The Essential Rothbard - Ludwig von Mises Institute

The Essential Rothbard 75
The suggestion is chimerical; structural reasons militate against
it. As Black rightly notes,
it is illogical to have the State itself—through its Supreme
Court—be recognized as the final and sole judge of its own
(State) actions. . . . [John C.] Calhoun saw the problem with
beautiful clarity. 203
Black refuses to abandon judicial review, even though he
acknowledges that “he puts his faith in ‘something of a miracle’ of
government being judge of its own cause,” because he cannot
accept the obvious alternative.
But, says, Black, what is the alternative? The Calhoun alternative
. . . was nullification, interposition, movements toward
unanimity principles, etc., but Black instantly . . . rejects this
sort of route as leading to an anarchic negation of the
national government itself. 204
To Rothbard, the horrible outcome that Black fears is precisely
what we need. He concludes with an important statement of his
view of the Constitution:
the Constitution, regarded as an attempt to limit government,
was one of the most noble attempts . . . at curbing the
State in human history—but . . . it has failed, and failed
almost ignominiously. One reason for such failure, as Calhoun
predicted, is the monopoly Supreme Court. 205
In his unpublished reports, Rothbard of course did not neglect
his principal academic specialty. He acutely criticized mainstream
work in economics and economic history. Although James
Buchanan approached advocacy of the free market more closely
than most economists, Rothbard could not accept his methodology.
It was based on unrealistic assumptions; and Rothbard deftly
exposes a central weakness.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.