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INFOSCAN
The implication is
that the captain is
conscious and capable
of communicating,
but speaking or
acting irrationally,
endangering
the flight.
as ‘far more intelligent than the procedures.’
Pilots are considered ‘better’ than the procedure
because they have a certain amount of
autonomy in their decisions, especially in case
of abnormal situations and emergencies (even
if, in some airlines, they have to justify that
decision afterwards).”
How far the experience and expertise of a pilot
should be allowed free exercise is a question
that seems to have no absolute answer, because
there is no way to take account in advance of
the pilot’s ability to fully know and understand
the situation, the pilot’s state of mind, the pilot’s
judgment abilities, the time pressure, and other
variables. “There have been long discussions
in many airlines and in international committees
to decide if the first officer should take a
decision/action in contradiction to the captain,”
such as calling for a rejected takeoff or taking
control of the aircraft, Pélegrin says.
Organizations are caught between encouraging
individual responsibility and defining
its limits. “If an airline promotes the idea that
everyone should be engaged in safety, then there
should be consistent policies (including training,
procedures and practices),” Pélegrin says.
“For example, you cannot promote the idea that
everyone must play a role in safety and not allow
them to act in safety situations.”
But when an organization orders a pilot to
take extraordinary action under some circumstances,
the long arm of the law reaches
into the cockpit. Pélegrin says, “The Indian
aviation authority has established a new rule:
the copilot needs to shout two warnings to the
commander if the aircraft is in danger during
its approach to the runway. If the commander
doesn’t listen, then the copilot has to
take charge of all operational functions. The
circular 2 noted the new actions would happen
‘only in case of total or subtle incapacitation’ of
the commander and also ‘those actions must
be inducted from about 500 ft.’”
It would be hard to find a better example of
trying to have it both ways, mixing judgment
and initiative with proceduralization.
There have been too many accidents in
which the captain appeared to have lost situational
awareness and the first officer failed to
compensate. Such accidents continue (ASW,
3/13, p. 16). But consider the copilot’s dilemma,
despite acting under a rule that intends to make
his or her position clear.
According to the author’s description, the
rule applies only on approach. What if the
wrong heading has been entered for the initial
climb, a mountain ridge lies ahead, the TAWS is
warning of the collision course with terrain and
the captain appears oblivious to the risk. Is the
copilot authorized to take charge?
But that is only the first decision the copilot
must make. He or she is to shout two warnings
to the captain. How should they be phrased,
what balance struck between respect for the
captain’s rank and the second-in-command’s
assumed right to avoid an impending accident?
How much time needs to be granted for the
captain’s response?
First, the rule says that “if the captain
doesn’t listen,” the copilot must take charge.
That is unambiguous. But the rule also says
the action is to happen “only in case of total
or subtle incapacitation.” Total incapacitation,
likewise, is clear and hardly needs to be embedded
in regulation — any copilot in his proper
mind would take over if the captain were
suffering a medical emergency and completely
unable to continue command.
What is subtle incapacitation? The implication
is that the captain is conscious and capable
of communicating, but speaking or acting
irrationally, endangering the flight. To put it
paradoxically, how overt must “subtle” be? This
theme was central to the classic novel of World
War II, The Caine Mutiny, in which the ship’s
officers had to decide what to do about the
behavior of Capt. Queeg, a crackpot whose eccentricities
might or might not have exceeded a
captain’s authority.
And what is the copilot to make of “these actions
must [emphasis added] be inducted from
about 500 ft”?
50 | FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | AEROSAFETYWORLD | MAY 2013