Fatigue Management

compared with close to five hours for the Captains and Majors group, nearly
six hours for Lieutenants and Senior NCOs, nearly seven hours for Junior
NCOs, and over eight hours for Privates. The generalisability of these
findings to the Australian Defence Force are of course suspect due to a host of
national and organisational differences. Nonetheless, the findings suggest
potentially important implications for training effectiveness and possibly for
operational effectiveness. Senior-ranking participants are more likely to show
progressive performance degradation as an exercise or operation progresses;
whereas, junior members are more likely to improve their performance over
the duration due to adequate sleep and the benefits of experience.
Nor is it fair to assume that sleep, like pay, is distributed
according to rank. Sometimes middle-rank officers,
majors and lieutenant-colonels, find the burden hardest to
bear. They are no longer in the first flush of youth, the
contrast between peace and war strikes them hard, and the
unremitting pressure of staff work may remind them that
they have become more worriers than warriors.
Richard Holmes
Battle: The Experience of
Modern Combat, 1997
Staff Officers. Staff officers also deserve mention. It is not just commanders
who are prone to fatigue among the officer ranks. Although the modern
battlefield is now capable of continuous operations, including night fighting,
the 24 hour schedule has always been a characteristic of the various
headquarters and their staff. Yet despite this long body of experience, staff
officers are often the worst offenders in terms of ‘self-inflicted' or preventable
fatigue. Just as many young officers learn the importance of proper sleep
hygiene the hard way, for example, by being sent to rest by their platoon
sergeant, many staff officers allow themselves to reach a mental state where
their performance adds no value to the decision processes of the headquarters.
Improper sleep may even adversely impact on operational effectiveness (such
as making errors in targeting coordinates). All officers must learn to balance
the competing priorities and demands placed on them and recognise that
sleep must be given due consideration. Fatigue should never be considered an
inevitable byproduct of operations or a constant of warfare that is excusable
and therefore easily dismissed. Unfortunately, the reality often stands in
stark contrast to this advice. One of the main findings from a review of the
Gulf conflict was that many commanders paid lip service to sleep need during
conventional operations.
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