Asia's Arc of Advantage - icrier

that it is willing to bridge the gap between its potential security role and its current level of
performance.
Enhancing physical connectivity through the land bridge of Myanmar and taking advantage
of economic opportunities in East Asia must be India’s foremost external economic priority
over the next decade. India must also pursue economic reforms and significantly raise its stakes
in regional initiatives such as RCEP (and eventually TPP) if it is to derive the full benefits of
regional trade agreements. Having already lost out on the boom years of the Asian Tigers in the
1980s because of its closed economy, India is once again facing a test of its economic outlook
and national resolve.
Since APEC’s inception, the United States has backed this body’s role as the premier Asia-
Pacific economic forum. In the 1990s, the US was strongly critical of efforts to create an East
Asia Economic Caucus declaring that it would oppose any plan that “drew a line down the
middle of the Pacific and placed the United States on the other side of that line.” 6 It is not
surprising, therefore, that the US initially stayed away from the East Asia Summit process. It
was only in 2012, a year after the US joined the EAS, that it described this forum as a “premier
institution for political and strategic issues, the capstone of an increasingly mature and effective
regional architecture.” 7
The US insistence on dealing with regional issues in East Asia on an Asia-Pacific basis has had
an adverse impact on regional community building. The impression that the United States is
dividing Asia with its TPP focus and going against basic regional economic integration impulses
is unlikely to serve either regional or US interests. The answer is for the US to draw closer to
both the EAS and RCEP processes led by ASEAN.
Unfortunately, this line of thinking has little traction among high-level policymakers in
Washington, even though it is recognised that “Asia’s success is fundamentally linked to ours.” 8
This anomaly extends to the US approach towards India as well. On the one hand, the US
“goal is to help tie Asia-Pacific nations together – from India to the Americas – through strong
alliances, institutions and partnerships.” 9 On the other, India is still left out of discussions
about the Asia-Pacific under APEC. This restricts the congruence of Indian and US policies to
Southeast Asia, where India’s ‘Look East Policy’ and the US ‘rebalance’ meet. Hopefully, the US
will act to realise India’s full economic integration into the Asia-Pacific region – the sooner the
better.
6 US Secretary of State James Baker’s statement, as cited in Claude Barfield, “The United States and East Asian
Regionalism: Competing Paths to Integration,” International Journal of Korean Studies, 2012, Fall, Vol. XVI,
No. 2, p. 158 available at http://www.aei.org/files/2013/01/08/-the-united-states-and-east-asian-regionalismcompeting-paths-to-integration_145424278672.pdf.
7 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Intervention at East Asia Summit,” Remarks by Secretary of State, Department
of State, United States of America, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, July 12, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2012/07/194988.htm
8 Joe Biden, “Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on Asia-Pacific Policy,” address at the George Washington
University, Washington D.C., The White House, July 18, 2013, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/07/18/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-asia-pacific-policy
9 Ibid.
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