Final Report - European Commission - Europa

16
Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: Albania
Lack of 2000 strategy
No subsequent formal strategy document was prepared. This lack is particularly important
given that the Stabilisation and Association Process, which began in 1999, marked a major
reorientation in the Commission-Albania relationship, by introducing the prospect of an SAA
for Albania (and in the much longer term, raising the possibility of EU accession). The
purpose of the SAP was both stabilisation of the region, and “to underline that all
countries…have the prospect of increasing rapprochement with the EU, in the perspective of
full integration with European structures.” 30
The Commission produced a report in late 1999 “On the feasibility of negotiating a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania”. 31 This report set out what Albania
needed to do – with the support of the international community – for an SAA to be feasible.
This led to a readjustment of the EC’s assistance strategy to Albania, but no formal new
strategy document was prepared to take account of the new situation. The rationale for this
was that Albania was to become part of the CARDS programme in 2001. However, this
created a number of problems in the annual programming in both year 2000 and 2001 (see
below).
The SAP process is progressing and in June 2001, the Commission concluded that it is
appropriate to open negotiations with Albania on the negotiation of a SAA.
Weak Annual Programmes
The programming process is carried out by DG Relex, which since 1998 has progressively
transferred programme implementation to a separate office (now called EuropeAid).
However, DG Relex carries out programming activities with little consultation with key
stakeholders (particularly the Delegation). Some consultation with the Albanian authorities
takes place on missions from Brussels- that is, missions arrive from Brussels, have
discussions with the Albanian authorities (at a relatively senior, political, level), return to
Brussels and then prepare programming documentation. The Delegation feels excluded from
this process, which lacks transparency. There is no consultation with civil society or
systematic consultation with other donors
As a result, programming decisions often appear, from the perspective of the Delegation and
some Albanian officials, to be superficial, ill thought-out, and insufficiently grounded in an
understanding of the Albanian context. The pesticides removal project described in section
3A (and more recently the proposed arsenic removal project) are examples. Other projects
that similarly appear to have been decided on in Headquarters with insufficient consultation
include support to the fishery sector (see box) and, in the 2001 Order for Services, Asylum
and Migration Management. Nor does programming appear to build on lessons from past
experience – the 2001 Order for Services allocates considerable funds for the computerisation
of tax administration, despite the failure of an IT project in the justice sector, and despite the
fact that the relative success of the Customs reform programme owed little to
computerisation.
Another effect of this process is the progressive disconnection of programmes and projects
from the underlying analysis and strategy. Recent annual programmes are not based on any
explicit formal strategy. This contributes to a programme that looks like a collection of
30
31
“The Stabilisation and Association Process for the countries of South-Eastern Europe”,
Commission Communication COM (99) 235, 26 May 1999.
Commission Communication COM 599 final, 24 November 1999.