History of the Ammunition Industrial Base - JMC - U.S. Army

Studying the Industrial Base through the 1990s
Numerous studies were conducted throughout the 1990s in attempts to justify increased
ammunition funding and understanding of the shrinking base. During this time period the
industrial base experienced reductions in size. The Soviet threat had diminished and the Army
began transforming to meet new demands for shorter regional contingencies. The strategic
concept began shifting towards providing power projection in a more unpredictable world.
Deterrence, crisis response, forward presence and reconstitution became strategic forerunners.
At the same the Army was working under stricter funding constraints with a smaller force.
GAO continued its interest in the ammunition base and in the mid-90s they completed
two reports. The first assessed the effectiveness of the Single Manager for Conventional
Ammunition. The second assessed DoDs ability to meet peacetime ammunition requirements
and replenish the ammunition stockpile following two major regional conflicts. 150 Both reports
expressed concern with management of the ammunition base. The GAO noted the decrease in
requirements and subsequent decrease in base capabilities. While noting some shortages, GAO
determined that the stockpile and production could meet peacetime requirements and
replenishment based on current requirements. However, GAO also indicated that if response
times were shortened or requirements increased, the base would not be able to replenish and
meet peacetime requirements. GAO reported that independent studies had concluded the base
was inadequate to meet requirements after two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). 151
In a second report, the GAO questioned DoD‟s ability to adequately assess their
capability to support a war effort and replenish the stocks. They noted the lack of a modern and
updated ammunition information management system. The failure to update and share data
created several management inefficiencies. Ammunition was shown as available and serviceable
despite overdue inspection and maintenance checks. The inability (or reluctance) to share data
between the Services resulted in some services consigning ammunition to demilitarization while
other Services were short the same items. 152
Between 1989 and 1998, the war reserve requirements dropped from 2,500 K short tons
to 540K short tons to support two Major Theater Wars (MTWs) for a total of a 79% reduction.
Training requirements dropped 43% from 135K short tons to 77K short tons. The use of excess
war reserve stocks was nearing an end, and the Army needed to pay the full training bill. It is
important to clarify that the war reserves were in short supply at this time, as they had been after
previous wars. At this time, although the base was seeing major decreases in requirements, costs
were rising. Modernization was a major cost driver in the munitions budget. The bottom line
was the munitions bill was rising faster than savings from decreases in requirements. 153
Other recent studies, including the RAND study, studies completed by National Defense
University (NDU) in 1996 and 1998, a 1998 GAO report, and a study by the National Academy
150 GAO, “Ammunition Industrial base: Information on DoD‟s Assessment of Requirements,” GAO/NSIAD-96-133,
May 1996 and GAO, “Defense Ammunition: Significant Problems if Left Unattended Will Get Worse,”
GAO/NSIAD-96-129, June 1996. Both reports were made pursuant to specific requests from Congress.
151 GAO/NSIAD-96-133, Executive Summary, 1-4. The GAO was probably referring to a Committee for the
Common Defense study and a Heritage Foundation study completed in 1994-95.
152 GAO/NSIAD-96-129, Executive Summary,. 2-8.
153 “Assessment of the Army‟s Munitions Strategy.” Briefing – DA level. 1998.
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