Finnish Security Intelligence Service - Poliisi

Annual Report 2012
Finnish Security
Intelligence Service
1

Director’s review 2012
Changes in operating
environment are
accelerating
For the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the year
2012 was, if possible, even busier than the previous
ones. Events causing the need to increase both
the preparedness and level of action were faced in
all operational fields. As our principle is to operate
preventively and our operational activity is practically
non-public, a significant part of the work done by the
Finnish Security Intelligence Service is not visible to
the public.
The strategy and mission of the Finnish Security
Intelligence Service were updated in 2012 as a
continuation of Supo’s reforming work started earlier.
According to our updated mission, the Finnish Security
Intelligence Service produces through its operational
work and cooperation analysed and up-to-date
security information for the benefit of Finnish society.
Information obtained in various ways and its professional,
well-timed use for the benefit of the security of
Finland is the cornerstone of our operation. Updating
the mission does certainly not revolutionise the activity
of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service but it
helps us to concentrate on the essentials even better
than before.
In 2012, a large reform project – Pora III – has
kept the whole police administration busy. This process
will bring about considerable changes to the
administration of the police, and the Finnish Security
Intelligence Service is also required to make its
functions more efficient, especially the administrative
ones, although the concrete aims concerning the
Finnish Security Intelligence Service are not big in
euros. More generally speaking, Pora III will affect the
agency’s functions significantly because all units must
achieve big savings at the same time as the operating
environment is changing rapidly from Supo’s
perspective. The functions of the Finnish Security
Intelligence Service and those of the other police
units must, however, not be set against each other
in any way. In this sense, too, Pora III has made the
situation clearer: according to the final report of the
project, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service has
no operational duties that overlap with those of other
police units.
Since the beginning of 2013, the Situation Centre
of the Government has operated entirely under the
Prime Minister’s Office. Supo has answered for the
Situation Centre services for the last four years on
the basis of a separate agreement between the
2

2012
Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of the Interior.
I would like to thank the Situation Centre personnel
for the important contribution they have made in
different ways for the benefit of the Finnish Security
Intelligence Service during these years.
The threat posed by illegal intelligence to Finland
has not decreased and is not about to do so in the
near future. As the significance of economy continues
to grow, high technology and its applications as
targets for intelligence gathering are an increasingly
important issue also for Finland’s future. “Traditional”
espionage has also remained at least on the same
level as before. Cases published in different EU member
states have considerably increased the media
coverage of illegal intelligence. This serves as a good
reminder of the fact that this form of state activity
still needs to be taken seriously also in Finland.
The national cyber security strategy recently approved
by the Government aims to ensure that Finland
will be able to secure its vital functions against
cyber threat in all situations. In connection with the
strategy’s implementation, it must be guaranteed
that authorities have sufficient legislative powers as
well as practical means for performing their duties.
In my opinion, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service
has a crucial role here as an authority safeguarding
the operational prerequisites of the society.
In 2012, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service
made a detailed assessment of individuals posing a
terrorist threat in Finland. The significant growth in
the number of risk persons and increased travelling
from Finland to crisis areas make it necessary to
invest more in terrorism prevention. In 2012, the
Finnish Security Intelligence Service concentrated
its counterterrorism-related liaison officer activity in
the Finnish embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Furthermore,
the laborious and extensive pre-trial investigation of
Finland’s first terrorist offence progressed in 2012
in very good cooperation with the National Bureau of
Investigation.
In the annual report of 2011, I wrote that the
Finnish Security Intelligence Service must perform in
a way that safeguarding internal and external security
of the society and preventing threats in advance are
considered worth the investment. In 2012, I have
witnessed constant commitment, responsibility and
flexibility in the work done by Supo’s employees for
the benefit of security in Finland. It is easy to be
proud of this team.
The concrete duty of the Finnish Security Intelligence
Service is to protect the governmental and
social systems of Finland. Our personnel has the professional
skills and experience needed in this work,
and they adhere to the Nordic rule of law. Surveys
conducted already for years show that the work done
by Supo receives solid and continuous support also
from different social groups. The experiences and examples
from the other Nordic countries alone during
the last few years have confirmed my impression that
adequate resources ought to be allocated for this
work also in Finland – keeping in mind that preventing
damages in advance is a much better alternative for
society than repairing them afterwards.
Antti Pelttari
Director of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service
3

