second year course outlines 2012-2013 - School of Social Sciences ...

SECOND YEAR 

COURSE OUTLINES 

2012-2013 

Please note: 

These are the course outlines 

for 2012-13 and are subject to 

change in 2013-14.

Contents 

PHIL20241: 20 th Century Analytical Philosophy 3 

PHIL20271: Philosophy of Mind 32 

PHIL20611: Phenomenology 40 

PHIL20951: Aesthetics 63 

PHIL20022: Philosophy of Religion 78 

PHIL20042: Formal Logic 86 

PHIL20212: Locke, Berkeley & Hume 92 

PHIL20232: Ethics 102 

PHIL20262: Philosophy of Science 121 

Please note: 

Philosophy courses for 2013-14 may run in different semesters, have 

different timetable slots and tutors and their content may alter. 

2

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES 

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 

PHILOSOPHY 

COURSE UNIT OUTLINE 2012-13 

PHIL20241 20 th Century Analytical Philosophy 

Semester: 1 Credits: 20 

Lecturer(s): Dr. Sean Crawford 

Office: Arthur Lewis 4.041 

Telephone: 0161 275 1756 

Email: 

sean.crawford@manchester.ac.uk 

Office Hours: Tuesdays 15:30-16:30, Thursdays 11:30-12:30 

Please email to arrange an appointment outside of these hours. 

Tutors: 

Administrator: 

Tutorials will be taken by Teaching Assistant: Michael Clark 

Caroline Harmer, UG Office, G.001 Arthur Lewis Building 

Tel: 0161 275 7129, Email: caroline.harmer@manchester.ac.uk 

Lectures: 

Tutorials: 

Wednesdays 11-1pm in Pariser C21 

Thursdays and Fridays 

Allocate yourself to a tutorial group using the Student System 

(this is compulsory and on a first come, first served basis) 

Assessment: 2 hour exam – 67% 

2,500 word essay – 33% 

Reading week: Week 6: Monday 29 th October to Friday 2 nd November 2012 

IMPORTANT INFORMATION – PLEASE READ 

Pre-requisite(s): 20 PHIL credits at Level 1 

Communication: 

Students must read their University e-mails regularly, as 

important information will be communicated in this way. 

Examination period: Monday 14 th January 2013 – Friday 25 th January 2013 

Re-sit Examination period: Monday 19 th August 2013 – Friday 31 st August 2013 

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Please read this course outline through very carefully as it provides essential information 

needed by all students attending this course 

This course guide should be read in conjunction with the Philosophy Study Guide. 

Copies may be obtained from the Undergraduate Office, G.001 Arthur Lewis Building or from 

the SoSS intranet at: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/intranet/ug/handbooks/ 

2. ABOUT THE COURSE 

Summary 

Analytical philosophy has become the dominant tradition in contemporary philosophy and yet 

it is scarcely a century old. In this course we will explore the rise of this philosophical 

tradition by studying the historical conditions and figures that gave birth to it and some of the 

important problems, methods, and principles that have shaped and continue to shape it. We 

shall also examine some contemporary work in this tradition. 

We begin by looking very briefly at the Post-Kantian, Absolute Idealist philosophy that 

dominated the British scene at the turn of the century and the rise of the new mathematical 

logic that helped to displace it. We then turn to the revolutionary works of Gottlob Frege, G. 

E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell, and the different roles they each played in setting the 

agenda for subsequent philosophy in the analytical tradition. 

We go on to look at some of the most important philosophical developments in analytical 

philosophy after these great foundational works, including Logical Positivism, Ordinary 

Language Philosophy, W. V. Quine’s famous attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction and 

modality in general, and contemporary work such as Saul Kripke’s celebrated revival of 

modal metaphysics, Hilary Putnam’s linguistic externalism and David Lewis’s approach to 

the paradoxes of time travel. 

The course provides excellent background for the following advanced courses: PHIL 30252 

Wittgenstein and PHIL30311 Philosophy of Language. 

Aims 

The course aims to: 

 

 

 

provide an understanding of the development of the analytical tradition in philosophy 

provide historical background for some of the contemporary debates in the analytical 

tradition 

help students to understand some of the central writings in the tradition 

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Learning Outcomes 

On successful completion of this course unit, students will be able to demonstrate: 

 

 

 

 

familiarity with different strands of philosophy in the analytical tradition 

appreciation of (some of) the major problems discussed in this tradition 

informed criticism of (some of) the most important positions taken on these issues. 

3. COURSE ORGANISATION 

Lectures: Wednesdays 11-1pm in Pariser C21 

Tutorials: 

DAY & TIME LOCATION TEACHING ASSISTANT 

Thursday 10-11am Roscoe 4.3 

Thursday 11-12pm Williamson 2.05 

Thursday 12-1pm University Place 4.208 

Michael Clark 

Friday 10-11am 

Friday 11-12pm 

Friday 12-1pm 

Dover Street BS5 

Dover Street BS5 

Dover Street O.1.6 

Tutorials are weekly, starting in week 2. Attendance at tutorials is compulsory. It is students’ 

responsibility to ensure that they have been allocated to a tutorial group. Students may not 

change group without permission. 

Work and attendance 

The work and attendance requirements for this course are that you: 

• Attend all tutorials 

If you are absent from a tutorial through illness you should inform your tutor and fill in a 

Certification of Student Ill Health (available from your department or from the SoSS UG 

Office; see you degree programme handbook for further details). If you are absent for 

another reason you should tell your tutor or the Philosophy Administrator, Caroline 

Harmer as soon as possible – if possible, before the tutorial. 

• Prepare adequately for tutorials 

You will be set preparatory work for tutorials; see the study budget below for a guide to 

roughly how long you should spend on this. 

• Complete written work on time 

Failure to complete assessed work by the due date constitutes a violation of the work 

and attendance requirement. 

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Violations of work and attendance requirements will be reported to your Programme Director. 

If you have difficulties (e.g. personal, financial or family problems) that result in persistent 

failure to meet the work and attendance requirements, you should talk to your Programme 

Director or Academic Advisor. 

Texts recommended for purchase: 

Stephen P. Schwartz, A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy. From Russell to Rawls 

Stroll, Avrum. Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy 

Kenny, Anthony. Philosophy in the Modern World. A New History of Western 

Philosophy Volume 4 

Skorpuski, John. English-Language Philosophy 1750-1945 [Vol. 6 of the Oxford series 

A History of Western Philosophy] 

Thomas Baldwin, Contemporary Philosophy. Philosophy in English Since 1945 [Vo. 8 

of the Oxford series A History of Western Philosophy] 

Jones, W.T. and Robert Fogelin, A History of Western Philosophy Vol. V. The C20 to Quine 

and 

Derrida, 3 rd ed 

Here is a link to Blackwell’s bookshop, displaying some of the recommended texts for the 

course: 

http://www.readinglists.co.uk/rsl/student/sviewlist.dfp?id=30888 

Course materials: 

Further materials will be made available on the courses Blackboard 

site. 

Log-in to Blackboard at: https://login.manchester.ac.uk/cas/login 

Study budget 

The University’s Academic Standards Code of Practice specifies that a 20 credit course is 

expected to require about 200 hours work by students. For this course, you are 

recommended to break this down roughly as follows: 

Lectures 

Tutorials 

Tutorial preparation 

Essay preparation 

Exam preparation 

10 x 2 = 20 hours 

10 hours 

10 x 5 hours = 50 hours 

40 hours 

80 hours 

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TOTAL: 

200 hours 

Prompt arrival at classes 

Students should note that all lectures and tutorials start on the hour and should end at 50 

minutes past the hour. Late arrival for tutorials may result in your being marked absent; if 

you arrive late it is your responsibility to ensure that your tutor has marked you as present. 

4. ASSESSMENT 

Assessment Criteria 

For the assessment criteria for PHIL course units, see the Philosophy Study Guide (available 

online at: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/intranet/ug/handbooks/ which also 

provides further guidance concerning the assessment criteria. 

EXAMINATION 

One two-hour exam will be set at the end of semester one, in which you must answer two 

questions. This provides two thirds of your assessment for the course. You will not be able to 

reproduce material from your assessed essay in your exam. 

Past Exam Papers can be found on the Blackboard site for this course. 

ASSESSED ESSAYS 

One essay of 2,500 words (titles listed below) which provides one third of your assessment 

for this course. 

The word limit includes footnotes but excludes the bibliography. 

Students must state the word count at the end of the essay – failure to do so will result in a 

deduction of 2 marks. 

If an essay goes over the word limit by 10% or more, 5 marks will be deducted. The marker 

is not obliged to read anymore than the number of words specified above and may ignore 

any additional material if they choose. 

You are also required to keep an electronic version of your essay in case we would like to 

double-check your word count. 

Presentation 

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Essays must be typed in at least 12 point in a readable font, and should be double spaced. 

They should include proper bibliography and references. Include your word count at the end 

of the essay. 

Bibliography and Referencing 

The lack of a proper bibliography and appropriate reference will potentially greatly affect the 

mark for the work and may be considered plagiarism, which is a serious offence. 

Students should consult the University’s statement on plagiarism which can be obtained 

from the School of Social Sciences student intranet. 

There are a number of referencing systems available. One that is both simple and widely 

used is the Harvard system of referencing. On this system, the bibliography would be set out 

as follows: 

Putnam, Hilary (1975) ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’ in his Philosophical Papers volume II 

(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp.105-219. 

Quine, W.V.O. (1960) Word and Object (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press). 

Ryle, Gilbert (1948) ‘It Was to Be’ Mind 47 pp.23-38. 

The system of referencing, then, has this pattern: 

Or: 

Surname, first name, date, title of book, location of publisher, name of publisher. 

Surname, first name, date, title of article, title of journal or collection, journal volume 

number, page numbers for the beginning and end of the article. 

Note that the title of the book or the journal should be italicised (or underlined.) The title of an 

article should be in quote-marks. (See the examples of Putnam and Ryle above.) 

If the bibliography contains more than one item by an author published in the same year, the 

convention is to write the date followed by a small case letter. For example, (1948a), (1948b), 

etc. 

Whenever you make a claim about what a philosopher says or believes – whether in direct 

or indirect speech – you must back it up with a reference. When giving a reference in your 

essay, simply write the author’s name, followed by the date, followed by the relevant page(s). 

The convention is to put the reference at the end of a sentence. For example: 

Ryle thought that the word ‘exists’ is ambiguous (Ryle (1949) pp.23-24). Quine 

argued against Ryle’s view (Quine (1960) p.61). 

Note that page numbers are given. Not including page references is very poor page 

referencing. The point of giving page references is to support your claim that Ryle or Quine 

say what you claim they said. The reader can check for him or herself that these 

philosophers said what you claimed they said without having to thumb through every page of 

the relevant books. 

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For further details please see the referencing guide included in the Philosophy Study Guide. 

Handing in your essay 

Two copies of your essay should be handed to the SoSS Undergraduate Office, G.001, in 

the Arthur Lewis Building. 

