History of the Ammunition Industrial Base - JMC - U.S. Army

companies in the U.S. with experienced personnel to produce explosives, and the capacity of
smokeless powder production had fallen to only 30 tons a day and TNT was lower at 12 tons a
day. 30 Therefore, a large proportion of Ordnance funding obligated during the latter half of 1940
went to new powder and explosives plants and for plants that loaded, assembled and packed
(LAP) artillery. The OD signed its first contract with Dupont for construction of a smokeless
powder works (Indiana Ordnance Works). Another contract was approved for the construction
of Radford Ordnance Works in Virginia with Hercules Powder Company as the operating
contractor. By December 1940, a full year before Pearl Harbor, 22 new facilities were under
way for shell loading and production of chemicals and explosives. 31
By October 1941 several ammunition complexes were producing ammunition. By the
end of 1941 there was at least one of every essential type of government owned ammunition
plants incorporated into the industrial base to include TNT, DNT, tetryl, toluene, anhydrous
ammonia, smokeless powder, bag loading, and shell loading plants. 32 After Pearl Harbor, an
additional 25 facilities were authorized almost immediately and construction began between
January and August 1942. A total of 112 plants were authorized and 84 were constructed in only
a few years. 33
The need for expansive buildup did not go unquestioned. The Truman Committee of the
Senate and the Tolan Committee of the House of Representatives expressed criticism in 1941.
They thought the building of new plants was needless and the Ordnance Department was failing
to fully utilize existing capability. They viewed Army procurement efforts as “helpless” in
dealing with large corporations who were refusing to convert to wartime production. This
perceived helplessness drove demand for new plant construction. They claimed the Army
wasted building materials, contributed to machine tool shortages, and delayed production. 34 The
committee may have been justified in their arguments; however, they failed to understand that
the new construction would be for a bulk of ammunition commodities that simply could not be
met through procurement efforts. In December 1941, the Under Secretary of War, Robert
Patterson, defended Army proposals and answered the critique by the Senate and the House. 35
The Secretary vigorously defended construction of ordnance facilities and assured the
Committees that the Army had not proceeded with base expansion of new plants except where
necessary. These criticisms were quickly forgotten after the outbreak of war. What appeared to
be over expansion in the fall of 1941, took an appearance of under expansion after Pearl Harbor.
Wartime requirements escalated rapidly and placed strain on all existing ordnance facilities. 36
By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, it took an average of 9-11 months between contract and
first operations when bringing a new capability on line.
Despite the large numbers of plants, attempts at efficiency were being practiced. In
several cases plants turned out more than one product. For example Badger Ordnance Works
(BOW) in Wisconsin was constructed to produce three smokeless powder lines but was revised
30
Hammond, 3.
31 Thomson & Mayo, 110-111.
32 Hammond, 105.
33 Hammond, 3; Thomson & Mayo, 110-113.
34 Thomson & Mayo, 33.
35 Records of the Under Secretary of War. Accessed at: http://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-
aid/military/rg-107-2.html.
36 Thomson & Mayo, 33.
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