2012
The future will be different
In 2030, the world will be very different from today’s
world. According to some recently published
international assessments, the changes will also
have a significant impact on security. The Finnish
Security Intelligence Service monitors and tries to
foresee the security situation and factors affecting
it both in Finland and abroad.
The Russian President Vladimir Putin estimated
in his annual state of the nation address in December
2012 that the world is about to enter
an era of change. The new balance of economic
systems, civilizations and armed powers poses
threats to the sovereignty of states. International
competition for natural resources, energy, technologies
and knowhow is getting fierce, resulting
in an even clearer division of states into “winners”
and “losers”. According to Putin, the increasingly
unequal global development lays a foundation for
new conflicts of economic, geopolitical and ethnic
nature.
In the United States, a report ( 1 ) predicting what
kinds of megatrends will be dominant in 2030 was
published in December 2012. According to the
report, the significance of individuals will increase
substantially during the next 15–20 years. For
the first time in the history of mankind, a majority
of the world’s population will no longer be poor,
thanks to expanding economy, growth of the global
middle class, greater educational attainment, and
better health care. The middle class will be the
most important social and economic actor in the
majority of countries. Consumption will increase
and the use of new communication devices extend,
leading to better access to information.
Power will be widely dispersed between different
states on the one hand, and between states and
non-state actors on the other. No individual state
will have the hegemony. Measured by a global
power index, Asia will have surpassed the USA
and Europe combined by 2030, whereas China will
have the largest economy in the world considerably
earlier. The future internet giants (cf. Google
and Facebook today) will have in their possession
more real-time information on individuals than governments
will. Nuclear weapons might be used in
future conflicts taking place especially in Asia and
the Middle East. The economic interests of states
might become a specific target for terrorists.
The aging of population presents a huge challenge
especially to states with high income level,
such as some European countries, Japan, and
South Korea. Urbanisation will remain strong
around the world. Today, roughly 50% of people
live in urbanised areas but in 2030, the figure will
be 60%.
This means that 1.4 billion more people will be
in need of new infrastructure, housing, roads,
energy, and jobs. Cross-border migration will also
4

2012
increase significantly, especially due to unbalanced
age structures between poorer and richer countries,
and different working and earning possibilities.
The integration of immigrants and the avoiding
of confrontation between population groups will
increase in importance.
A shortage of resources will manifest itself as
an increasing demand for food and water. The
growing middle class will consume more and
climate change will reduce the availability of food
and water. Energy demand will grow even by 50%
during 15–20 years.
( 1 ) Global Trends 2030, NIC 2012
The division of resources at Supo in 2012
23.5%
(26% / 2011)
41%
(37% / 2011)
35.5%
(37% / 2011)
Counterterrorism
Prevention of illegal
intelligence
Security work
The percentage
figures include
support functions
18
The budget of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service
in 2008–2012 (million euro)
16 16
14 14
12 12
10 10
8
revenue
project financing
allocations
6
4
2
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
(16.2)
1
(17.2)
2
(17.8)
3
(17.5)
4
(17.9)
5
5