You must also submit your essay electronically via Blackboard. Further instructions on 

this will be made available on the Blackboard site for the course, see: 

https://login.manchester.ac.uk/cas/login 

Failure to submit both a hard copy and an electronic copy of your essay will result in 

a mark of zero. The hard copy and online submission (submitted through Blackboard) 

must be exactly the same. 

Deadline 

The submission date for the assessed essay is Tuesday 6 th November 2012. All essays will 

be submitted to the Undergraduate Office, G.001, in the Arthur Lewis building and must be 

submitted by 2pm on the hand in day. 

The standard essay submission form will be provided by the UG office. 

See the Philosophy Study Guide for information about the granting of extensions and 

penalties for unexcused late submission and for overlong essays. 

Penalties for late submission of essays 

Essays submitted after 2.00pm carry the following day’s date. The penalties for late 

submission of essays is -10 marks for up to 24 hours late and -10 marks for each 

subsequent day (including weekends) for up to 10 days. Students who have a valid reason 

(i.e. mitigating circumstances with the necessary documentation) for not being able to submit 

their assessed essay on time should collect a mitigating circumstances form from the SoSS 

Undergraduate Office (Lewis, G.001), which should be completed and returned to G.001. 

Return of assessed essays 

A report on your assessed essay will be available on the Student System no later than 15 

working days after the essay deadline date (provided the essay is submitted on time). 

Please note that all essay marks are provisional until confirmed by the external examiner 

and the final examinations boards in June. 

Students are welcome to discuss their essay with their tutor or the course convenor during 

their office hour. 

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Feedback 

The School of Social Sciences (SoSS) is committed to providing timely and appropriate 

feedback to students on their academic progress and achievement, thereby enabling 

students to reflect on their progress and plan their academic and skills development 

effectively. Students are reminded that feedback is necessarily responsive: only when a 

student has done a certain amount of work and approaches us with it at the appropriate fora 

is it possible for us to feed back on the student's work. The main forms of feedback on this 

course are written feedback responses to assessed essays and exam answers. 

We also draw your attention to the variety of generic forms of feedback available to you on 

this as on all SoSS courses. These include: meeting the lecturer/tutor during their office 

hours; e-mailing questions to the lecturer/tutor; asking questions of the lecturer (before and 

after lecture); presenting a question on the discussion board on Blackboard; and obtaining 

feedback from your peers during tutorials. 

Assessed Essay Topics 

1. Critically assess Frege’s theory of Thought. 

2. Has Moore refuted the doctrine of internal relations? 

3. Has Russell’s theory of descriptions successfully solved all the puzzles Russell 

intended it to solve? 

4. Has Ayer successfully eliminated metaphysics? 

5. COURSE OUTLINE 

Week 1 Introduction: Logical and Philosophical Background 

Week 2 Frege on Thought 

Week 3 Moore’s Attack on Idealism 

Week 4 Russell’s Theory of Descriptions 

Week 5 Logical Positivism: Ayer’s Elimination of Metaphysics 

Week 6 READING WEEK 

Week 7 Ordinary-Language Philosophy: Austin’s Sense & Sensibila 

Week 8 Quine’s Attack on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 

Week 9 Davidson’s Anomalous Monism 

Week 10 Kripke on Identity and Necessity 

Week 11 Putnam on Meaning and Reference 

Week 12 Lewis on Time Travel 

6. READING LIST 

A web-based version of this reading list, with links to catalogue entries, is available on The 

University of Manchester Library web site. (Click on 'Reading Lists' on the left of the main 

catalogue page.) Detailed bibliographies for each week’s philosophical topic will be given on 

the tutorial worksheets (available on Blackboard). But, in addition, the following books also 

have helpful material in them. 

10

All reading lists are for guidance only! The texts listed should help you increase your 

understanding of the topics covered in the course, and help you prepare for the assessed 

essay and exam. But you are also encouraged to use your own initiative and find relevant 

articles and books by chasing up interesting footnotes, browsing real and virtual libraries, 

following your hunches, and so on. 

Anthologies of Classic Articles 

Parenthetical abbreviations will be used to refer back to these works in weekly reading lists 

Ayer, A. J. (ed.) Logical Positivism (LP) 

Benacerraf, Paul and Hilary Putnam (eds.) Philosophy of Mathematics (POM) 

Block, Ned (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 2 vols. (RPP) 

Borst, C. V. (ed.) The Mind/Brain Identity Theory (MBIT) 

Feigl, H. and W. Sellars (eds.) Readings in Philosophical Analysis (RPA) 

French, Peter A., Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) Contemporary 

Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (CPPL) 

Hist-Analytic Website: http://www.hist-analytic.com (HA) 

Klemke, E. D. (ed.) Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies (CALP) 

Martinich, A. P. and D. Sosa (eds.) Analytic Philosophy. An Anthology (AP) 

Martinich, A. P. (ed.) The Philosophy of Language, all editions (PL) 

Rorty, Richard M. (ed.) The Linguistic Turn (LT) 

Rosenthal, David (ed.) Materialism and the Mind-body Problem (MMBP) 

Salmon, Nathan and Scott Soames (eds.) Propositions and Attitudes (PA) 

General Secondary Sources 

Reference back to these works in the weekly reading lists is by author name and, where 

appropriate, title and volume number 

Ayer, A. J. Russell and Moore. The Analytical Heritage. [Ayer’s William James lectures 

delivered at 

Harvard; accessible and highly recommended] 

11

Ayer, A. J. Philosophy in the Twentieth Century [selective history by a famous practitioner; 

very 

readable] 

Baldwin, Thomas. Contemporary Philosophy: Philosophy in English Since 1945 [picks up 

where 

Skorupski — see below — leaves off] 

Simon Blackburn. Spreading the Word. Groundings in the Philosophy of Language 

Baldwin, Thomas (ed.) The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945 [large volume of 

introductory essays ordered by philosophical theme] 

Coffa, J. Alberto. The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. To the Vienna Station. 

[scholarly work on the early days of logical positivism construed as a reaction to Kantian 

views about science and mathematics; by “semantic” Coffa means roughly ‘linguistic’] 

Corrado, Michael. The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy. Background and Issues [a very 

accessible, if slightly dated, text of some key themes] 

Hacker, P.M.S. Wittgenstein’s Place in C20 Philosophy [cursory but detailed and sweeping 

narrative by a hard-core Oxford Wittgensteinian] 

Hylton, Peter. Propositions, Functions, and Analysis. Selected Essays on 

Russell’sPhilosophy. 

[superb essays by a well-known Russell scholar] 

Hylton, Peter. Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. [the best book 

on 

Rusell’s early philosophy; highly recommended] 

Jones, W.T. and Robert Fogelin, A History of Western Philosophy Vol. V. The C20 to Quine 

and 

Derrida, 3 rd ed 

Kenny, Anthony. A New History of Western Philosophy, vol. 4. Philosophy in the Modern 

World 

[highly readable and accessible introduction] 

Lepore, Ernst and Barry C. Smith (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language 

[see 

‘Part 1: The Historical Context’, for essays on Frege, Wittgenstein and philosophy of 

language in the C20] 

12

Makin, Gideon. The Metaphysicians of Meaning. Russell and Frege on Sense and 

Denotation. 

Martin, Robert. The Meaning of Language [a highly accessible and comprehensive text on 

issues 

in philosophy of language and logic. Contains lucid elementary discussions of the theories 

of Frege, Russell, Kripke, function-object analysis, quantifiers, extensionality and nonextensionality; 

highly recommended] 

Martinich, A.P. and David Sosa (eds.). A Companion to Analytic Philosophy [short essays on 

central figures] 

Passmore, John. One Hundred Years of Philosophy [the first authoritative, astonishingly 

scholarly 

and comprehensive and now classic history of late C19/C20 philosophy to circa 1950] 

Pears, David. Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy 

Putnam, Hilary. Philosophical Papers, 3 vols. [classic papers on central themes in C20 

analytic 

philosophy by a major living analytic figure who knew Carnap and Reichenbach and was a 

colleague of Quine’s at Harvard for many years] 

Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [famous critique of analytical philosophy 

by a 

neo-pragmatist apostate; claims that the C20’s greatest philosophers are Wittgenstein, 

Dewey and Heidegger] 

Ryle, Gilbert (ed.) The Revolution in Philosophy [brief essays by prominent philosophers on 

more 

prominent philosophers than themselves] 

Shanker, Stuart (ed.) Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the Twentieth 

Century. 

[contains essays on the philosophy of logic, mathematics and physics, as well as logical 

positivism, Frege and the early Wittgenstein] 

Shapiro, Stewart (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic [advanced 

introductory essays] 

Skorpuski, John. English-Language Philosophy 1750-1945 [selective but detailed and very 

accessible; elegantly written] 

Soames, Scott. Philosophical Analysis in the C20. Vol. 1: The Dawn of Analysis 

Soames, Scott. Philosophical Analysis in the C20. Vol. 2: The Age of Meaning 

13

[both these volumes are excellent, detailed, but highly selective, accounts; advanced and 

technical in places; give a good idea of what students are taught in American graduate 

schools] 

Stroll, Avrum. Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy [cursory and selective but accessible 

survey] 

Schwartz, Stephen P. A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy. From Russell to Rawls 

Taylor, Kenneth. Truth and Meaning. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. 

[advanced 

but accessible intro; fairly technical in places, but covers a lot of issues not covered in 

other introductions, such as Tarski’s theory of truth and intensional semantics] 

Urmson, J.O. Philosophical Analysis [good but somewhat dated] 

Reference Works 

Again, note the parenthetical abbreviations for back reference 

Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 8 vols. Paul Edwards (ed.) (EP) 

Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (IEP) http://www.iep.utm.edu/ 

Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (REP) Internet access via Library webpages 

Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (SEP) http://plato.stanford.edu 

The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. Dermot Moran (RCTP) 

WEEK 1. LOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 

Required Readings 

1. Corrado, Michael. The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy. Background and Issues, ch. 1; on 

the 

course website 

2. Hylton, Peter. ‘Hegel and Analytic Philosophy’, on the course website; originally in 

Frederick C. 

14

Beiser (ed.) Cambridge Companion to Hegel; available on the Cambridge Companions 

Complete Collections website, accessible through the library’s electronic resources under 

‘electronic books’ 

Recommended Further Reading 

Priest, Graham. Logic. A Very Short Introduction 

Martin, Robert. The Meaning of Language, chs 11 & 12 

David Bostock, Russell’s Logical Atomism, ch. 1 

Jones & Fogelin, ch. 1 

Lowe, E. J., ‘Metaphysics’, in RCTP 

Passmore, John. A Hundred Years of Philosophy, chs. 1 & 6 

Potter, Michael, ‘The Birth of Analytic Philosophy’, in RCTP 

Russell, ‘The Philosophical Importance of Mathematical Logic’, at 

http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/russell.htm 

Schwartz, ch. 1 

Scott Soames, ‘Philosophical Analysis’, on the course website 

Soames, ‘Analytic Philosophy in America’, on the course website 

WEEK 2. FREGE ON THOUGHT 


1. Excerpt from Gottlob Frege, ‘On Sense and Reference’, pp. 36-42 & 56 (first fifteen 

paragraphs plus the final paragraph), on the course website; repr. in A. W. Moore (ed.) 

