12 Global Memo
16 The Use of Force and EU-led
Military Operations
By Lieutenant Colonel Neville Galea
Roberts (MT), formerly EUMS
Operations Directorate
18 Better Citizens -
Humanitarian and Gender
Training EUTM Somalia
By Commandant Garry McKeon (IE),
EUTM Somalia
20 Non combatant Evacuation
Operations”, No Way Out!
By Commander Chris Schrumph and
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur STAM,
Operations Directorate
22 Lessons Learned -
Everybody’s Business
By Commander Charlie Robinson and
Lieutenant Colonel François-Régis
Dabas, Concepts and Capability
Directorate
Impetus is a Newsletter published by the EU Military Staff
Contact: Lt Col Des Doyle
PR/PI Officer, EUMS
Tel: +32-2-281-5242
Fax: +32-2-281-7493
E-mail: desmond.doyle@eeas.europa.eu
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eums
IN BRIEF
‘EUMS ‘Meet and Greet’, 27 February 2012
EUMS ‘Autumn Dinner’, 07 October 2011, Club Prince Albert, Brussels
‘Who we are, What we do’
EUROFOR EU Battle Group ‘Air Assets Capability’
Visitors Address:
Av. De Cortenbergh 150
B-1040 Brussels
Belgium
Postal Address:
Rue de la Loi 175
B-1048 Brussels
Belgium
Lt Gen T. van Osch
(NL), Director General
of the EUMS, presents
Cdr Philip Sparke (UK)
with the EUMS ‘Letter
of Appreciation’.
From L to R. Mrs. Aline
Guilbaud (FR), Lt Col Jean-
Philippe Guilbaud (FR), Lt Col
Piers Noble (UK), Mrs. Pippa
Noble (UK), Maj Mautits
Wygman (NL, ‘standing’) and
Col Philippe Guidi (FR).
Lt Gen T. van Osch
(NL) with EUMS and
TV production
(Commission)
personnel in the EU
Situation Room
during the filming of
a short video on
‘Who we are, What
we do’.
EUROFOR EU Battle Group,
commanded by Maj Gen José
Alberto Martins Ferreira (PT), stood
down from its stand by period on
the 31 December 2011.
All rights reserved.
Edition/Creation
Composiciones Rali, S.A.
All information is accurate at time of going to press/publication