History of the Ammunition Industrial Base - JMC - U.S. Army

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management of conventional ammunition for all Services and three Navy ammunition installations were transferred to the Army. Analysis of Ammunition Requirements Versus Industrial Capacity Across Wars WWI U.S. forces were ready for combat within a year after the declaration of WWI, however, they were mostly equipped with munitions obtained from Allies. Because Great Britain could not sustain explosive requirements, the U.S. industry built its explosives, propellants and loading industry up extensively. Prior to U.S. entry into WWI in 1917, only a few privately owned establishments in the U.S. could undertake ammunition production because requirements had been historically fulfilled by Great Britain and France. 78 Ordnance arsenals were operated at maximum capacity and U.S. industry mobilized to establish munition facilities to produce wartime needs. During WWI, 53 powder, explosive and loading plants operated to meet U.S. and Allies requirements. 79 However, for many ammunition items, the full capacity and operation of the plants was never reached before the signing of the Armistice in 1918. The American explosives industry expanded to meet the Interallied Ordnance Agreement to augment explosive and propellant production already being produced in England and France. Prior to entry into the war, the U.S had depended on ammonium picrate or explosive “D” as their primary bursting charge for high explosive shells. America quickly expanded its production complex to manufacture amatol and TNT. In 19 months the U.S. produced 632 million pounds of propellant and 375 million pounds of high explosives. Smokeless powder production capacity rose from 1.5 million pounds a month to a projected capacity of over 1 billion pounds per year, bringing the rate of production seven times above peacetime production rates. Explosives manufacturing increased from 660K pounds a month to over 16 million pound capacity by the end of the war. 80 France and Great Britain accomplished most artillery shell production. When the U.S. entered WWI, stocks on hand accounted for less than a single month‟s supply based on expenditure rates. Capability to produce a complete round were almost non-existent in the U.S. The U.S. had to develop resources to create metallic parts; shells, fuses, boosters, adapters, as well as design and build new plants for artillery shell loading. The artillery industry and loading plants produced more than 17 million rounds of various filled artillery rounds and 38 million unfilled rounds by 1918. The U.S. small caliber ammunition industry‟s ability to meet requirements starting from minimal production rates has been repeated across time. The following chart shows how small caliber ammunition production of machine gun, rifle, pistol, and revolver rounds increased during WWI to almost 4B total rounds of ammunition. 81 78 Ordnance Corp History Vol I, 109. 79 Crowell, 105. 80 Crowell, 105-110. 81 Ibid, 199. 28
Date Rounds 30 Nov 1917 156M 31 Jan 1918 574M 30 Apr 1918 1.3B 31 July 1918 2.3B 30 Sept 1918 2.9B 31 Oct 1918 3.2B 31 Dec 1918 3.94B Grenade production during WWI prompted one of the greatest challenges for the industry. Initial requirements were set at 68 million live rounds and 3 million training rounds. After initial production and fielding, U.S. Soldiers refused to use defensive grenades because the firing mechanisms were too complicated to use rapidly and Soldiers forgot to release the safety device which then gave the Germans an opportunity to launch the rounds back at them. Production was stopped and all items were reworked to new design specifications. Requirements were adjusted to 44 million rounds to be produced by eight industrial firms. Producers reached 21 million rounds when the Armistice was signed. 82 After 1918 most of the WWI statistical data and technical knowledge of requirements gained during the war were lost through disuse and failure to study the records before destruction. This, combined with a lack of technical requirement specialists in the workforce, caused the Ordnance Department to miss the opportunity to build and shape requirement calculations during peacetime before WWII mobilization. It wasn‟t until 1938, that the “Partridge Report” by LTC Clarence E. Partridge and a board of Ordnance officers reported that after analysis of what little data was left over from WWI, “no current battle experience was available,” to base WWII requirements. 83 Historian, James Huston, noted the U.S. "had revealed the greatest war-making capacity that the world had ever seen,” 84 during WWI. At the war's end the United States had an Army of over 3.5 million and huge ordnance surpluses. WWII The U.S entered World War II (WWII) with virtually a non-existent munitions production base. WWI producers had returned to commercial production and the Army had to build a government owned base from scratch. Ordnance leaders describe the time period as “extremely” difficult as they determined production base capacity while WWII ordnance requirements were in constant fluctuation. 85 Since ordnance requirements were established from troop basis figures which rose and fell every few months as the strategic situation changed, planning and implementing the industrial base size and capacity was a complex task throughout WWII. As soon as one computation of requirements was established it was necessary to incorporate changes and to recalculate computations. A war production board official wrote, “It 82 Ibid, 205-206. 83 Thomson & Mayo, 49. 84 “Center of Military History. Mobilization. Accessed at http://www.history.army.mil/documents/mobpam.htm, Section 4. 85 Major N.A. Hamilton, Army Service Force, Office Chief of Ordnance, History of the Powder and Explosives Section (Washington, D.C., October 1945) Appendix II, 5. 29
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Page 75 and 76: Bibliography Bacevich, A.J. The Pen
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