Meaning and Reference, pp. 23-29 & 42; also in G. Frege, Collected Papers on 

Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. B. McGuinness, trans. P. Geach and R. H. 

Stoothoff (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). 

2. Gottlob Frege, ‘Thoughts’, on the course website; from G. Frege, Collected Papers, op. 

cit. 

Further Primary Reading 

Frege, ‘On Sense and Reference’, on the course website; repr in Martinich, POL; Martinich 

and 

Sosa, AP; Feigl and Sellars, RPA; and Michael Beaney (ed.) The Frege Reader [NOTE: 

The title of this classic essay of Frege’s is also variously translated as ‘On Sense and 

Meaning’, ‘On Sense and Nominatum’, ‘On Sense and Designation’, and, with the original 

German words, ‘On Sinn and Bedeutung’] 

Frege, ‘Function and Concept’, repr in G. Frege, Collected Paper; Beaney (ed.) The Frege 

15

Reader 

Frege, ‘On Concept and Object’, repr in G. Frege, Collected Paper; Beaney (ed.) The Frege 

Reader 

Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. B. McGuinness, trans. 

P. 

Geach and R. H. Stoothoff (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). 

Beaney, Michael (ed.) The Frege Reader 

Burge, Tyler. Truth, Thought, Reason. Essays on Frege [advanced] 

Dummett, Michael. Frege. Philosophy of Language [classic text; intermediate] 

Perry, John. ‘Frege on Demonstratives’, Philosophical Review 86 (1977): 474-497 [explores 

the 

problems that indexical expressions raise for Frege’s theory of sense and reference] 

Nathan Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle [advanced and slightly technical; argues for a Russellian 

solution 

to Frege’s puzzle of cognitive value] 

Further Secondary Reading 

Blackburn, Simon. Spreading the Word. Groundings in the Philosophy of Language, ch 9 

Crawford, Sean. ‘Propositions’, The Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics, 2 nd ed., 

Elsevier (2005), on course website [introduction to theories of propositions, comparing 

contemporary Fregean and Russellian views] 


Kenny, Anthony, Frege, esp. chs 10 & 11 [introductory] 

Klemke, E. D. (ed.) Essays on Frege 

Kneale, W. C. ‘Gottlob Frege and Mathematical Logic’, in Ryle (ed.) The Revolution in 

Philosophy 

[brief, very accessible intro to Frege’s philosophy of mathematics] 

Nonnan, Harold. Frege, esp. ch 5 

McCulloch, Gregory. The Game of the Name, chs1-4 [very accessible introduction from a 

Fregean perspective] 

Makin, Gideon. The Metaphysicians of Meaning, chs 4 & 5 

Martin, Robert. The Meaning of Language, chs 13-20 [very accessible] 

16

Sluga, Hans, Frege [an intermediate and more properly historical treatment than Dummett] 

Taylor, chs 1 & 5 [advanced and technical but accessible intro] 

Weiner, Joan. Frege Explained, esp. ch 9 [introductory; highly recommended] 

Wettstein, Howard, The Magic Prism, chs 1-2 [very accessible; relates Frege to current 

research] 

Zalta, Edward N. ‘Gottlob Frege’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online at: 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/ 

Mark Sainsbury, ‘Philosophical Logic’, in A.C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy: A Guide Through the 

Subject (OUP, 1995), pp. 65-76. 

Michael Dummett, ‘Gottlob Frege (1848-1925)’, in A. P. Martinich and D. Sosa (eds.) A 

Companion 

to Analytic Philosophy. 

Michael Dummett, ‘Frege, Gottlob’, in Paul Edwards (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

Kevin C. Klement, ‘Gottlob Frege’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

http://www.iep.utm.edu/frege/ 


‘Sense and Reference’, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

WEEK 3. MOORE’S ATTACK ON IDEALISM 

Required Reading 

G. E. Moore, ‘External and Internal Relations’, on the course website; repr in Moore’s 

Philosophical Studies 


Ayer, A. J. Russell and Moore. The Analytical Heritage, chs. 6-9; part of this can be found on 

the 

course website 

David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 

Moore, G. E. ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, at http://www.ditext.com/moore/refute.html; also in 

Moore’s Philosophical Studies; Klemke, CALP 

Moore, ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ repr in Moore’s Philosophical Papers; Klemke, CALP; 

and 

17

at http://www.ditext.com/moore/common-sense.html and at HA http://www.histanalytic.org/ 

Moore, ‘Proof of an External World’, repr in Moore’s Philosophical Papers; also online at HA 

http://www.hist-analytic.org/ 

Moore, Philosophical Papers 

Moore, Philosophical Studies; available online at 

http://www.archive.org/details/philosophicalstu008406mbp 

Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy 


Baldwin, Thomas. G.E. Moore 

Baldwin, T. ‘Moore’s Rejection of Idealism’ in Richard Rorty, et. al. (eds.) Philosophy in 

History 

Ewing, A. C. (ed.) The Idealist Tradition [contains an excellent selection of idealist texts, 

including 

a causation-based argument by Brand Blanshard for the doctrine of internal relations and a 

criticism of the argument by the eminent philosopher of science Ernst Nagel, the latter of 

which is available on the web here: http://www.ditext.com/nagel/sr.html] 

Hylton, Peter. Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, pp. 117-52 


Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics. A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd ed., chapter 5, on course 

website 

Passmore, ch. 9; available online at HA: http://www.hist-analytic.com 

Rorty, Richard. ‘Relations, Internal and External’, Encyclopedia of Philosophy (EP); on the 

course 

website 

Schwartz, chs. 2 & 6 

Soames, v1, chs. 1-2 

WEEK 4. RUSSELL’S THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS 

18


1. Russell, ‘Descriptions’, ch 16 of Russell’s Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy; on the 

course website; repr in Martinich, POL 

2. Bertrand Russell, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, on the 

course 

website; originally ch 5 of Russell’s Problems of Philosophy 


Ayer, A. J. Russell and Moore. The Analytical Heritage, chs. 1-5 

Donnellan, Keith. ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, on course website; originally in 

Philosophical Review 75 (1966): 281-304; repr in Martinich, PL; also in Donnellan’s 

Essays on Reference, Language and Mind, J. Almog and P. Leonardi (eds.) [famous 

paper introducing the “referential” and “attributive” uses of definite descriptions] 

Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity, Lectures I & II; on course website [the most influential 

attack 

on the part of Russell’s theory that claims proper names are equivalent to definite 

descriptions] 

Neale, Stephen. Descriptions [technical but not unduly so; defends a Russellian view] 

Bertrand Russell, ‘On Denoting’, on the course website; repr in Martinich, POL; Feigl and 

Sellars, RPA; Martinich and Sosa, AP; Russell, Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Marsh; 

and at http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Russell/denoting/ [This is the canonical 

presentation of Russell’s theory of descriptions, technically and philosophically more 

advanced than ‘descriptions’ but also much more famous and referred to] 

Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Lectures V & VI, on the course website; also 

available on the web at HA: http://www.hist-analytic.org/ 

Russell, ‘Propositional Functions’, ch 15 of Russell’s Introduction to Mathematical 

Philosophy; 

on the course website 

Russell, ‘Mr. Strawson on Referring’, [this is a response to Strawson’s ‘On Referring’ – see 

below]; 

on course website 

19

Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.) Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (Library of Living Philosophers) 

Searle, John. ‘Proper Names’, widely reprinted; originally in Mind 67 (1958) 

Searle, John. ‘Referential and Attributive’, The Monist (1979); repr. in J. Searle, Expression 

and 

Meaning, ch. 6 [discusses Donnellan] 

Searle, John, Intentionality, ch. 9 ‘Proper Names and Intentionality’ 

Strawson, P. F. ‘On Referring’, on course website; repr in Martinich and Sosa, AP; 

Strawson’s 

Logico-Linguistic Papers; Caton (ed.) Philosophy and Ordinary Language; Martinich, PL 

[famous ordinary-language attack on Russell’s theory of descriptions; for Russell’s reply 

see above] 

Strawson, P. F. Individuals, ch. 1 ‘Bodies’ [contains the famous “duplication argument”] 


Simon Blackburn. Spreading the Word. Groundings in the Philosophy of Language, ch 9 

Bostock, David. Russell’s Logical Atomism, chapters 3 and 7 


Elsevier (2005), on course website [introduction to theories of propositions, comparing 

contemporary Fregean and Russellian views] 

Griffin, Nicholas (ed.). Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, available on the 

Cambridge 

Companions Complete Collections website, accessible through the library’s electronic 

resources under ‘electronic books’ 

Hylton, Peter, Propositions, Functions, and Analysis. Selected Essays on Russell’s 

Philosophy. 

Hylton, Peter, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. 

Jacob, Pierre ‘Intentionality’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online at: 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ 


Kaplan, David. ‘What is Russell’s Theory of Descriptions?’, in D. Pears (ed.) Bertrand 

Russell. A 

Collection of Critical Essays (1972) 

20

Klement, Kevin. ‘Russell’s Logical Atomism’, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-atomism 

Passmore, ch. 9; available online at HA: http://www.hist-analytic.com 

Peter Ludlow, ‘Descriptions’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online at: 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/ 

Lycan, William G. Philosophy of Language, chs 1-3 

Lycan, William G., ‘Kripke’s Modal Objection and Dummett’s Reply’ at: 

http://www.unc.edu/~ujanel/KripkeDummett.htm 

Makin, Gideon. The Metaphysicians of Meaning, chs 1-3 

Martin, Robert. The Meaning of Language, chs 13-20 

Pears, David. Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy 

Pears, David (ed.) Bertrand Russell. A Collection of Critical Essays (1972). 

Taylor, ch 2 [advanced and technical but accessible intro] 


Soames, v1, chs5-8 [advanced introduction focussing on philosophy of language, logic and 

mathematics; quite technical in places] 

Wettstein, Howard, The Magic Prism, chs 1-2 [very accessible; relates Russell to current 

research] 

WEEK5. LOGICAL POSITIVISM: AYER’S ELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICS 


A. J. Ayer, ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics’, on the course website; originally from Ayer’s 

Language, Truth and Logic; repr in Klemke, CALP; Martinich and Sosa, AP 


Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic, 2 nd ed. [a very readable popular classic] 

Ayer, A. J. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [accessible classic; the later target of J. 

L. 

