History of the Ammunition Industrial Base - JMC - U.S. Army

theater levels but the overall ammunition position was more serious. Expenditures in Korea had
exhausted left over WWII stocks. The nature of the phase when reserves were becoming
exhausted faster than new production could fill, applied more to ammunition than any other class
of supply.
Many contend that Ordnance planners could not plan properly for Korea because of the
assumption that the war was expected to be over quickly. Budget and requirements were set for
the amount of ammunition used plus the replacement of reserve stocks with no advance planning
for a war lasting over 6 months. Continuous expansion of the ammunition program added to the
difficulty of stabilizing requirements. Production schedules were subject to constant
modification with metal parts availability acting as the principal controlling factor. At no time
were installations incapable of meeting schedules but slippages resulted directly from shortages
of components. Estimates of productive capability of producers of metal parts, based on
contracted rates, and the review of stated production potential by Ordnance districts in numerous
cases failed to properly evaluate the impact of factors, which could impact production. 111
Vietnam
The Vietnam War presented a new dimension to the production and supply of
ammunition. As explained during WWII the Army had Allies fighting while we had essentially
a window of time to build up the munitions base. In Korea, we relied on leftover WWII stocks
to springboard us into the war and reestablish the production base. For Vietnam, reserve stocks
were inadequate to provide the time necessary to build up to the point where production equaled
consumption (D-P) stocks and the production base wasn‟t initially responsive to the requirements
that developed. When war broke out in Vietnam specific requirements existed for the strategic
deployment of Army combat forces to Europe and Pacific theaters. Although forces deployed
and the operations they engaged in were small in January 1965, the situation intensified quickly,
and the production base had to again reestablish capabilities to meet requirements.
In comparison to the Korean Conflict, the ammunition base operated far fewer production
lines to meet requirements. The following chart compares active production lines during Korea
in 1954 and Vietnam in 1970. 112
Production Lines Operating
Korea
SEA
Small Arms 24 10
LAP 138 86
Propellants 35 31
Explosives 151 75
Metal Parts 20 21
Total Lines 368 223
110 Committee on Armed Services. Investigation of the Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services – Interim
Report of the Preparedness Subcommittee No.2 of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate.
(1953), 15, 3.
111 Reeder, passim.
112 Hammond, Table 7.
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