Why are Mexican mayors getting killed by traffickers? The dynamics ...

3.2 Corruption supply: Prosecuting, ignoring or protecting
Definition 3: A decides between rejecting b and prosecute N (e ≥ 0), and accepting b and
protect N (e ≤ 0).
Politicians decide how much they will enforce law given their capacity constraints. Law can
be enforced against traffickers (i.e. prosecute) or in favor of them (i.e. protect). Politicians
can also decide not to enforce (i.e. ignore). No enforcement means traffickers won’t be actively
hunted; a de facto equivalent to decriminalization. Not enforcing is less compromising than any
other option but gives fewer profits for politicians.
The capacity to enforce of the state is a double-edge knife for traffickers. A strong government
is an exceptional criminal protector but also, a threatening institution. A certain level of
government strength is beneficial for traffickers because it allows corruption to be efficient by
securing that bribes will indeed buy what they are meant to buy: impunity.
A very weak state may be entirely willing to contribute to traffickers’ wellness, but may be
de facto unable to deliver what traffickers require. Securing say, an oligopolistic market for a
DTO by prohibiting other organizations to sell or cross drugs in an area, requires at the very
least a government able to crush potential competitors and identify which members belong to
each DTO. Tijuana local police, for example, famous during the 90s for protecting the Arellano
Felix DTO, regularly beat up local gang members who were trying to become small drug traders
in Mr. Arellano territory. Policemen were effectively protecting the oligopolistic benefits that
Mr. Arellano’s bribes had paid for (Proceso 1995). If Tijuana government would have been
unable to track and hunt gang members, Mr. Arellano would have found it completely useless
to bribe them and would have to take care of the cumbersome task of protecting his territory
himself.
The ability of the state to enforce along all its territory and levels is also beneficial for organized
crime; such state keeps the price of bribing under control and ensures that agreements will
bind. Bribing such state may indeed be expensive but it will never be as expensive as bribing a
fractionalized state. When bribing one fraction of the state does not ensure that the agreement
will bind in all the territory (as would be the case during a civil war), more bribes are needed 4 .
In short, a strong state with ability to enforce and vertical control over its bureaucracy will
ensure that traffickers bribe only one actor, keeping the price of bribes under certain affordable
limits. If instead, several agents have legitimacy over one single territory, drug trafficking organization
may need to spend more money to get the impunity and monopoly that they need
4 Note that keeping bargaining power fixed, more bribes do not necessarily mean fewer profits for traffickers
(e.g. a same bribe may be divided among two bribees) but it does mean that trafficker’s profits will not be more
than with a single actor.
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