History of the Ammunition Industrial Base - JMC - U.S. Army

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number of GOCO plants was reduced from 84 to 38 and continued to decrease. 50 Increased tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union caused by the Soviet aggressive stance in Eastern Europe forestalled complete disarmament, but did not drive significant funding to maintain the base. In 1945, a standby program for government facilities estimated to have an acquisition cost of $1.8 billion was approved. The program planned to maintain the facilities to a degree that mobilization could be attained in 4-6 months and reach full production capacity in 8-12 months. This level of funding was never realized for several reasons. Appropriations and personnel were inadequate. The Corps of Engineers was responsible for conducting maintenance and repair of real property, which was also inadequately funded. Therefore, production equipment and utilities, buildings, structures, roads, and railroad were allowed to fail and deteriorate into states of disrepair at many plants. Several leaders openly disagreed with the low level of funding and attention to the base after WWII and thought the base should be maintained. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown said, “Nuclear war remains the least likely course of action for our potential enemies. The capability of industry is critical to the U.S. successfully developing a conventional deterrent…we are experiencing a creeping erosion of the U.S. industrial bases that promises to grow progressively more severe in foreseeable future…industrial base must be capable of sustaining all mobilized U.S. forces (Active and Reserve) in a long war against either the Warsaw Pact or the People‟s Republic of China.” 51 Though U.S. politicians lamented war with China and it was included in strategic planning but the front soon turned to Korea. The below chart illustrates how fast production/procurement was built up over WWII and how quickly it was reduced at the end of the war. 52 50 Hammond, 6. 51 Hammond, 138. 52 History of the Ordnance Department in WWII, Table I (between pages 13 and 14). 18
Ammunition Other than Heavy Field Bombs Heavy Field Artillery 1942 1943 1944 1945 The requirements and inventory reporting processes had been so inefficient that in September 1945, the Army was adrift in excess ammunition of all types. In particular, last minute surges in artillery ammunition production provided a significant excess of those rounds. In addition, due to the sudden shut down from full volume production, significant amount of inprogress materiel was on hand and assumed by the Army. Thus, the Army owned components of ammunition rounds in addition to complete rounds. To add to issues, the Army began to retrograde ammunition from overseas theaters or destroyed it in place through detonation, burial or dumping in open water. While the Army knew it had a large stockpile of ammunition, by the time the Korean Conflict started, they were just ending an initial inventory process. This made forecast and planning efforts difficult in the beginning of the Korean Conflict mobilization. Despite not knowing the full extent of the post-WWII stockpile, the Services determined sufficient ammunition existed and the next war could be fought using the excess stored in the vast depot system. Unfortunately, this plan did not take into account the modernization process or the relative technological state of the excess ammunition. Also, the plan did not consider the potential problems if the next war was long or if there were sustained increases in consumption rates. Finally, because of the reduction in funding, maintenance and inspections did not occur. Far more of the stocks were unserviceable in June 1950 than had ever been expected. 53 Most ammunition built in WWII supported weapons systems designed in 1940 or 1941. There were some improvements items like the upgraded tank gun or rocket propelled charges, but even those upgrades were designed to defeat weapons in use in 1941. By the Korean 53 William R. Reeder, “The Korean Ammunition Shortage,” unpublished, 1-5. (See all of Reeder for a strong summary of ammunition planning and production in Korea. Reeder was in DA at the time and prepared the monograph as a case study for the Army Comptrollers Course at Syracuse University.); James A. Huston. The Sinews of War, Army Logistics 1775-1953 (Center for Military History, Washington D.C.: 1966): 630-634. 19
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15 July 1941 Maumelle Ord. Works -
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APPENDIX B WWII ERA GOVERNMENT OWNE
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2007 GOVERNMENT OWNED AMMUNITION IN
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Bibliography Bacevich, A.J. The Pen
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Office of the Comptroller, Ordnance
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History of the Ammunition Industrial Base - JMC - U.S. Army

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