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Cost Benefit Analysis of Washington-Richmond High-Speed Rail

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<strong>Cost</strong> <strong>Benefit</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Washington</strong>-<strong>Richmond</strong> <strong>High</strong>-<strong>Speed</strong> <strong>Rail</strong> Spring 2010<br />

38<br />

• The <strong>Rail</strong> Enhancement Fund - $25 million in annual funding;<br />

• Capital Project Bonds (CPB) - $113 million in capital project bond proceeds; and<br />

• 2007 Acts <strong>of</strong> the Assembly General Fund Appropriations - $65 million for specific I-95 corridor<br />

projects. 42<br />

In Florida, during the initial attempt in the 1990s to build HSR between Tampa and Miami, $70 million<br />

were appropriated annually for a similar rail investment fund, which was set up to support an<br />

infrastructure bond equal to $2.146 billion dollars. 43 It is assumed that, in a similar fashion, Virginia<br />

could use the dedicated annual $12.9 million in CPB funds, and $25 million annual REF to float a<br />

construction bond equal to $1.2 billion dollars, which is enough to cover the 70% match 44 . In California,<br />

debt service costs followed the market interest rates for major infrastructure projects <strong>of</strong> 7.5% annually<br />

to service a bond that covers a total build scenario for HSR infrastructure improvements for the entire<br />

Los Angeles-San Francisco corridor. 45 Both <strong>of</strong> these figures were used to estimate total construction<br />

cost debt incurred and debt service costs on a yearly basis for the length <strong>of</strong> the D.C.-<strong>Richmond</strong> project<br />

assuming limited federal support. These costs were separated out from the mandatory 30% contribution<br />

<strong>of</strong> public and private partners (VRE, Amtrak, CSX, the federal government, and local jurisdictions), which<br />

is required by the Commonwealth <strong>of</strong> Virginia to qualify for use <strong>of</strong> its REF and CPB funds. No further<br />

analysis was conducted to estimate the likely breakdown <strong>of</strong> contributions on the part <strong>of</strong> individual<br />

agencies within this consortium; however, it was included in a lump sum in a separate column in the<br />

infrastructure costs table.<br />

42<br />

Virginia Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>Rail</strong> and Public Transportation, “Virginia Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>Rail</strong> and Public Transit, Statewide<br />

<strong>Rail</strong> Plan Technical Update,” 8-4 - 8-8<br />

43<br />

Anthony Pearl, New Departures: Rethinking <strong>Rail</strong> Passenger Policy in the Twenty-First Century (Lexington, KY: The<br />

University Press <strong>of</strong> Kentucky, 2002), 71<br />

44<br />

Virginia Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>Rail</strong> and Public Transportation, “Virginia Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>Rail</strong> and Public Transit, Statewide<br />

<strong>Rail</strong> Plan Technical Update,” 8-1 - 8-4<br />

45<br />

Levinson et al., “The Full <strong>Cost</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>High</strong>-<strong>Speed</strong> <strong>Rail</strong> : An Engineering Approach.,” 194.

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