Asia's Arc of Advantage - icrier

decade will be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic,
and otherwise – in this region.” 67 The US entry into the EAS in 2011 was part of the overall US
pivot towards Asia. The inclusion of the US in the EAS was a response to the growing demand
from the region and was an attempt to create a stable regional architecture. Therefore, it should
not come as a surprise that the US, a year after becoming a member of the EAS, termed the
East Asia Summit the “premier institution for political and strategic issues, the capstone of an
increasingly mature and effective regional architecture.” 68
With the US having already stated in 2010 that freedom of navigation and respect for international
law in South China Sea are a “national interest,” 69 the agenda of maritime security no longer
appeared as a non-traditional security item for discussion at the EAS in 2011. Senior Chinese
officials categorically stated that the South China Sea would not be an issue for discussion at the
East Asian Summit. However, the East Asia Summit in 2012 became the occasion for Chinese
aggressive diplomatic manoeuvres on South China Sea issues.
President Barack Obama’s visit to the East Asia Summit in 2012, immediately after his re-election,
the institutionalisation of the US-ASEAN Leaders Meeting as an Annual Summit, the elevation
of the US-ASEAN partnership to a strategic level, and the launch of the US-ASEAN Expanded
Economic Engagement (E3) 70 demonstrated a new US commitment to the region. However,
in spite of the US presence, ASEAN cohesion came under severe stress at the 2012 Summit, as
China pushed host Cambodia to break ranks with fellow ASEAN countries on South China
Sea issues. Reportedly at the behest of China, Cambodia sought to issue a declaration that
ASEAN countries had agreed not to internationalise the South China Sea maritime dispute.
This naturally prompted a sharp response from some of the ASEAN countries such as Indonesia
and the Philippines. The fact that China sought to arm-twist ASEAN member countries even
in the presence of the leaders of the US, Australia and India prompted many to contemplate
the possible consequences of a major power imbalance for the countries in the region in the
absence of regional frameworks such as the East Asia Summit. 71
67 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, available at http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.
68 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Intervention at East Asia Summit,” Remarks by Secretary of State, Department
of State, United States of America, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, July 12, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2012/07/194988.htm.
69 Ben Dolven, Shirley A. Kan, Mark E. Manyin, “Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2013, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42930.pdf.
70 “Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting,” The White House, November 19, 2012, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/19/fact-sheet-us-asean-leaders-meeting.
71 Ernest Z. Bower, “The ASEAN and East Asia Summits: U.S. Walks Softly While China Wields a Big Stick,”
CSIS, November 21, 2012, available at http://csis.org/publication/asean-and-east-asia-summits-us-walkssoftly-while-china-wields-big-stick.
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