Final Report - European Commission - Europa
Final Report - European Commission - Europa
Final Report - European Commission - Europa
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Chapter 3 Explaining the performance of the Phare programme 31<br />
As in other sectors, impact has been further limited by slow and inefficient implementation. 58<br />
Even the relatively successful IPRS has experienced implementation problems.<br />
Local Community Development<br />
Support for local community development has been provided through the Albanian<br />
Development Fund, an organisation that grew out of the World Bank’s Poverty Alleviation<br />
Programme, and has for the most part been directed towards the provision of rural<br />
infrastructure (with roads and bridges representing over 50%). The programme has produced<br />
relatively quick outputs – extremely quick relative to Phare implementation. They are likely<br />
to contribute to development and poverty reduction at a local level, although – given a lack of<br />
monitoring and assessment – assessing the sustainability is difficult. The project has also had<br />
a positive impact on the development and performance of the local construction industry and<br />
on employment. 59 Local commitment to the projects is ensured by requiring a small financial<br />
contribution to the project costs.<br />
The ADF is an autonomous non-governmental body answering to a board (which includes<br />
ministerial representation). It is also generally regarded as an Albanian rather than a donor<br />
organisation. Many donors are using the ADF, because of its capacity to channel funding to<br />
small infrastructure projects aimed at assisting local community development.<br />
The efficiency of the ADF is hindered by Phare procedures and regulations, which are often<br />
not compatible with those of other donors (most of whom adopt World Bank procedures).<br />
Phare funded projects also lack monitoring and assessment (particularly beneficiary<br />
assessment). This makes it difficult to form a judgement on the relative importance of<br />
“bottom-up” community participation, as well as other aspects of project development.<br />
The programme has experienced a number of serious hiatuses. One related to the submission<br />
of a weak work programme by the PMU, followed by an exceedingly protracted revision and<br />
approval process emanating from delays in Brussels. The programme was further halted for a<br />
long period for audit, because of some procedural and accounting problems. However, it<br />
would appear that these issues are being addressed.<br />
Sustainability of many projects is likely to be low because of the absence of a maintenance<br />
policy on the part of local governments (who ultimately assume responsibility for the<br />
infrastructure). Phare support has not targeted poverty, which was not regarded as a priority<br />
PHARE objective. Instead, ADF stated in interviews with the Evaluators that EC policy has<br />
been to distribute resources evenly across the country, for political reasons.<br />
C. Democracy and the Rule of Law<br />
Phare has had little impact on democracy and the rule of law, despite significant –but<br />
weakly designed- programmes in the justice and police sectors. Phare has offered<br />
very limited support to civil society and NGOs. However, the EC and a number of<br />
Member States provided important support in the immediate aftermath of the 1997<br />
crisis.<br />
In the immediate aftermath of the 1997 civil disorder, the EU and a number of Member States<br />
took actions that had a positive impact on the restoration of order and the rule of law. Partly<br />
58<br />
59<br />
See “Audit of Agriculture Projects”, Draft <strong>Final</strong> <strong>Report</strong>, April 2001, ADE S.A.<br />
Only local contractors are used and they have to abide by rigorous tender procedures.