Why are Mexican mayors getting killed by traffickers? The dynamics ...

iefcase full of money. He rejected it because he knew that under the strong competition that
the municipality faced, any deal done with a DTO will immediately put him in danger to be
killed by the other. The only viable solution for mayors ruling in competitive municipalities is
to reject bribes at all and not enforce. Enforcing is twice as dangerous when two enemies are
being fought.
The mayors of Durango, a state where seven mayors have been killed since 2004 –three on
row at the municipality of Otaez–, have been very explicit about their approach to corruption.
First, “pretend to be stupid” claimed one of them (XX-confidential). Second, never enforce
“Nooo!” said the mayor of Santiago when asked whether he prosecuted traffickers, “I never
bother anybody. My police do not prosecute drug traffickers, they only arrests boozers and
petty thieves.” Third, better avoid becoming a mayor. “This job of being a mayor is not recommendable
anymore” concluded the mayor of Guacevi. The advice, given by the Mayor of
Poanas, to those that already have the job was “to trust in God.”
Note that assassinations will only happen when mayors get trapped into a bad equilibrium.
When they took office competition was not in place, which allowed them to made explicit arrangements
with one DTO. Later though, competition started and they were unable to either
break the agreement that they had, or made a new one with the new DTO. The only chance to
remain alive in such case is to run away, but even that is difficult given that traffickers can still
take revenge with whoever remains in town (i.e. family, friends). In the words of the mayor of
Pueblo Nuevo: “if I leave now, they [drug traffickers] will think that I’m guilty.”
With competition the value of killing as a sign of power increases. Killing is a way to generate
a reputation. Reputation double pays in competitive environments because it not only
reduces the price of bribes but, deters potential competitors. At least 2 of the 20 cases studied
here are explained as signaling cases. The mayor of Mezquital was killed, an intelligence report
(XX-confidential) claim, as a threat to the governor of Durango; the mayor and the governor
were very close friends.
Insight 3b: Changes in Mexico’s illegal-drug industry (i.e. DTOs becoming more competitive)
increased the price of bribes, and made killing more valuable as a signal.
To summarize, this section has presented the results of a case by case study of assassinated
mayors. I showed that, unlike silver-or-lead narrative would predict, political violence does
not necessarily increase as traffickers become more powerful. Mayors are getting killed now
because (a) decentralization open a new sub-national corruption market, and (b) recent market
competition between DTOs made bribes get higher, and increased the value of killing as a signal.
24