Why are Mexican mayors getting killed by traffickers? The dynamics ...

Current academic literature understands the relationship between criminals and government
as an evolutionary phenomenon. Criminals have as one of their main interests to control the
state in order to facilitate the conduction of their illegal business. Yet, in its first stages, when
crime is less pervasive, profitable and organized, controlling the state is impossible for DTOs.
It is only when DTOs “evolve” and become more powerful, that they are able to impose their
will into a relatively weaker state (Baylor and Godson 2001, pg 14-15). At the peak of their
evolution, criminal organizations become parallel states (Bunker and Sullivan 2010) and supply
services –such as protection– that the state is not able to provide. In short, literature argues
that traffickers demand corruption only when they are not powerful enough as to become the
government themselves.
This understanding of the political/criminal nexus however has failed to take in consideration
many other reasons why, I argue, even a highly powerful DTO may prefer to have a state
(rather than being the state themselves). A state benefits traffickers as it ensures larger and
cheaper trade.
A legitimate state is useful for traffickers as it (a) provides a platform of legal trade that
is used by traffickers to smuggle their products, and (b) a series of public goods and positive
externalities, such as a structure of law enforcement and infrastructure that traffickers can use
for their own advantage. A state is required for the survival of any type of business, illegal ones
included. Ironically, even criminals need politicians.
First, having a legitimate state secures an stable amount of commercial transactions and
trade. Legal trade facilitates illegal trade because a large share of illegal products cross borders
camouflaged as legal cargo. Actually, increments in US-Mexico trade during the late nineties
as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) proved to be a blessing
for Mexican DTOs. If Mexico became the main illegal-drug exporter into the US is precisely
because the country became an increasingly important commercial partner for the US 2 . Drug
lords love trade, and traders love governments. The circle is closed.
Furthermore, as trade increases, the burden of inspection increases exponentially. About 40
percent of all trade between Mexico and the US crosses via Nuevo Laredo, a small city at the
border of Texas (INEGI 2005), that is thousands of trucks per day. Mexican migration officers
2 During the nineties, Mexican DTOs were well aware of the value that Mexico would acquire if NAFTA was
signed. They saw the trade bonanza approaching. As soon as the trade agreement was signed in 1994, some of
them hired migration experts to advice them on which were the best type of cargo for introducing their products
into the US (Blancornelas 2001). Advisors were necessary because for health and other considerations, some
cargos were going to be (and currently are) inspected less carefully than others (e.g. perishable goods cross the
border faster than say, electronics). Knowing the probability of inspection in advance was a de facto reduction
in transportation costs for DTOs.
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