Why are Mexican mayors getting killed by traffickers? The dynamics ...

not receive illegal profits (b=0), and there are no killings (k=0). This would only be the case if
he places a lot of value into virtue and has the force to control traffickers’ violence. Under this
circumstance, there will be not illegal profits because trafficking would be controlled. It won’t
be worth for traffickers to go into illegal business because the state is too powerful and virtuous.
Result 5: When M > 0, k = 0 if and only if b = M is a viable equilibrium;“Silver and
no-lead”
If organized crime is in business, political violence will only be absent (k = 0) if the corrupt
state is powerful enough as to take all of the illegal profits for itself. Recall that traffickers always
have an incentive to kill either to (a) reduce the price of bribes, or (b) keep their reputation.
Killing thus will only be zero in the very extreme case that traffickers are unable to kill. This
is not easy given than even weak traffickers may get lucky at times. Only a very powerful state
will be able to have a peaceful drug market yet, this requires the state to be strong enough as
to extort criminals. Such strong state can decide between eradicating crime at all, or take all
illegal profits for itself. This is the case of a potentially extortionist state (i.e. b=M is a viable
equilibrium)
Results 4 and 5 have important implications for the quality of politicians. When running for
office, politicians know that if trafficking is in place is because either there has been a corruption
agreement (b > 0), or because politicians are too scared to (fully) enforce against crime (result
4).
Result 6: When M > 0, only corrupt A’s will take office, unless b = M is a viable equilibrium;
“To be completely virtuous, one need to be able to be completely corrupt”
Those politicians who take office at corrupted places know they will be bribed because otherwise
they will be killed. Because of result 6, we know that the only chance for political violence
to be absent, given that traffic is present, is to have a very powerful state. Rational politicians
deny running for office if they have a positive probability to be killed 5 . Weak politicians who
decide to enforce have a positive probability to be killed. Thus, we will only have non-corrupt
candidates if the incumbent is powerful enough as to be completely corrupt. Quiet drug markets,
like the US, require politicians to be potential extortionists 6 .
5 The rationality of politicians may be debatable as it may be affected by the value that they put into virtue.
A very virtuous politician could be argued, will take office even if it is to be a martyr. I do not discard this
possibility but find it improbable given that, if the ultimate motivation of a virtuous politician is to reduce
crime, his assassinated will not put him any closer to achieve his goal. Nobody can change the world from the
grave. Martyrs though may still give their live for a uncertain, further ulterior purpose. A politician may think
that even if killed, his assassination will generate international attention and a increase in retaliation against
crime.
6 Enforcement by a weak politician is only possible if such enforcement does not really hurt traffickers, at
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