Asia's Arc of Advantage - icrier

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V. Security Issues Since 2010, China’s rising power and influence in East Asia, which has been accompanied by its growing assertiveness over “core interests”, have raised alarm bells among its Asian neighbours from Japan to Southeast Asia. As a result, the US “pivot” or “rebalance” towards the Asia-Pacific has been largely welcomed across the region, except of course by China, which sees this as an attempt to contain China’s rise. The escalation of tensions over maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea witnessed the collapse of ASEAN cohesion in 2012, raising the possibility of wider strategic destabilisation. The prized notion of “ASEAN centrality” in maintaining regional security was severely jolted, helping China to stall multilateral initiatives. The 22 nd ASEAN Summit chaired by Brunei on April 24-25, 2013, has allowed ASEAN to regroup behind a decision to “work actively with China on the way forward for the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea on the basis of consensus.” 24 Historically uncomfortable with great power rivalry, ASEAN would prefer to sustain its centrality and unity while benefiting from both the reassurance of the US military presence and economic interdependence with China. However, ASEAN’s cohesion is bound to be tested through 2013, and with it, the prospects for its central role in regional architecture building. Chart 3: Defence Spending Budgets Under Various Assumptions Source: The Economist, "Military Might," April 15, 2013* 24 “Chairman’s Statement of the 22nd ASEAN Summit, ‘Our People, Our Future Together’,” ASEAN Secretariat, April 25, 2013, available at http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/chairmansstatement-of-the-22nd-asean-summit-our-people-our-future-together. * available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2013/04/daily-chart-9 28 | Asia’s Arc of Advantage
Indonesia, the largest and most powerful ASEAN state, has strongly championed a “dynamic equilibrium” in which all EAS countries have an equal stake in building regional trust and norms through overlapping institutions like the EAS, the ADMM+8 dialogue and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF). Jakarta has also propagated a new EAS-wide set of legally binding principles to manage regional tensions based on the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) and the Bali Principles adopted during the Indonesian presidency of ASEAN in 2011. Holding China to the process of the 2002 Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea by concluding a binding Code of Conduct is seen by Indonesia as a central element of its ASEAN policy. 25 This brings us to China’s impact on regional security. As Asia’s most consequential power, China is today increasingly self-confident and assertive as it looks to shape the regional and international order to serve its interests. After two decades of double-digit growth in defence spending, well ahead of its high GDP growth rates, former Chinese President Hu Jintao declared to the CPC Congress on November 8, 2012, that China would resolutely build “strong national defence and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing.” 26 He also signalled a shift in focus towards asserting “core national interests” across the maritime domain, from naval power to economic rights and territorial claims. 27 China’s new President, Xi Jinping, has enunciated the “dream of a strong nation and a strong military” by 2049. 28 He has also signalled a “core interests”-based foreign policy on which there could be no compromise: “We will stick to the road of peaceful development, but absolutely will not abandon our legitimate rights and interests, and absolutely cannot sacrifice core national interests.” 29 This has implications not only for territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, but also for India’s own boundary dispute with China, which Xi has candidly admitted will not be easy to solve. On the one hand, China is seeking to redefine its relationship with the United States as one between equal “great powers” (or a “new type of great power relationship” 30 ), to the exclusion of other regional powers; on the other, it discourages countries with territorial disputes with China from drawing strength from their US alliances or the US presence in Asia as a resident 25 Gregory Poling, “Dynamic Equilibrium: Indonesia’s Blueprint for a 21st Century Asia-Pacific,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 8, 2013, available at http://csis.org/publication/dynamicequilibrium-indonesias-blueprint-21st-century-asia-pacific. 26 Edward Wong, “China’s Communist Party Chief Acts to Bolster Military,” The New York Times, December 14, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/asia/chinas-xi-jinping-acts-to-bolstermilitary.html?_r=0 . Also see Kathrin Hille, “Hu calls for China to be ‘Maritime Power’” The Financial Times, 08 November 8, 2012, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ebd9b4ae-296f-11e2-a604-00144feabdc0. html#axzz2Kezpv9C2. 27 Ibid. 28 Jeremy Page, “For Xi, a ‘China Dream’ of Military Power,” The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324128504578348774040546346.html. 29 Ibid. 30 Jane Perlez, “Chinese President to Seek New Relationship With US in Talks,” The New York Times, May 28, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/world/asia/china-to-seek-more-equal-footing-withus-in-talks.html?pagewanted=all. India’s Role in Shaping Asian Architecture | 29