Counterterrorism 2012
Persons returning from conflict
areas give cause for concern
The operating environment of counterterrorism in
Finland continues to change. The number of persons
with links to terrorism and radical activity has
become a three-digit figure. In addition to the threat
posed by the conflict in Somalia, also the possible
repercussions of the Syrian crisis, such as an increasing
number of refugees and the impacts on the
security situation of the nearby areas and possibly
also Europe, give cause for concern.
Threats might be posed by persons who have taken
part in fighting in the ranks of radical groups in conflict
areas in the past and now return to their home
countries in Europe. It is known that persons from
various European countries – also from Finland – have
travelled both to Somalia and Syria to join the conflicts
there. Syria’s attraction among radical islamists
is emphasised due to the fact that it is much easier
to travel there than to other conflict areas. Terrorist
networks operating in the conflict area can make use
of the returnees in order to extend violent activity
beyond the networks’ actual area of operation and
recruit new fighters in their ranks. A close multinational
cooperation between authorities is necessary
in countering this phenomenon. The Finnish Security
Intelligence Service tries to respond to the challenge
also with its liaison officer activity, which became
more firmly established during 2012. The Finnish
Security Intelligence Service has a liaison officer at
the Finnish embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, which is an
important area of operation for counterterrorism.
Two significant terrorist attacks were committed in
Europe in 2012. In March, a radical Islamist of Algerian
origin shot dead three soldiers and four civilians
in France. In July, there was an explosion at the Burgasi
airport in Bulgaria, in a bus carrying Israeli tourists.
Six persons plus the suicide attacker were killed
in the explosion. Al-Qaeda, suffering from the loss of
some of its important leaders and having weakened
as an organisation, continues to encourage individual
jihadists and radical groups to commit suicide attacks
against the West. The Somali terrorist organisation
Al-Shabaab joined forces with Al-Qaeda in February
2012.
Despite the changes in the operating environment,
terrorist threat in Finland has remained low so far.
The pre-trial investigation of Finland’s first terrorist
offence was launched in autumn 2011, and in early
2013 the case will be submitted for consideration
of charges. The investigation concerns supporting
Al-Shabaab.
The Finnish Security Intelligence Service is actively
involved in the well-functioning cooperation networks
established to counter international terrorism. These
networks include among their members intelligence
and security authorities from both Europe and other
parts of the world.
6

Countering of illegal intelligence 2012
Intelligence activity causes
substantial economic damages
The amount of foreign intelligence personnel in
Finland grew slightly during 2012. The main aims
of foreign intelligence include forecasting political
developments in Finland and influencing decisionmaking.
During the 2000s, the main attention of
political intelligence switched from the Finnish
domestic policy to the country’s international
relations. The Finnish security and EU policies,
and Finland’s stance on Nato in particular, have
remained key targets for political intelligence.
Through military intelligence, foreign states try
to chart Finland’s military preparedness and the
resilience of the society. Furthermore, they aim
at acquiring both technology that can be used for
military purposes and knowhow to support the
states’ own armed forces. The military intelligence
against Finland has remained on the same level as
in the last few years.
High-level technological research and its applications
already in production are constant targets
for intelligence gathering. The resulting damages
may be severe and have a significant impact on
the competitiveness of our national economy. Over
the past few years, the main focus of intelligence
activity has lied on monitoring the development
of new fields of research. Last year, particular
interest was taken in the energy and chemical
industries. In 2012, the Finnish Security Intelligence
Service also undertook a survey on illegal
intelligence gathering against Finnish companies
during the years 2009–2011. According to the
survey, 12% of the companies had themselves
observed that they had been targets for illegal
intelligence gathering, whereas 16% suspected it
had happened. The results are similar to those of
corresponding surveys conducted earlier.
In their activity, some intelligence services resort
to using persons for whom fake identities and
life stories have been created in order to conceal
their real identity and background. The Finnish
Security Intelligence Service monitors such illegals
activity. Illegals cases recently revealed in Europe
have shown that intelligence services still continue
their illegals programmes, despite their high cost
and long duration.
In early 2012, the Finnish Security Intelligence
Service suggested that so-called refugee espionage
should be criminalised also in Finland. The
Ministry of Justice has started to look into the
matter. During the year 2012, the Finnish Security
Intelligence Service continued to monitor
refugee espionage in order to evaluate the extent
and seriousness of the phenomenon.
7

