History of the Ammunition Industrial Base - JMC - U.S. Army

first budget supplemental and U.S. Forces were confined within the Pusan Perimeter; he
indicated that they had only asked for extra funding through December 1950 because the war
would be over by then. Defense Department planners cut the Ordnance Department‟s request for
ammunition by $2.4 billion to $374 million. Similar cuts happened with the third supplemental,
formulated in November - December 1950, when the DoD again expected the war to be over by
June 1951. Not until mid-1951 did Congress and DoD realize there were problems with
ammunition production and significantly increased ammunition funding. 55 Due to lead time
issues, this money did not produce significant quantities of ammunition until 1952.
Part of the problem with obtaining ammunition funding was convincing DoD, and even
Army leadership, that all types of rounds needed procurement. The OD had a longer view over
the ammunition situation than the Army and DoD leadership. The OD recognized need for
increased production across all rounds. To accomplish this, the Chief of Ordnance wanted to
create a balanced war reserve in addition to meeting the immediate needs for Soldiers in Korea.
Because of his wider vision, he asked for significantly larger amounts of funding than Army or
DoD was willing to provide. Army and DoD only saw the amount of WWII excess ammunition.
They did not grasp the details of inventory balance by family and weapons type. Not until late
1951 did DoD understand the need for a systemic plan for ammunition production for combat
and replenishment, and this was only after most stock in Europe had been reduced below safety
levels and rounds transferred to Korea. 56
The Korean War also impacted the commercial ammunition industry. Army GOCO LAP
plants required commercially and government produced components. The problems at the
GOCO plants had been partially addressed, but problems were more pronounced in the
commercial base. Unlike in the 1930s, U.S. commercial industry was operating at high capacity
in 1950. Low levels of ammunition production after WWII had forced producers to convert to
commercial consumer goods in order to turn a profit. Any ammunition peculiar plant machinery
had been placed aside, removed, or converted. Personnel had been laid off. Without a
declaration of war in 1950, or any government call for mobilization, industry was not inclined to
turn from profitable commercial production to limited profits in a boom or bust ammunition
industry. 57
The machine tool industry, which had vastly expanded in WWII, collapsed because of
significant over capacity in the late 1940s. After WWII, the OD transferred or sold most of the
ammunition machinery and tools to commercial entities at well below market value. In the late
1940s the machine tool industry consolidated or converted to other production. The OD
collected other machinery to create a National Industrial Plant Reserve. However, as later events
revealed, most of this machinery was worn out. The arsenals had cannibalized the good
equipment and most of what remained could not maintain production. In effect, the government
had dumped supply onto the market and had undercut the very industry most required to restart
the ammunition base. 58
In the 1950s, as the OD began to place orders for machinery or place orders with
commercial entities that required new machinery, the machine tool industry over-committed.
55 Reeder, III-10 to III-15 and V-10.
56 Ibid, II-8 – II-11 and Section III.
57 Reeder, 7.
58 Ibid, Section III.
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