Austin’s attack in Sense and Sensiblia (see below under week 7)] 

Ayer, LP 

21

Comte, Auguste. ‘A General View of Positivism’, at 

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/comte/1856/general-view.htm 

[statement by the early C19 French coiner of the term ‘positivism’] 

Feigl and Sellars, RPA 

Feigl, H. ‘Logical Empiricism’, in Feigl and Sellars, RPA 

Hempel, Carl, ‘Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes’, 

repr in Ayer, LP; Martinich, POL [classic, non-technical article on the verifiability principle; 

highly recommended] 

Hempel, ‘On the Nature of Mathematical Truth’, in Feigl and Sellars, RPA; 

Benacerraf and Putnam, POM; and at http://www.ditext.com/hempel/math-frame.html 

[relatively non-technical] 

Jones & Fogelin, ch7 


Ayer, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in Ayer, LP [very easy read; highly recommended] 

Coffa, Alberto, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station 

[scholarly work on the early days of logical positivism construed as a reaction to Kantian 

views about science and mathematics; by “semantic” Coffa means roughly ‘linguistic’] 

Freidman, Michael, ‘Logical Positivism’, REP 

Friedman, Michael, Reconsidering Logical Positivism [superb collection of 

separately readable and incredibly clear essays by the pre-eminent scholar of logical 

positivism; some essays assume some familiarity with issues in the foundations of logic 

and mathematics; highly recommended] 

Hahn, Lewis Edwin (ed.) Philosophy of A.J. Ayer (Library of Living Philosophers) 

Richardson, Alan and Thomas Uebel (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Logical 

Empiricism, 

available on the Cambridge Companions Complete Collections website, accessible 

through the library’s electronic resources under ‘electronic books’ 

Schwartz, chs. 2-3 

Soames, v1, chs.12-13 [clear, thorough and rigorous; focuses on Ayer] 

Uebel, Thomas. ‘Vienna Circle’, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/ 

22

WEEK 6. READING WEEK: NO LECTURES OR TUTORIALS 

WEEK 7. ORDINARY-LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY: 

Required Reading: 

J. L. Austin, selections from Sense and Sensibilia; on the course website 


Austin, J.L., Sense and Sensibilia 

Austin, J.L. Philosophical Papers, 2 nd ed.; available online at 

http://www.archive.org/details/philosophicalpap013680mbp 

Ayer, A.J., ‘Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?’, Synthese 17 (1967); repr 

in Ayer’s Metaphysics and Commonsense [Ayer’s reply to Austin] 

Caton, Charles E. (ed.) Philosophy and Ordinary Language [collection of important 

essays] 

Grice, H. P. ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’, repr in Grice’s Studies in the Way of 

Words and available at http://www.hist-analytic.org 

Grice, ‘Logic and Conversation’, repr in Grice’s Studies in the Way of Words 

Ryle, Dilemmas 

Ryle, ‘Systematically Misleading Expressions’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 

Society, 1931-32; repr. Rorty, LT 

Ryle, ‘Ordinary Language’, available at http://www.hist-analytic.org/Ryle.htm 

Rorty, LT 

Strawson, P. F. ‘On Referring’; repr in Martinich and Sosa, AP; Martinich, POL; 

Caton (ed.) Philosophy and Ordinary Language; and Strawson’s Logic-Linguistic Papers 

Strawson, P. F. Logico-Linguistic Papers 

23

Wisdom, John. Other Minds [ordinary language dissolution of the eponymous problem] 


M.G.F., Martin, ‘Austin: Sense & Sensibilia Revisited’, 

http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Background%20Readings/Austin%20Sense%20and%20S 

ensibilia%20Revisited.pdf 

Jones & Fogelin, ch12 

Soames, v2, chs3-5, 7-9 

Hahn, Lewis Edwin (ed.) Philosophy of P. F. Strawson (Library of Living Philosophers) 


WEEK 8. QUINE’S ATTACK ON THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION 


W. V. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, on the course website; repr in Quine’s From a 

Logical Point of View; Martinich, POL; Martinich and Sosa, AP; Klemke, CALP; 

Benacerraf and Putnam, POM; and at http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html 


Carnap, Rudolf. Philosophical foundations of physics : an introduction to the philosophy of 

science, 

Part V, chs 23-28, esp chs 27 & 28 [Carnap’s final answer to Quine] 

Carnap, ‘W. V. Quine on Logical Truth’, Schilpp (ed.) Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap [Carnap’s 

reponse to Quine’s famous attack on him] 

Fodor, Jerry and Ernest Lepore, Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, ch. 2 [advanced] 

Grice, H. P. and Peter Strawson, ‘In Defense of a Dogma’, repr in Martinich and 

Sosa, AP; and available at HA http://www.hist-analytic.org/ [ordinary-language rebuttal of 

Quine] 

Putnam, Hilary, ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic’, in Putnam’s Mind, Language and Reality. 

Philosophical Papers, v2 [excellent article; highly recommended] 

24

Putnam, ‘“Two Dogmas” Revisited’, in Putnam’s Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers, 

v3 

Putnam, ‘There Is At Least One A Priori Truth’, ibid. 

Quine, ‘Truth by Convention’, repr. in Quine’s Ways of Paradox; Feigl and Sellars, RPA 

Benacerraf and Putnam, POM [in some ways, a better article than ‘Two Dogmas’] 

Quine, ‘Carnap on Logical Truth’, Schilpp (ed.) Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap; repr. in Quine’s 

Ways of Paradox [again, this is arguably a better article than ‘Two Dogmas’] 

Quine, ‘Designation and Existence’, repr. in Quine’s From a Logical Point of View and in 

Feigl 

and Sellars 

Quine, ‘On What There Is’, repr. in Quine’s From a Logical Point of View; Klemke, CALP; 

Martinich and Sosa, AP; Benacerraf and Putnam, POM 

Quine, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, in Quine’s Ontological Relativity and Other Essays; repr 

in 

Martinich and Sosa, AP 

Quine, From a Logical Point of View 

Quine, Ways of Paradox 

White, Morton, ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic’, in White’s Toward Reunion in Philosophy; 

available online at HA : http://www.hist-analytic.org/ 


Bealer, George. ‘Analyticity’, REP 

Boghossian, Paul, ‘Analyticity’, in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the 

Philosophy of Language 

Gibson, Roger F., ed., The Cambridge Companion to Quine, available on the Cambridge 

Companions Complete Collections website, accessible through the library’s electronic 

resources under ‘electronic books’) 

Hahn, Lewis Edwin and Paul Arthur Schilpp (eds.) Philosophy of W.V. Quine (Library of 

Living 

Philosophers) 

25

Hylton, Peter. Quine 


Martin, Robert. The Meaning of Language, ch 6 

Orenstein, Alex. Quine 

Rey, Georges. ‘The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction’,http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analyticsynthetic/ 


Soames, v1, ch16; v2, chs10-11 

WEEK 9. DAVIDSON’S ANOMALOUS MONISM 


Donald Davidson, ‘Mental Events’ (1971), on course website; reprinted in Davidson’s Essays 

on 

Actions and Events (1980); also repr. in D. Rosenthal (ed.) The Nature of Mind and many 

other philosophy of mind anthologies 


Donal Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, in Davidson’s Essays on Actions and 

Events 

Donald Davidson, ‘Psychology as Philosophy’, in ibid. 

Donald Davidson, ‘The Material Mind’, in ibid. 

Donald Davidson, ‘Thinking Causes’, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.) Mental Causation. 

[D’s most recent statement of anomalous monism] 

William Child, Causality, Interpretation and the Mind 

William Child, ‘Anomalism, Uncodifiability, and Psychophysical Relations’, The Philosophical 

Review 102 (1993) 

Jaegwon Kim, ‘Psychophysical Laws’, in J. Kim, Supervenience and Mind; originally in Ernst 

LePore and Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) Actions and Events. Perspectives on the 

Philosophy of Donald Davidson. [a lucid and critical account of Davidson] 

26

Brain McLaughlin, ‘Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental’, in ibid. [a 

detailed 

account of Davidson’s position] 

E. C. Tiffany, ‘The Rational Character of Belief and the Argument for Mental Anomalism’, 

Philosophical Studies 103 (2001) 

S. Yalowitz, ‘Rationality and the Argument for Anomalous Monism’, Philosophical Studies 87 

(1997) 


Simon Evnine, Donald Davidson [good basic introduction to Davidson’s philosophy] 

Donald Davidson, ‘Davidson, Donald’, S. Guttenplan’s A Companion to the Philosophy of 

Mind. 

[Davidson’s own “self-profile”] 

Julie Yoo, ‘Anomalous Monism’, in McLaughlin, Beckermann and Walter (eds.) The Oxford 

Handbook of Philosophy of Mind 


WEEK 10: KRIPKE ON IDENTITY & NECESSITY 


Kripke, Saul. ‘Identity and Necessity’, on the course website; originally in M. K. Munitz (ed.) 

Identity 

and Individuation; website; repr. in Martinich and Sosa, AP; S. Schwartz (ed.), Naming, 

Necessity and Natural Kinds 


Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity (Blackwell, 1980)), on the course website; originally 

appeared 

in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.) Semantics of Natural Language. D. 

Dordrecht: Reidel (1972), pp. 252–355 [this is the original publication of which the 1980 

monograph is a revised reprinting] 

Searle, John, Intentionality, ch. 9 ‘Proper Names and Intentionality’ 

27

Shoemaker, Sydney. ‘Kripke and Cartesianism’, in A. Berger (ed.) Saul Kripke (on course 

website) 

Soames, Scott. Philosophical Analysis in the C20. Vol. 2: The Age of Meaning, chs14-17 

Stalnaker, Robert. ‘Reference and Necessity’, in Hale & Wright (eds.) The Blackwell 

Companion to the Philosophy of Language 

Wright, Crispin. ‘The Conceivability of Naturalism’, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 

Conceivability 

and Possibility (excerpt on course website) 

Yablo, Stephen. ‘Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts’, Pacific 

Philosophical 

Quarterly Volume 81, Issue 1: 98–122, March 2000; repr in Yablo, Thoughts: Papers on 

Mind, Meaning and Modality 


Bird, Alexander. (2009). ‘Kripke’, in Christopher Belshaw & Gary Kemp (eds.), Twelve Modern 

Philosophers. Wiley—Blackwell; on the course website 

Burgess, John, ‘Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity’, in John Shand (ed.).Central Works of 

Philosophy. Vol. 5. London: Acumen Publishing; on course website 


Elsevier (2005), on course website 

Jackson, Frank and Michael Smith (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary 

Philosophy, 

sections IV on Philosophy of Language and V on Metaphysics 

Lepore, Ernst and Barry C. Smith (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of 

Language, chs 

18-22 on The Nature of Reference 

Lowe, E. J. A Survey of Metaphysics [introductory; contains discussions of possible worlds, 

essentialism and related issues] 

Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics. A Contemporary Introduction. 3 rd ed. [introductory; contains 

discussions of possible worlds and related issues] 

28

Loux, Michael and D. Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, sections II 

on 

Existence and Identity and III on Modality and Possible Worlds 

Lycan, William. Philosophy of Language, chs 2-4 [very accessible and at times blackly comic 

introduction; highly recommended] 

McCulloch, Gregory. The Game of the Name, chs1-4 [very accessible introduction from a 

Fregean 

perspective] 

Robert Martin, The Meaning of Language, chs 13-20 


WEEK 11. PUTNAM ON MEANING AND REFERENCE 


Hilary Putnam, ‘Meaning and Reference’, on the course website; originally in The Journal of 

Philosophy, Vol. 70, No. 19 (Nov. 8, 1973): 699-711. 