2012
Terrorist threat assessment
Despite the changes occurred in the operating
environment, the direct threat posed to
Finland or the Finnish population by organised
radical Islamist or other kind of terrorism
has remained low. From the point of view of
radical Islamist or other terrorist organisations,
Finland is not a significant target area
for violent activities. There are now more
persons with connections to international
terrorism residing in Finland than in the previous
years who seek to support the activity
of foreign radical organisations in different
ways. Some of them support terrorist groups
also by taking part in armed fighting in
conflict areas. The threat posed by radicalised
individuals, as well as their motives, are
difficult to predict. Terrorism-related incidents
elsewhere may affect the security situation in
Finland rapidly and in an unexpected way.
Proliferation control
Some states seek to obtain technology
and related know-how that can, in addition
to acceptable purposes, be used
for developing nuclear weapon and other
mass destruction weapon programmes
in violation of international regulations
and conventions. Such dual use goods
were acquired from Finland also in 2012.
The acquiring operations become more
complex, which renders them more difficult
to detect and prevent. International
information exchange related to proliferation
increased by 20% from the previous
year.
Illegals activity still part of the intelligence
services’ modus operandi
• the aim is to conceal the country of origin of the espionage activity
• a fake identity, often starting from the birth certificate, is created for the
person
• personal history and life story, the so-called legend, is created for the
espionage activity
• operations that last for decades
• an expensive method, major resources are needed for the support activity
8

Security work 2012
Radical activity was small-scale
Internal security
No danger was posed to the state security in Finland
by radical extraparliamentary movements in 2012.
Anarchist activity, which had slightly grown in
2011, decreased, and no significant illegal actions
were committed within its sphere in 2012. Elsewhere
in Europe, too, anarchist and other extreme
left activity decreased from the previous year.
Radical activity conducted mainly by local skinhead
and neo-Nazi groups in Finland last year was quite
marginal. The increased confrontation observed in
2012 between the extreme right movement and antifascist
actors is, however, a cause for concern.
Individuals or small operational cells using the
leaderless resistance tactic pose a potential security
threat related to domestic extremism also in Finland.
There have been efforts to improve the identification
and prevention of threats through an increasingly
close and extensive cooperation between authorities.
One example of this cooperation is the participation
of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service in violent
extremism prevention programme launched in 2012.
Security of state leaders
The Finnish Security Intelligence Service monitored
the security situation relating to state leaders and
maintained situation awareness in 2012. No significant
change was observed in the security situation.
Moreover, no factors turned out that would have
compromised the security of state visits or other
important events relating to state leadership in the
security arrangements of which the Finnish Security
Intelligence Service was involved.
In 2012, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service
investigated several individual threat and harassment
incidents against the state leaders and members of
parliament.
Two major elections were organised in 2012:
Presidential elections early in the year and municipal
elections in the autumn. The Finnish Security Intelligence
Service took part in guaranteeing the security
of both elections by having security talks with the
persons in charge of the security of the candidates
and parties in advance. Some threat and harassment
incidents were investigated also in connection with
the elections.
Number of personal security clearances has
become stable
The number of personal security clearances carried
out by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service
remained almost unchanged in 2012. Over 16,000
standard security clearances were conducted in total.
At present, around 160 companies and facilities are
included in the security clearance procedure.
As a Designated Security Authority (DSA) responsible
for facility security clearances, the Finnish Security
Intelligence Service has been involved in providing
Finnish companies better chances of participating in
international classified projects already for several
years. These clearances are carried out on the basis
of international information security obligations.
In 2012, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service
also took part in the work of a working group preparing
the Security Clearance Act reform.
9

2012
The division of posts at the Finnish
Security Intelligence Service in 2012
Security clerances conducted by Supo
in 2003–2012
29.5% other
personnel, women
(29.1% / 2011)
14% other
personnel, men
(14.4% / 2011)
47.7% policemen
(48% / 2011)
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
8.8% policewomen
(8.5% / 2011)
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Briefings on preventive security work held by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service
350
300
250
200
150
Companies and
other entities
Authorities
100
50
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
10

2012
High confidence in Supo
A survey concerning the views of the citizens on Supo’s activity is carried out yearly at Supo’s request.
The latest survey was conducted on 10–21 December 2012 and the sample was drawn from people
aged 15–79 living in continental Finland. A total of 1005 interviews were carried out.
The confidence interval of the results is +/- 3 percentage points.
According to Finns, Supo has performed its duties either very well or somewhat well (77%)
very well somewhat well not well, not badly cannot say somewhat badly badly
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2012
2011
2010
More than four out of five (84%) interviewed Finns have high confidence in Supo
high rather high cannot say not very high non-existent
2012
0%
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2011
2010
11

2012 2011
www.supo.fi