ISSUE 61 : Nov/Dec - 1986 - Australian Defence Force Journal

52 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 61 November/December 86
could comfortably operate modern aircraft in
greater safety; a sharp decrease in the high
accident rate was an immediate benefit. The
angle deck was such a valuable concept that
introduction was swift: the idea was first officially
suggested in 1951, it was tested in 1952
and incorporated in an operational carrier in
the same year. By the mid-1950s the Royal Navy
had decreed that jet aircraft would no longer
operate from straight deck (i.e. World War Two
design) carriers."
The Australian Government's determination
that the Fleet Air Arm, though small, was to
be as modern as possible meant that the second
Australian aircraft carrier was delayed while the
latest features were incorporated. She had been
expected to commission in 1952 but would now
be delayed for several years. The Government
was gravely concerned at this delay in completing
its naval aviation plan, because of the
belief that global war was imminent, 12 and
sought a temporary substitute from the British
Government which lent HMS Vengeance to
Australia in 1953 to provide a second operational
aircraft carrier. 13
The large number of improvements being incorporated
in the second Australian aircraft
carrier (HMAS Melbourne) ensured that she
would be one of the most modern aircraft carriers
in the world. Considerable RAN pride in
the ship, and in her capable new aircraft, was
offset by the realisation that Sydney, and her
aircraft, had entered premature obsolescence
because the rapid progress in carrier design had
left her behind. Although she had been in service
for less than ten years, and some aircraft
bought to equip her squadrons had flown only
a few hours. Sydney would soon be obsolete.
Arrangements were made to return her to Britain
for modernisation but, well before she was
due to leave Australia, defence policy shifted
and naval aviation lost its pride of place.
Since 1945 Australia's area of defence interest
had been ill-defined but broad and included
large parts of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
The Minister for Defence described the RAN's
responsibilities in 1952 as including '. . . the
safety of the sea routes over a large part of
these great oceans . . .' because '. . . the security
of sea communications is of first importance,
. . .' 14 Interest in protecting trade routes had
resulted in the Radford-Collins agreement of
1951 establishing a framework of Australian-
American responsibilities for protecting merchant
shipping in the Pacific and Indian Oceans
under which Australia's area included half of
the Indian Ocean and a large part of the Pacific."
The ANZUS Treaty of 1951 did nothing to
reduce the Australian area of defence planning
or to replace plans for Anglo-Australian wartime
co-operation in South-East Asia and in
the Middle East. Long-standing interest in sending
forces to the Middle East in time of war
was taken a step further when Cabinet decided,
in December 1951, to participate in garrisoning
the Middle East 16 and Australian air force personnel
were sent to Malta to man Royal Air
Force fighter squadrons. 17 The Navy's responsibility
expanded to include the protection of
convoys carrying army or air force units from
Australia to the Middle East as a high priority
wartime task. At that time Government decision
making was dominated by the conviction that
global war was imminent and that Australia
must be prepared to co-operate with its allies
in the coming war. In March 1951, Prime Minister
Menzies had told Parliament that Australia
had less than three years left to prepare for
war;' 8 in this climate of war preparation, growth
in naval aviation was accepted despite cost rises
caused by aircraft purchases and extensive ship
modifications.
The fear of imminent war faded after 1952
and defence expansion stopped as the Government
tried to reduce the adverse effects of defence
spending on national development. 19 The
basis of defence policy altered from urgent
preparation for imminent, wide-ranging, war to
long-term preparation for emergencies in the
South-East Asian region. 20 The Manila Treaty,
signed in September 1954, expressed this fundamental
shift in Australian strategy. Menzies
explained the new delimitation of Australia's
defence area in August 1954 when he said that
SEATO would '. . . define our task. It will
give a clarified direction to our defence organisation.
It will mark out our zone of possible
operations. We will know not generally, but
specifically, the nature and extent of the forces
we need, the character of the equipment they
will require . . .'. 21
The Navy was no longer the leading Service
and did not retain its former wide-ranging role:
The RAN's primary role became the operation
of surface warships for anti-submarine operations.
Australia's defence effort would now be
weighted towards Air Force development and