Hilary Putnam, ‘The Meaning of “Meaning” ’, widely reprinted in philosophy of mind and 

language 

anthologies; also repr. in Putnam’s Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, 

vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1975) and Andrew Pessin and Sanford Goldberg (eds.), The Twin 

Earth Chronicles 

Andrew Pessin and Sanford Goldberg (eds.), The Twin Earth Chronicles 

Tyler Burge, ‘Other Bodies’, in A. Woodfield (ed.) Thought and Object; repr. in 

Pessin and Goldberg (eds.) The Twin Earth Chronicles and in Burge’s Foundations of 

Mind 

Tim Crane, ‘All the Difference in the World’, The Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1991): 1-26; 

repr. in 

Pessin and Goldberg (eds.) The Twin Earth Chronicles 

Colin McGinn, ‘Content’, ch 5 of McGinn’s The Character of Mind, 2 nd ed. 

Gregory McCulloch, The Mind and Its World, chs 7 & 8 

John Searle, Intentionality, pp. 197-208; repr. in Pessin and Goldberg, op. cit. 

H. Putnam, Representation and Reality, ch 2. 

Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 1 st ed., ch 8 

Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 2 nd ed., ch 9 

Robert Martin, The Meaning of Language, ch 16 

Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word. Groundings in the Philosophy of Language, ch 9 


WEEK 12. LEWIS ON TIME TRAVEL 


David Lewis, ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’, available on the course website: 

29

https://login.manchester.ac.uk/cas/login. Originally published in American Philosophical 

Quarterly 13 (1976) 145-52. Reprinted in Crane and Farkas (eds) Metaphysics; P. Van 

Inwagen and D. Zimmerman (eds) Metaphysics. The Big Questions; Le Poidevin and 

MacBeath (eds) Philosophy of Time; also in Lewis’s Philosophical Papers, vol 2. 


Kadri Vihvelin, ‘What Time Travelers Cannot Do’, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 81 (1996), pp. 

315- 

330, online at: http://www.springerlink.com/content/q6l51147w06k3867/; and available on 

the course website. See also Vihvelin’s philosophy blog here: 

http://vihvelin.typepad.com/vihvelincom/ 

Kadri Vihvelin, ‘Two Objections to the Possibility of Time Travel’, at Vihvelin’s blog: 

http://vihvelin.typepad.com/vihvelincom/2011/05/two-objections-to-the-possibility-of-timetravel.html 

Theodore Sider, ‘Time Travel, Coincidences and Counterfactuals’, Philosophical Studies 110 

(2002): 115-38; also available on Ted Sider’s website: http://tedsider.org/ 

M. Lockwood, The Labyrinth of Time, ch7 

Paul Horwich, Asymmetries in Time, ch7 


Earl Conee and Theodore Sider, Riddles of Existence, ch3 (esp. pp. 57-61) 

E.J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics, ch18 

B. Dainton, Time and Space, ch8 


7. SAMPLE EXAM PAPER (for guidance only) 

1. Are all necessary truths knowable a priori? Discuss with reference to Kripke. 

2. Is Frege right to maintain that a sign can have sense without having reference? 

3. Critically assess the logical positivists’ verification theory of meaning. 

4. Are token mental events identical with token physical events? Discuss with reference 

to Davidson. 

30

5. How much of Russell’s theory of descriptions is acceptable? 

6. ‘Physical objects are conceptually imported … as convenient intermediaries — not by 

definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, 

epistemologically, to the gods of Homer’ (‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’). Is Quine 

right to take physical objects to be “posits” comparable to the gods of Homer? 

31



PHILOSOPHY 


PHIL20271 Philosophy of Mind 


Lecturer(s): Dr. Tim Bayne 


Telephone: 0161 3066944 

Email: tim.bayne@manchester.ac.uk 

Office Hours: Wednesday 9-11 


Tutors: Tutorials will be taken by Teaching Assistants: Ben Matheson 

Administrator: Caroline Harmer, UG Office, G.001 Arthur Lewis Building 


Lectures: Thursdays 12-2pm in Samuel Alexander Class Wing A112 

Tutorials: Mondays 




2,500 word essay – 33% 

Reading week: Week 6: Monday 29th October to Friday 2nd November 2012 

***IMPORTANT INFORMATION – PLEASE READ*** 


Communication: Students must read their University e-mails regularly, as important 

information will be communicated in this way. 

Examination period: Monday 14th January 2013 – Friday 25th January 2013 

Re-sit Examination period: Monday 19th August 2013 – Friday 31st August 2013 


needed 

by all students attending this course 



the 

SoSS intranet at: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/intranet/ug/handbooks/ 

2 


32

Summary 

We will focus on the metaphysics of mind. We will begin by looking at different accounts of 

the 

relationship between the mind and the body. After this, we will examine two key issues 

raised by 

these accounts of the mental: the possibility of mental causation and the nature of 

consciousness. 

Aims 

This course aims to: 

• give a detailed understanding of contemporary debates concerning the metaphysics of 

mind; 

• enable students to engage critically with some recent contributions to these debates; and 

• enhance students’ powers of critical analysis, reasoning and independent thought. 



• knowledge of debates concerning the metaphysics of mind; 

• a thorough knowledge of some recent contributions to the debate; and 

• an ability to present carefully argued and independent lines of thought in this area. 


Lectures: Thursdays 12-2pm in Samuel Alexander Class Wing A112 

Tutorials: 


Monday 10-11am Coupland 3 LG10 

Monday 12-1pm Dover St BS5 Ben Matheson 

Tutorials are weekly, starting in week 2. Attendance at tutorials is compulsory. It is studentsʼ 


change 

group without permission. 






Office; 

see you degree programme handbook for further details). If you are absent for another 

reason 

you should tell your tutor or the Philosophy Administrator, Caroline Harmer as soon as 

possible – if possible, before the tutorial. 





Failure to complete assessed work by the due date constitutes a violation of the work and 

attendance requirement. 


If 

3 

you have difficulties (e.g. personal, financial or family problems) that result in persistent 

failure to 

meet the work and attendance requirements, you should talk to your Programme Director or 

Academic Advisor. 

Text recommended for purchase: 

Kim, J. 2011. Philosophy of Mind (3rd ed.) Westview: CO: Boulder. 

It would be fine to purchase the 2nd edition of this book instead. 

Course materials: Further materials will be made available on the courses Blackboard site. 

33


Study budget 

The Universityʼs Academic Standards Code of Practice specifies that a 20 credit course is 


recommended to 

break this down roughly as follows: 

Lectures 10 x 2 = 20 hours 

Tutorials 10 hours 

Tutorial preparation 10 x 5 hours = 50 hours 

Essay preparation 40 hours 

Exam preparation 80 hours 

TOTAL: 200 hours 



minutes 

past the hour. Late arrival for tutorials may result in your being marked absent; if you arrive 

late it 

is your responsibility to ensure that your tutor has marked you as present. 

4. ASSESSMENT 




provides 

further guidance concerning the assessment criteria. 

EXAMINATION 







for this 

course. 





is not 

obliged to read anymore than the number of words specified above and may ignore any 

additional 

material if they choose. 

4 


doublecheck 

your word count. 

Presentation 


They 

should include proper bibliography and references. Include your word count at the end of the 

essay. 



mark 

for the work and may be considered plagiarism, which is a serious offence. 

34

Students should consult the Universityʼs statement on plagiarism which can be obtained 

from the 

School of Social Sciences student intranet. 


used is 

the Harvard system of referencing. On this system, the bibliography would be set out as 

follows: 

Putnam, Hilary (1975) ʼThe Meaning of ʼMeaningʼʼ in his Philosophical Papers volume II 



Ryle, Gilbert (1948) ʼIt Was to Beʼ Mind 47 pp.23-38. 



Or: 







etc. 


or 

indirect speech – you must back it up with a reference. When giving a reference in your 

essay, 

simply write the authorʼs name, followed by the date, followed by the relevant page(s). The 

convention is to put the reference at the end of a sentence. For example: 

Ryle thought that the word ʼexistsʼ is ambiguous (Ryle (1949) pp.23-24). Quine argued 

against Ryleʼs view (Quine (1960) p.61). 


referencing. 

The point of giving page references is to support your claim that Ryle or Quine say what you 

claim 

they said. The reader can check for him or herself that these philosophers said what you 

claimed 

they said without having to thumb through every page of the relevant books. 


5 



the 

Arthur Lewis Building. 


this 

will be made available on the Blackboard site for the course, see: 



a 

mark of zero. The hard copy and online submission (submitted through Blackboard) 

must 

be exactly the same. 

Deadline 

The submission date for the assessed essay is Tuesday 20th November 2012. All essays 

will be 

35

submitted to the Undergraduate Office, G.001, in the Arthur Lewis building and must be 

submitted 

by 2pm on the hand in day. 



penalties for 

unexcused late submission and for overlong essays. 


Essays submitted after 2.00pm carry the following dayʼs date. The penalties for late 

submission of 

essays is -10 marks for up to 24 hours late and -10 marks for each subsequent day 

(including 

weekends) for up to 10 days. Students who have a valid reason (i.e. mitigating 

circumstances with 

the necessary documentation) for not being able to submit their assessed essay on time 

should 

collect a mitigating circumstances form from the SoSS Undergraduate Office (Lewis, G.001), 

which 

should be completed and returned to G.001. 



working 

days after the essay deadline date (provided the essay is submitted on time). 


and the 

final examinations boards in June. 


their 

office hour. 

Feedback 


feedback 

to students on their academic progress and achievement, thereby enabling students to 

reflect on 

their progress and plan their academic and skills development effectively. Students are 

reminded 

that feedback is necessarily responsive: only when a student has done a certain amount of 

work 

and approaches us with it at the appropriate fora is it possible for us to feed back on the 

student's 

work. The main forms of feedback on this course are written feedback responses to 

assessed 

essays and exam answers. 


this as 

on all SoSS courses. These include: meeting the lecturer/tutor during their office hours; e- 

mailing 

questions to the lecturer/tutor; asking questions from the lecturer (before and after lecture); 

presenting a question on the discussion board on Blackboard; and obtaining feedback from 

your 

peers during tutorials. 

6 

Assessed Essay Titles 

(1) What is Brentano’s thesis? Is it true? Does it matter whether or not it is true? 

(2) Are intentionalist accounts of phenomenal character plausible? 

36

(3) What is the best formulation of physicalism? Why does the formulation of physicalism 

matter? 

(4) Explain and evaluate eliminativism as an account of the propositional attitudes. 

(5) What is externalism about mental content? Explain and evaluate one objection to 

externalist 

accounts of mental content. 


This course function as an introduction to the philosophy of mind. What is it to have a mind? 

Can 

mental states be explained in the way that other natural phenomena can be? If so, how? Are 

mental states causally relevant? How well do we know our minds? We will examine these 

and 

many other questions relating to the nature of mindedness. 




catalogue page.) Detailed bibliographies for each weekʼs philosophical topic will be given on 

the 

tutorial worksheets (available on Blackboard). But, in addition, the following books also have 

helpful material in them. 



essay 

and exam. But you are also encouraged to use your own initiative and find relevant articles 

and 

books by chasing up interesting footnotes, browsing real and virtual libraries, following your 

hunches, and so on. 

useful textbooks 

Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Jackson, F. 1996. The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Cambridge, 

MA: 

Blackwell Publishers. 

