History of the Ammunition Industrial Base - JMC - U.S. Army

expansion set by Washington. He was correct, and by 1943 excess ammunition created storage
problems. Plants were able to produce over and above initial estimates, and the mobile tank
warfare in North Africa called for much smaller expenditure in rifle and machine gun
ammunition than previously anticipated. In an August 1943 procurement review board, on hand
stock of small arms ammunition in the U.S. was reported at 2.5 billion rounds. This was nearly
equal to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) expenditures in WWI. It observed that the
Day of Supply figures were excessively large, ammunition plants were operating below capacity,
and reserves of ammunition were reaching “astronomical” figures. The Board concluded the
War Department had to bring small caliber ammunition production back to “realms of reality.” 46
To eliminate excess production Frankford Arsenal returned its focus to laboratory work
in 1943. Commercial operated plants converted to other war time needs and machinery was
transferred elsewhere for work, stored or scrapped. Production of all types of small caliber
ammunition dropped from 20 billion rounds in 1943 to 6.5 billion in 1944. Four factors were
cited in the closures: 1) high rates of production attained by plants, 2) virtual elimination of the
submarine warfare 3) effectiveness of .50 caliber incendiary ammunition in downing enemy
planes and 4) Japanese evacuation of Kiska without a fight. Though the war was not over, the
small caliber ammunition crisis had passed. 47
After VJ day, all small caliber production plants except Lake City and Twin Cities were
closed. Years later, the Korean Conflict would only require operation of six small caliber
ammunition plants to meet wartime requirements. Five plants were utilized in the Vietnam War
and amazingly today‟s production is able to meet requirements of 1.5 billion rounds per year by
operating one facility, Lake City with Alliant Techsystems (ATK) as the current operating
contractor. Modernization of production lines and new technologies has provided the abilities to
meet this mission with a reduced infrastructure. Additional rounds are procured from General
Dynamics and provided by NATO forces to meet total requirements. 48
During WWII, requirements were difficult to determine in an era of changing warfare.
Fluctuating requirements caused leaders to over and under estimate the readiness and quantity of
inventory available for war. It is important to recall the nature of the times, as America
experienced an attack on its own shores and the war expanded with the addition of a new front in
Japan. Leaders were alarmed and were willing to pay the costs to ensure Soldiers were equipped
and armed with ammunition to win the war and protect our borders.
Reducing the WWII Ammunition Base
Immediately after the defeat of Germany the Ordnance Department began closing down
ammunition plants. After the defeat of Japan, the entire system was swiftly shut down. Around
50 plants, known to be excess, were transferred to the operating contractor or sold on the open
market. Fourteen plants remained in an active status, primarily engaged in demilitarization,
renovation, and the production of fertilizer. The remaining plants not excessed were placed in
inactive status, decontaminated, padlocked and left without maintenance money. 49 In 1945 the
46 Report of War Department Procurement Review, 31 August 1943.
47 Thomson & Mayo, 219.
48 PEO Ammunition. PM MAS Briefing, 2004.
49 An inactive plant is placed in layaway status for future use. An excess facility is determined no longer required in
the event of a future war, and are slated to be sold, dismantled or turned over to the Federal government.
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