ISSUE 61 : Nov/Dec - 1986 - Australian Defence Force Journal

THE FOUNDATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY 1901-1914 35
Henderson recommendations as a guide to policy,
it lost office in May 1913.
Development of a More Self-Reliant
Posture
Australia was represented at the 1911 Imperial
Conference by the Prime Minister, Mr
Andrew Fisher, and the Minister for Defence,
Senator George F. Pearce. On the main naval
issues, the Australian delegation argued for a
greater dominion contribution in the formulation
of imperial defence policy, local control of
dominion navies, and supported extension of
the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The conference accepted
that the naval forces of Australia and
Canada would be exclusively under the control
of their respective Governments. The limits of
geographic control were defined and intentions
to send Colonial ships outside these limits were
to be notified to the Admiralty. Concurrence
of the British Government was also to be sought
for visits to foreign ports and whilst in port the
commanding officer was required to obey any
instructions, on international matters, from the
British Government. Government was also to
be sought for visits to foreign ports and whilst
in port the commanding officer was required
to obey any instructions, on international matters,
from the British Government.
On completion of the Imperial Conference
the Admiralty proposed to King George V that
he approve the prefix "Royal" being attached
to Australia's naval forces and that her warships
be called His Majesty's Australian ships. The
submission was annotated by King George V:
"I approve of this memorandum with great
satisfaction."
An intimation that the British Government
did not intend to proceed with development of
a Far East Fleet, as agreed at the 1909 Imperial
Conference, was provided in a speech by Winston
Churchill on 15 May 1912 when he stated
that the Royal Navy would be concentrated in
home waters, while the Dominion navies patrolled
the British possessions elsewhere. While
the Austrailian Government's initial reaction
was one of support, it gradually began to grasp
the full implications for Australia's security.
In a further speech on 26 March 1913
Churchill called on the colonies to make a more
substantial contribution to Imperial naval defence,
either in the form of Colonial navies, or
preferably by contributions to the Royal Navy.
He also announced an intention to create an
Imperial Squadron, based at Gibraltar, which
would be available for service in any part of
the world. This squadron was to be formed by
colonial contributions, including HM Ships New
Zealand and Malaya and three Canadian battleships.
The Australian Government considered
such a squadron to be totally inadequate
for protection of a world-wide empire and stated
at the Imperial Defence Committee in 1913 that
the Pacific dominions did not feel happy that
their security should rest almost solely on the
maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
Australia feared that a situation could arise
where the alliance was either ineffective or had
been terminated, and the existence of the German
Fleet would prevent the Royal Navy from
strengthening its forces in the Pacific.
On 15 August 1913 the Australian Government
formally sought advice from the Admiralty
on its intention to establish the China and
East Indies units of the Far East Fleet. The
Admiralty advised that as a result of the changed
naval situation, since the 1911 conference, it
had been decided to defer development of the
fleet in the precise form contemplated. The
Admiralty argued that the distribution of battle
cruisers and light cruisers projected in the 1909
agreement bore no resemblance to the threats
which might be encountered in the Far East. A
table detailing the naval strengths of various
nations in the Pacific, excluding the Japanese
because of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, formed
the basis for the Admiralty's argument that any
potential enemy ships in the Pacific could be
adequately dealt with by lesser vessels than battle-cruisers
of the Invincible class. It was concluded,
therefore, that battle-cruisers would
more usefully be stationed in European waters.
This position was re-stated by Churchill on 16
March 1914 in a speech on the naval estimates.
He argued that a battle-cruiser was not a necessary
part of a Dominion Fleet Unit and that
the presence of such vessels in the Pacific was
not necessary to British interests.
Australia's response was detailed by Senator
Reid, the Minister for Defence, on 13 April
1914 when he remarked that Mr Churchill's
statement involved:
"1. The definite non-fulfilment by the Admiralty
of Obligations undertaken by the 1909
agreement.