Crane, T. 2003. The Mechanical Mind (2nd ed.) London: Routledge. 

Crane, T. 2001. Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press 

Heil, J. 2004. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction (2nd ed). London: Routledge. 

McGinn, C. 1996. The Character of Mind (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

useful anthologies, companions, and handbooks 

Block, N., Flanagan, O. & Güzeldere, G. 1997. The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical 

Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 

Chalmers, D. 2002. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings Oxford: OUP. 

Heil, J. 2003. Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Lycan W. & Prinz, J. (ed.) 2008. Mind and Cognition: A Reader (3rd ed.) Blackwell. 

McLaughlin, B. et al. (eds.) 2009. The Oxford Handbook to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: OUP. 

O’Connor, T. & Robb, D. 2003. Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. London: 

Routledge. 

Stich, S. & Warfield, T. 2003. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. 

7 

Fundamentals: Intentionality, Consciousness, Physicalism 

Crane, T. 2001. Elements of Mind. Oxford: OUP (ch. 1). 

Crane, T. 1998. Intentionality as the mark of the mental. In T. Crane (ed.), Contemporary 

Issues in 

the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 

Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: CUP (ch. 1). 

Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge. 

Tye, M. 1996. Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 

Eliminativism 

37

Baker, L. 1987. Saving Belief. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 

Churchland, P. 1981. Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of 

Philosophy, 78: 67-90. (Reprinted many times.) 

Dennett, D. 1988. Quining qualia. Reprinted in Lycan & Prinz (2008) and in Chalmers (2002). 

Horgan, T. & Woodward, J. 1985. Folk psychology is here to stay. The Philosophical Review, 

94/2: 

197-226. Reprinted in Lycan & Prinz 2008. 

Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990. In defence of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies, 59: 31-54. 

Content 

Adams, F. 2003. Thoughts and their contents. In Stich and Warfield 2003. 

Crane, T. 1991. All the difference in the world. Philosophical Quarterly, 41/162: 

Dennett, D. 1987. True believers: The intentional strategy and why it works. In The 

Intentional 

Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 

Cummins, R. 1983. Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 

Fodor, J. 1985. Fodor’s guide to mental representation: The intelligent Auntie’s vade-mecum. 

Mind, 94: 76-100. 

Loewer, B. 1997. A guide to naturalizing semantics. In C. Wright & B. Hale (eds.), A 

Companion to 

the Philosophy of Language. Reprinted in Lycan & Prinz 2008. 

McGinn, C. 1989. Mental Content. Oxford, Blackwell. 

Burge, T. 1988. Individualism and self-knowledge, Journal of Philosophy, 85: 64-663. 

McKinsey, M. 2007. Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent. In B. McLaughlin & 

J. 

Cohen, J. (eds) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. 

Segal, G. 2008. Reference, causal powers, externalist intuitions, and unicorns. In Lycan & 

Prinz 

2008. 

Consciousness 

Block, N. 1990. Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4. In Lycan and Prinz. 

Block, N. and Stalnaker, R. 1999. Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap, 

Philosophical Review, 108: 1-46. 

Alter, T. & S. Walter (eds) 2006. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. OUP. 

Chalmers, D. & Jackson, F. 2001. Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation, 

Philosophical 

Review, 110: 315-60. 

Crane, T. 2009. Intentionalism. In McLaughlin et al. 2009. 

Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-136. Reprinted in 

Lycan 

& Prinz 2008 and Chalmers 2002. 

Levine, J. 1983. Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical 

Quarterly 64: 

354-61. 

Ludlow, PY et al. (eds.) 2004. Introduction. There's Something About Mary, MIT Press. 

Nagel, T. 1974. What is it like to be a bat?, Philosophical Review. Reprinted in his Mortal 

Questions and elsewhere. 

8 

Mental Causation 

Bennett, K. 2003. Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to 

tract it. 

Nous, 37: 471-97. 

Crane, T. 1998. Causation and determinable properties: On the efficacy of colour, shape and 

size. 

In J. Kallestrup & J. Hohwy (eds) Being Reduced. Oxford: OUP. 

38

Davidson, D. 1970. Mental events. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and 

Theory, 

Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 79-101. (Reprinted many times.) 

Kim, J. 1998. Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 

Macdonald, C., and Macdonald, G. 2006. The metaphysics of mental causation. Journal of 

Philosophy, 103: 539-76. 

Yablo, S. 1992. Mental causation. Philosophical Review, 101: 245-80. Reprinted in 

Chalmers 

2002. 

Yoo, J. 2009. Anomalous monism. In McLaughlin et al. 2009. 

Self-knowledge 

Dretske, F. 1994. Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 94: 263-278. 

Dretske, F. 1999. The mind’s awareness of itself. Philosophical Studies, 95: 103-24. 

Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, see p. 224-35. 

Macdonald, C. 2009. Introspection. In McLaughlin et al. 2009. 

Shoemaker, S. 1988. On knowing one’s own mind. Philosophical Perspectives, 2:183-209. 

Reprinted in Shoemaker, S. (1996) The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. 

Cambridge: 

CUP. 

Other minds 

Avramides, A. 2001. Other Minds. London: Routledge. 

Block, N. 2002. The harder problem of consciousness. The Journal of Philosophy, 99: 391- 

425. 

Pargetter, R. 1984. The scientific inference to other minds. Australasian Journal of 

Philosophy, 62: 

158-63. 

39



PHILOSOPHY 


PHIL20611 Phenomenology 


Lecturer(s): Dr. Joel Smith 


Telephone: 0161 275 1760 

Email: joel.smith@manchester.ac.uk 

Office Hours: Tuesday & Friday 10-11am 


Tutors: Tutorials will be taken by Teaching Assistant: Howard Kelly 

Administrator: Caroline Harmer, UG Office, G.001 Arthur Lewis Building 


Lectures: Tuesdays 11-1pm in Coupland 3 Theatre B 

Tutorials: Fridays 




2,500 word essay – 33% 

Reading week: Week 6: Monday 29th October to Friday 2nd November 2012 



Communication: Students must read their University e-mails regularly, as important 

information will be communicated in this way. 

Examination period: Monday 14th January 2013 – Friday 25th January 2013 

Re-sit Examination period: Monday 19th August 2013 – Friday 31st August 2013 


needed 

by all students attending this course 



the 

SoSS intranet at: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/intranet/ug/handbooks/ 

2 


Summary 

Phenomenology is the study of the structure of experience. In this course unit we will 

examine 

40

aspects of the work of some of the most important Twentieth Century phenomenologists: 

Edmund 

Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Edith Stein, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 

Topics 

covered may include: the nature of intentionality, perception and imagination; our awareness 

of 

self, body and others; and our consciousness of time. We shall also look at what is 

distinctive 

about the methods of phenomenological philosophy. 

Aims 


• introduce students to the philosophical writings of the Twentieth Century phenomenologists; 

• present the historical and philosophical context in which phenomenology was developed; 

• explore in detail some central concepts of phenomenology: intentionality, reduction, 

constitution, 

transcendental ego, time-consciousness, embodiment, intersubjectivity, etc; 

• show how phenomenology relates to issues in metaphysics, epistemology and the 

philosophy of 

mind. 



• an ability to identify the main philosophical questions arising in phenomenological texts; 

• an ability to engage with some of the major issues in the interpretation of the 

phenomenological 

tradition in philosophy; 

• an ability to evaluate the significance of phenomenological philosophy; 

• an ability to relate the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to other 

philosophical disciplines. 

3 


Lectures: Tuesdays 11-1pm in Coupland 3 Theatre B 

Tutorials: 


Friday 11-12pm Coupland 3 LG9 

Friday 12-1pm Humanities Bridgeford St G.34 Howard Kelly 

Friday 1-2pm University Place 4.208 



change 

group without permission. 






Office; 

see you degree programme handbook for further details). If you are absent for another 

reason 

you should tell your tutor or the Philosophy Administrator, Caroline Harmer as soon as 

possible – if possible, before the tutorial. 





Failure to complete assessed work by the due date constitutes a violation of the work and 

41

attendance requirement. 


If 

you have difficulties (e.g. personal, financial or family problems) that result in persistent 

failure to 

meet the work and attendance requirements, you should talk to your Programme Director or 

Academic Advisor. 


Moran, D. & Mooney, T. Eds. 2002. The Phenomenology Reader. London: Routledge. 

[The majority of tutorial readings will be taken from this reader, so you may find it a useful 

purchase] 

Course materials: Further materials will be made available on the courses Blackboard site. 


4 

Study budget 



recommended to 

break this down roughly as follows: 

Lectures 10 x 2 = 20 hours 

Tutorials 10 hours 

Tutorial preparation 10 x 5 hours = 50 hours 

Essay preparation 40 hours 

Exam preparation 80 hours 

TOTAL: 200 hours 



minutes 

past the hour. Late arrival for tutorials may result in your being marked absent; if you arrive 

late it 

is your responsibility to ensure that your tutor has marked you as present. 

4. ASSESSMENT 




provides 

further guidance concerning the assessment criteria. 

EXAMINATION 







for this 

course. 





is not 

obliged to read anymore than the number of words specified above and may ignore any 

additional 

material if they choose. 

42


doublecheck 

your word count. 

Presentation 


They 

should include proper bibliography and references. Include your word count at the end of the 

essay. 

5 



mark 

for the work and may be considered plagiarism, which is a serious offence. 


from the 

School of Social Sciences student intranet. 


used is 

the Harvard system of referencing. On this system, the bibliography would be set out as 

follows: 







Or: 







etc. 


or 

indirect speech – you must back it up with a reference. When giving a reference in your 

essay, 

simply write the author’s name, followed by the date, followed by the relevant page(s). The 

convention is to put the reference at the end of a sentence. For example: 

Ryle thought that the word ‘exists’ is ambiguous (Ryle (1949) pp.23-24). Quine argued 

against Ryle’s view (Quine (1960) p.61). 


referencing. 

The point of giving page references is to support your claim that Ryle or Quine say what you 

claim 

they said. The reader can check for him or herself that these philosophers said what you 

claimed 

they said without having to thumb through every page of the relevant books. 




the 

Arthur Lewis Building. 

43


this 

will be made available on the Blackboard site for the course, see: 



a 

mark of zero. The hard copy and online submission (submitted through Blackboard) 

must 

be exactly the same. 

6 

Deadline 

The submission date for the assessed essay is Tuesday 13th November 2012. All essays 

will be 


submitted 

by 2pm on the hand in day. 



penalties for 

unexcused late submission and for overlong essays. 



submission of 

essays is -10 marks for up to 24 hours late and -10 marks for each subsequent day 

(including 

weekends) for up to 10 days. Students who have a valid reason (i.e. mitigating 

circumstances with 

the necessary documentation) for not being able to submit their assessed essay on time 

should 

collect a mitigating circumstances form from the SoSS Undergraduate Office (Lewis, G.001), 

which 

should be completed and returned to G.001. 



working 

days after the essay deadline date (provided the essay is submitted on time). 


and the 

final examinations boards in June. 


their 

office hour. 