Page 1: A REPORT OF THE ICRIER WADHWANI CHA
Page 4 and 5: ICRIER Wadhwani Programme of Resear
Page 6 and 7: VI.i “Connecting East : The Myanm
Page 8 and 9: The ICRIER Wadhwani Chair is please
Page 10 and 11: vi | Asia’s Arc of Advantage
Page 12 and 13: space, even though some would argue
Page 14 and 15: Recommendations The “Emerging Asi
Page 16 and 17: • Based on their regional experie
Page 18 and 19: List of Maps Map 1: The Indo-Pacifi
Page 20 and 21: ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting ASSM ASEAN
Page 22 and 23: TPP TTR UNCLOS UNCTAD US USPACOM US
Page 24 and 25: Indian side and 10 on the ASEAN sid
Page 26 and 27: I.ii Advancing India-US-ASEAN Co-op
Page 28 and 29: Maritime Security and HADR Given th
Page 30 and 31: I.iii India’s ‘Look East’ and
Page 32 and 33: Concrete Next Steps Under instructi
Page 34 and 35: easons. The lack of historical bagg
Page 36 and 37: 17. Prof. G.V.C. Naidu, Professor a
Page 38 and 39: II INDIA’S ROLE IN SHAPING ASIAN
Page 40 and 41: “strategic bet” 3 on the develo
Page 42 and 43: tendency to cite ‘strategic auton
Page 44 and 45: However, these declarations of inte
Page 46 and 47: Chart 1: Average Increase in Percen
Page 48 and 49: Table 1: GDP Projections of Seven L
Page 52 and 53: power. It also holds that within As
Page 54 and 55: Secretary Kerry’s visit to China
Page 56 and 57: institution for political and strat
Page 58 and 59: Reconnecting to Southeast Asia The
Page 60 and 61: global Cold War issues. When the AS
Page 62 and 63: co-operation. Although the pace of
Page 64 and 65: While the theoretical debate on the
Page 66 and 67: Naval ships from India, Australia,
Page 68 and 69: of communication for unfettered mov
Page 70 and 71: South China Sea are the subject of
Page 72 and 73: Chinese Aircraft Carrier Liaoning S
Page 74 and 75: China Sea issue, only to be publicl
Page 76 and 77: Philippine Navy flag officer-in-com
Page 78 and 79: Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and
Page 80 and 81: Whatever the domestic motivations o
Page 82 and 83: IV. i EAST ASIA SUMMIT MEMBER STATE
Page 84 and 85: Crucially, the numbers incorporated
Page 86 and 87: Chart 6: East Asian Summit Member S
Page 88 and 89: 3500 Chart 10: Air Force Aircraft (
Page 90 and 91: Map 6: APEC Member Economies Table
Page 92 and 93: partner, Japan and Korea responded
Page 94 and 95: Korea were invited to be part of th
Page 96 and 97: decisions that would have regional
Page 98 and 99: a community.” 37 Prime Minister K
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The Second East Asia Summit in Cebu
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political construct. 58 Such robust
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decade will be to lock in a substan
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them to the status of objects, rath
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VI INDIA-ASEAN CONNECTIVITY: A STRA
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China is by far the largest investo
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Map 9: Kaladan Multi-Modal Project
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meeting in September 2012 decided t
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and ASEAN by combining physical con
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mill. 38 It should be noted that in
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South Korean companies are now seek
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US officials have forcefully advoca
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• Support for democratic institut
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Executive Summary and Key Recommend
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with the downsides of greater conne
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• Research collaboration among th
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B. Executive Summary of “ASEAN-In
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under construction and the projects
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Figure 4: Selected Infrastructure P
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3-3. A Regional Framework A regiona
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construction work has just started
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Figure 7: Economic Corridors, 47 De
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WELCOMING India’s consistent supp
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efforts to strengthen cooperation i
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D. Recommendations by ASEAN-US Emin
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and delivered by September 30, 2013
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Socio-Cultural The Leaders should r
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About the Authors and Contributors
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Ted Osius Ted Osius is currently a
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