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Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions

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multiple entities control different aspects of the employment relationship, as when one entity, which<br />

hires <strong>and</strong> pays workers, places them with other entities that supervise the work.” 525<br />

The Court noted that the plaintiffs in Reynolds had conceded that “the plain language of <strong>Wage</strong><br />

Order No. 9 defining employer does not expressly impose liability under section 1194 on individual<br />

corporate agents.” 526 “In a footnote, we added that the ‘plaintiff . . . ha[d] not persuaded us that one<br />

may infer from the history <strong>and</strong> purposes of section 1194 a clear legislative intent to depart, in the<br />

application of that statute, from the common law underst<strong>and</strong>ing of who qualifies as an employer.’” 527<br />

The Martinez plaintiffs, however, gave the Court extremely detailed, exhaustive briefing on the<br />

history of <strong>California</strong>’s minimum wage law, the IWC, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Wage</strong> Orders. This apparently<br />

convinced the Court that “an examination of section 1194 in its full historical <strong>and</strong> statutory context<br />

shows unmistakably that the Legislature intended to defer to the IWC’s definition of the employment<br />

relationship in actions under the statute.” 528 As a result, the Court limited the application of<br />

Reynolds:<br />

In sum, we hold that the applicable wage order‘s definitions of the employment<br />

relationship do apply in actions under section 1194. The opinion in Reynolds, supra, 36<br />

Cal.4th 1075, properly holds that the IWC‘s definition of employer does not impose<br />

liability on individual corporate agents acting within the scope of their agency. (Reynolds,<br />

at p. 1086.) The opinion should not be read more broadly than that. 529<br />

525<br />

526<br />

527<br />

528<br />

529<br />

Id. at 59.<br />

Id. at 63.<br />

Id. at 64.<br />

Id.<br />

Id. at 66. The Court of Appeal in Futrell v. Payday <strong>California</strong>, Inc. held that, because the language of <strong>Wage</strong> Order 12<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Wage</strong> Order 14 use identical language to define the terms “employ,” “employee” <strong>and</strong> “employer,” the Supreme<br />

Court’s holding in Reynolds that applied <strong>Wage</strong> Order 14’s definition of “employment” also applies to <strong>Wage</strong> Order 12.<br />

190 Cal. App 4th 1419, 1429 (2011).<br />

Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com <strong>Litigating</strong> <strong>California</strong> <strong>Wage</strong> & <strong>Hour</strong> <strong>Class</strong> <strong>Actions</strong> (12th Edition) 118

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