Feedback 


feedback 

to students on their academic progress and achievement, thereby enabling students to 

reflect on 

their progress and plan their academic and skills development effectively. Students are 

reminded 

that feedback is necessarily responsive: only when a student has done a certain amount of 

work 

and approaches us with it at the appropriate fora is it possible for us to feed back on the 

student's 

work. The main forms of feedback on this course are written feedback responses to 

assessed 

44

essays and exam answers. 


this as 

on all SoSS courses. These include: meeting the lecturer/tutor during their office hours; e- 

mailing 


presenting a question on the discussion board on Blackboard; and obtaining feedback from 

your 

peers during tutorials. 


1. Is intentionality ‘the mark of the mental’? 

2. Are there such things as intentional objects? If so, what sort of thing are they? 

3. Is Husserl’s account of time-consciousness correct? 

7 


Δ Essay Topics 

Φ Exam Topics 

Week 1 (beginning 24th Sept): Introduction to Phenomenology 

Week 2 (beginning): Intentionality I – the mark of the mental (Franz Brentano) Δ 

Week 3 (beginning): Intentionality II – intentional objects (Edmund Husserl) Δ 

Week 4 (beginning): Temporality – the flow of time (Edmund Husserl) Δ 

Week 5 (beginning): Perception I – the objects of perception (Heidegger) Φ 

Week 6 (beginning): Reading Week 

Week 7 (beginning): Perception II – perceiving & doing (Heidegger) Φ 

Week 8 (beginning): Perception III – perceptual constancy (Maurice Merleau-Ponty) Φ 

Week 9 (beginning): Embodiment I – the living body (Edith Stein) Φ 

Week 10 (beginning): Embodiment II – the habitual body (Maurice Merleau-Ponty) Φ 

Week 11 (beginning): Imagination – mental images (Jean-Paul Sartre) Φ 

Week 12 (beginning): Self-Consciousness – reflection and the self (Jean-Paul Sartre) Φ 

Weekly tutorials (starting in Week 2) will address issues raised in each lecture. 

8 





the 

tutorial worksheets (available on Blackboard). But, in addition, the following books also have 

helpful material in them. 



essay 

and exam. But you are also encouraged to use your own initiative and find relevant articles 

and 

books by chasing up interesting footnotes, browsing real and virtual libraries, following your 

hunches, and so on. 

A web-based version of this reading list, with links to catalogue entries, should be available 

on the 

JRUL web site. (Click on ‘Link2Lists’ on the main catalogue page). 

General Reading List: 

Carman, T. 2008. Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge. [An excellent introduction to a broad 

range of themes in Merleau-Ponty’s work] 

Carman, T. & Hansen, M. B. N. Eds. 2005. Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. 

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [For the most part, an excellent collection of 

essays] 

45

**Cerbone, D. 2006. Understanding Phenomenology. Chesham: Acumen. [This is, 

perhaps, 

the best place to start. It introduces phenomenology in a very accessible manner] 

Dreyfus, H. 1991. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 

Division 

1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [A classic. This high-level introduction to Heidegger’s 

phenomenology offers a pragmatist interpretation and relates Heidegger to more 

contemporary 

views] 

Dreyfus, H. & Wrathall, M. 2006. A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism. 

Oxford: 

Blackwell. [Lots of helpful introductory essays on a broad range of phenomenological topics] 

**Gallagher S. & Zahavi, D. 2012. The Phenomenological Mind, 2nd Edition. London: 

Routledge. [This advanced introduction is excellent at situating phenomenological issues 

within 

the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology] 

Gorner, P. 2000. Twentieth Century German Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

[Chs. 2-3 are a useful introduction to aspects of Husserlian and Heideggerian 

phenomenology] 

Guignon, C. Ed. 2006. Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, second edition. Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press. [An excellent collection of essays] 

Hammond, M., Howarth, J. & Keat, R. 1991. Understanding Phenomenology. Oxford: 

Blackwell. [A clear introduction to many of the themes of this course] 

McCulloch, G. 1994. Using Sartre. London: Routledge. [An excellent book, relating Sartre 

to 

contemporary philosophy of mind] 

**Moran, D. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. London: Routledge. [A comprehensive 

introduction to phenomenology, particularly useful on Husserl & Heidegger] 

**Moran, D. & Mooney, T. Eds. 2002. The Phenomenology Reader. London: Routledge. 

[The 

majority of tutorial readings will be taken from this reader, so you may find it a useful 

purchase] 

Russell, M. 2006. Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. [Very clear 

introduction to Husserl, covering a broad range of topics] 

Smith, B. & Smith, D. W. Eds. 1995. Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press. [As usual with the Cambridge Companions, an excellent 

collection of introductory essays] 

Smith, D. W. & Thomasson, A. L. Eds. 2005. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. 

Oxford: 

Clarendon. [Collection of advanced essays relating phenomenological themes to 

contemporary 

philosophy of mind and psychology] 

Sokolowski, R. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press. [A very useful introduction to Husserlian phenomenology] 

9 

Weekly Reading List and Tutorial Questions 

This week by week reading list gives you: the required tutorial readings, in most cases a 

selection 

from Moran & Mooney, The Phenomenology Reader; the recommended secondary reading; 

and a 

number of further readings. 

Every week: you must read the first of these; you ought to read the second; you will get extra 

brownie points if you have a look at some of the others. The primary reading can be very 

hard to 

46

follow. Reading the secondary literature as you go will help you to understand the primary 

literature and will give you ideas of things to say about it. When it comes to writing your 

essays 

and revising for exams, you must read a significant amount of material from the further 

reading 

sections. If you don’t, your answers will appear superficial. You should also make use of the 

general reading list, there’s lots of useful material there. For each topic, I have starred (*) 

three 

further readings that I think are useful places to start. 

Some secondary readings largely historical (i.e. ‘what is the best way to understand 

Heidegger’s 

claim that P?’), while others largely systematic (i.e. ‘Heidegger claims that P, but is P true?’). 

It is 

possible to take either approach with any topic. However, it is worth considering that the two 

approaches are related—a good principle to adopt when interpreting a philosopher is to try 

to 

understand their claims in a way which makes them plausible. 

There is a set of questions for each week’s tutorial. Think hard about these and write 

answers to 

them. You need to arrive at the tutorial prepared to speak on the topic, and this is much 

easier if 

you have something written down. 

Lectures 2-4 are the essay topics. Lectures 5-12 are the exam topics. The exam will contain 

6 

questions, drawn from each of these topics, of which you can answer any two. However, it is 

important to bear in mind that (i) the topics are often closely interrelated; (ii) questions may 

be on 

any aspect of the material covered. 

As much as possible from this reading list is either available online, or has been specially 

digitised 

by the library. In the majority of cases where this has not been possible, items have been 

added to 

the short loan library. 

O source available online 

D digitised source available at library 

S short loan 

There is a vast amount of literature on Phenomenology. Just because something is not on 

the 

reading list does not mean that it isn’t worth reading. So explore. However, stick to reputable 

sources—well-known journals, books from academic presses—don’t just copy out what 

some 

chump you’ve never heard of says on an obscure website. It will almost certainly be crap. 

Lecture 1 (Week 1): Introduction to Phenomenology 

There is no required reading or tutorial this week. However, you might like to have a look at 

the 

following: 

Cerbone, D. 2006. Understanding Phenomenology. Chesham: Acumen, Introduction. 

Gallagher S. & Zahavi, D. 2012. The Phenomenological Mind, 2nd Edition. London: 

Routledge, Introduction. 

Routledge.Moran, D. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. London, Routledge, 

Introduction [O] 

10 

Lecture 2 (Week 2): Intentionality I – the mark of the mental (Brentano) 


47

Brentano, F. 1874. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena. In Moran, D. 

& 

Mooney, T. Eds. The Phenomenology Reader. London: Routledge, 2002. [S] 

Recommended Reading: 

Crane, T. 1998. Intentionality as the mark of the mental. In O’Hear, A. Ed. Contemporary 

Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Also available at: www.timcrane.com 

Further Reading: 

Bartok, P. J. 2005. Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and 

Phenomenological Readings. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 [O] 

Brandl, J. L. The Immanence Theory of Intentionality. In D. W. Smith & A. L. Thomasson, 

eds. 

Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 

*Crane, T. 2006. Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence. In M. Textor, ed. The 

Austrian 

Contribution to Philosophy. London: Routledge. 

Also available at www.timcrane.com 

Fish, W. 2005. Emotions, moods and intentionality. In Forrai, G. & Kampis, G. Eds. 

Intentionality Past and Future. Amsterdam: Rodolpi. 

Also available at www.massey.ac.nz/massey/learning/departments/schoolhistoryphilosophyclassics/staff/william-fish.cfm 

*Jacquette, D. 2004. Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality. In Jacquette, D. Ed. The 

Cambridge 

Companion to Brentano. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

*Moran, D. 1996. Brentano’s Thesis. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 

Supplementary 

Volume 70 [O] 

Moran, D. 2000. Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of 

Intentionality. 

Inquiry 43 [O] 

Ness, A. 2008. Are only mental phenomena intentional? Analysis 68 [O] 

11 

The Topic 

Intentionality (not to be confused with intensionality) is ‘aboutness’, and it is commonplace 

that 

many of our mental states are about things. Brentano considers intentionality to be the 

defining 

feature of the psychological realm – all and only mental entities possess intentionality. He 

also 

offers a particular, and controversial, account of intentionality as ‘intentional inexistence’. 

It is difficult to underestimate the significance of intentionality for phenomenology, as it is the 

basis 

of almost all subsequent phenomenological analyses, from Brentano Husserl onwards. 

Brentano might be criticised by claiming that not all mental phenomena are intentional, that 

not all 

intentional phenomena are mental, or that the intentional inexistence account of intentionality 

is 

false. 

The Reading 

In this classic text, Brentano sets himself the task of finding a principle that distinguishes 

mental 

from non-mental phenomena. He considers a number of proposals, rejecting some and 

tentatively 

48

accepting others. However, the view he regards as most fundamental is that all and only 

mental 

phenomena exhibit intentional inexistence. In the process, Brentano makes a number of 

surprising 

claims about perception and existence. 

Questions to Consider: 

1. Brentano claims that presentations are foundational for all other mental phenomena. What 

are 

presentations and is the claim plausible? 

2. Is Brentano right to distinguish between pain as a condition of the body and pain as 

sensation? 

What reason is there for doing so? 

3. Is it correct to say, as Brentano does, that feelings (emotions, moods) have objects? 

4. What is intentional inexistence as Brentano understands it? 

12 

Lecture 3 (Week 3): Intentionality II – intentional objects (Husserl) 


Husserl, E. 1900/1901. Consciousness as Intentional Experience. In Moran, D. & Mooney, 

T. 

The Phenomenology Reader. London: Routledge, 2002. [S] 


Kelly, S. 2003. Husserl and Phenomenology. In R. Solomon & D. Sherman, eds. The 

Blackwell 

Guide to Continental Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. [O] 

Also available at www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~sdkelly 


*Bell, D. 1990. Husserl. London: Routledge, Ch.3 [D] 

*Crane, T. 2001. Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch.1 [D] 

*Dreyfus, H. 1993. Heidegger’s Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality. 

Social 

Research 60 [O] 

Drummond, J. J. 2003. The Structure of Intentionality. In D. Welton, ed. The New Husserl: 

A 

Critical Reader. Bllomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 

Føllesdal. D. 1969. Husserl’s Notion of Noema. Journal of Philosophy 66 [O] 

Hopp, W. 2008. Husserl on sensation, perception and interpretation. Candadian Journal of 

Philosophy 38:2 [O] 

Husserl, E. 1913. Noesis and Noema’. In Moran, D. & Mooney, T. The Phenomenology 

Reader. London: Routledge, 2002. [S] 

Also available at www.archive.org 

Moran, D. 2000. Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of 



13 

The Topic 

Intentionality is ‘aboutness’, but what exactly is involved in one thing’s being about another, 

and 

what is the ontological status of those things that intentional states are about? Although 

greatly 

impressed by Brentano’s discussion, Husserl argues against his conception of intentionality 

as 

‘intentional inexistence’, putting forward his own phenomenological account. 

Husserl’s account of the intentionality of the mind has been highly influential, but has not 

commanded universal consent. Husserl’s account has been criticised for failing to offer an 

49

adequate account of the ontological status of intentional objects, and of focussing on 

theoretical 

intentionality (and mental content) at the expense of the non-content involving, practical 

sphere. 

The Reading 

‘Consciousness as Intentional Experience’ is an important extract from Husserl’s Logical 

Investigations (It is quite long, so you can skip §§14, 18 and 19). In it Husserl lays out the 

fundamentals of his account of intentionality. In particular: he articulates the crucial 

distinctions 

between intentional object, intentional matter and intentional quality; he argues against views 

that 

take intentional objects to be immanent; he describes the relation between intentionality and 

sensation. Husserl begins with some (rather obscure) critical comments on Brentano. But 

persevere because, although this selection is rather dense, it is packed full of important and 

insightful material. 

Note: 'real' and 'reell' mean 'in the world of natural things' and 'actually part of', 

respectively. 


1. In §11 Husserl discusses one of two ‘misunderstandings’ of intentionality. It concerns the 

status of intentional objects. What do you think this misunderstanding amounts to? Do you 

think that Husserl is right that it really is a misunderstanding? 

2. In §20 Husserl makes some important distinctions: between matter and quality and 

between two aspects of matter. What are these distinctions? How do these notions relate 

to that of the intentional object? What is supposed to be immanent and what transcendent? 

3. §21 is rather obscure. What do you think ‘semantic essence’ is supposed to be? 

4. In the Appendix Husserl offers a regress argument against what he refers to as the ‘image 

theory’. What is the theory? What is the argument? Do you think it is convincing? 

14 

Lecture 4 (week 4): Temporality – the flow of time (Husserl) 


Husserl, E. 1905. The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. In Moran, D. & 

Mooney, T. The Phenomenology Reader. London: Routledge, 2002. [S] 


Smith, D. W. 2007. Husserl. London: Routledge, pp.210-217. [S] [D=Ch.5] 


*Dainton, B. 2000. Stream of Consciousness. London: Routledge, Chs.5-7 [S] 

Dainton, B. 2008. Sensing Change. Philosophical Issues 18 [O] 

Hoerl, C. 2009. Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience. Philosophers’ Imprint 9 [O] 

James, W. 1890. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Holt & Co, Vol.1, Ch.15: 'The 

Perception of Time'. 


*Kelly, S. 2005. The Puzzle of Temporal Awareness. In A. Brook & K. Akins, eds. 

Cognition 

and Neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 


Phillips, I. 2010. Perceiving Temporal Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 18 [O] 

Le Poidevin, R. 2007. The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation. Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, Ch.5. [O] 

*Zahavi, D. 2007. Perception of Duration Presupposes Duration of Perception – or Does it? 

Husserl and Dainton on Time. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 [O] 

15 

The Topic 

We experience things as having duration. How can we best account for this pervasive 

feature of 

50

experience? Some have argued that our experience of the present is itself temporally 

extended 

(the so-called specious present view, held by William James), others that our perception of 

the 

present moment is accompanied by an imaginative awareness of the recent past (Brentano). 

Husserl argues for the existence of a primitive sort of memory (retention) which permeates 

all 

perceptual awareness of temporally extended objects (events). 

Husserl’s view might be criticised in a number of ways, two of which would be: (i) the worry 

that the 

retention-primal impression-protention structure that he attributes to all experience cannot 

really 

explain the phenomenon of experienced duration, and (ii) the concern that retention does not 

really 

differ in any significant way from recollection. 

The Reading 

‘The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness’ is, at times, a difficult read. It is, 

however, 

recognised as an important contribution to the perplexing topic of our awareness of the 

passing of 

time. Husserl spends a good deal of time describing retention (and to a lesser extent, 

protention), 

and distinguishing it from another type of memory, recollection. The reading also includes a 

difficult 

but important discussion of the duration of experience itself (§18). 


1. What do you think the phenomenon is that Husserl is attempting to characterise? 

2. For much of this reading Husserl is concerned to distinguish between what he calls 

primary 

memory (retention) and secondary remembering (recollection). What is the difference 

between the two? Do you think that Husserl has made a good case for his view that they 

are different in kind? 

3. In §§16-17 Husserl distinguishes between two senses of ‘perception’. What does this 

distinction amount to? 

4. Husserl doesn’t say very much about it, but what is protention (expectational intuition)? 

16 

Lecture 5 (Week 5): Perception I – the objects of perception (Heidegger) 


Heidegger, M. 1925. The Fundamental Discoveries of Phenomenology, its Principle, and 

the 

Clarification of its Name (§5). In Moran, D. & Mooney, T. The Phenomenology Reader. 

London: Routledge, 2002. [S] 


Crane, T. 2006. Is there a perceptual relation. In Gendler, T. & Hawthorne, J. Eds. 

Perceptual 

Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Also available at www.timcrane.com 


Carman, T. 2003. Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being 

and 

Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chs.3-4. 

Christensen, C. B. 1997. Heidegger’s Representationalism. Review of Metaphysis 51 [O] 

*Hopp, W. 2008. Husserl on sensation, perception and interpretation. Candadian Journal 


51

Philosophy 38 (2008) [O] 

*Kelly, S. 2003. Husserl and Phenomenology. In R. Solomon & D. Sherman, eds. The 

Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. [O] 


Mooney, T. 2010. Understanding and Simple Seeing in Husserl. Husserl Studies 26 (2010) 

[O] 

Mulligan, K. 1995. Perception. In D. W. Smith & B. Smith, eds. Cambridge Companion to 

Husserl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [O] 

Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch.2 [S] 

*Smith, D. 2003. Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations. London: Routledge, Ch.2 [O] 

17 

The Topic 

What are the objects of perception? What are the respective roles of intentionality and 

sensation in 

perception? With respect to the first question, Husserl and Heidegger agree that the objects 


perception are ordinary worldly objects. This is in contrast to the claims of a number of 

philosophers throughout the history of philosophy, who have claimed that the objects of 

perception 

are themselves something mental (ideas, sense-data, sensations, representations). Husserl 

and 

Heidegger also both characterise perception as intentional, as Heidegger puts it, as 

‘directingitselftoward’. 

However, Heidegger has little positive to say about the role of sensation in 

perception. In this he differs from Husserl. 

The Reading 

This is Heidegger at his most Husserlian. It is a particularly clear discussion of intentionality 

with 

specific reference to the intentionality of perception. There are arguments against ‘indirect’ 

accounts of perception, and some hints towards the primacy of the practical. The reading 

also 

contains a critical discussion of Rickert (which you don’t need to concentrate on). Although 

not part 

of the reading, §6 is an interesting discussion of categorical intuition, fulfilment and truth. 

You are also strongly recommended to read: Husserl, E. 1900/1901. Consciousness as 

Intentional 

Experience (§14). In Moran, D. & Mooney, T. The Phenomenology Reader. London: 

Routledge, 

2002. 


1. In §5a Heidegger claims that a perception is ‘intrinsically intentional’ whether or not it has 

a 

real object. Is this right? Do you think that an account of perception as intentional can 

account 

for hallucinations? Is there not some plausibility to the idea that, in a hallucination, what one 

is 

aware of is a ‘content of consciousness’? 

2. In §5c(α) Heidegger distinguishes between the ‘environmental thing’ and the ‘natural 

thing’. 

This distinction prefigures next week’s topic. What exactly does the distinction amount to? 

Do 

you think that we literally perceive things as environmental things, or only as natural things? 

Is 

52

Heidegger right to claim that the perception of a chair as hard is really, primarily, the 

perception 

of it as uncomfortable. 

3. Heidegger argues, in §5c(β) that indirect (picture based) accounts of perception are 

falsified by 

the phenomenology, according to which the perceived is ‘bodily there’. Is he right? He also 

argues that they fall down to an infinite regress objection. Is this a convincing argument? 

4. Heidegger only mentions sensation in his rejection of ‘indirect’ accounts of perception. Do 

you 

think that this is right? Is there such a thing as perceptual sensation or can perception be 

characterised entirely in terms of intentionality and ‘bodily presence’? 

18 

Lecture 6 (Week 7): Perception II – perceiving and doing (Heidegger) 


Heidegger, M. The Worldhood of the World. In Moran, D. & Mooney, T. The 

Phenomenology 



Hall, H. 1993. Intentionality and World: Division I of Being and Time. In C. Guignon, ed. 

Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 1st Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

[O] 


Blattner, W. 1999. Is Heidegger a Representationalist? Philosophical Topics 27 

Carman, T. 2003. Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being 

and 

Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chs.2-3 

Cerbone, D. 1999. Constitution and Composition: Heidegger’s Hammer. Philosophical 

Topics 

27 (1999) [D] 

Christensen, C. B. 1997. Heidegger’s Representationalism. Review of Metaphysis 51 [O] 

*Dreyfus, H. 1991. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 

Division 1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Ch.3-5 [S] [D = Ch.3] 

*Moran, D. 2000. Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of 



Richardson, J. 1991. Existential Epistemology: A Heideggerian Critique of the Cartesian 

Project. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Part I, ‘Everydayness’ [O] 

*Soffer, G. 1999. Phenomenologizing with a Hammer: Theory of Practice? Continental 

Philosophy Review 32 (1999) [O] 

19 

The Topic 

We don’t just think about things and see things, we do things. And, usually, we do things 

with 

things—we drive in the nail with the hammer, type with the computer, scrub with the brush. 

When 

we engaged in such activities, how do the objects with which we are engaged appear to us? 

Heidegger’s influential answer to this question incorporates his important distinction between 

the 

ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, and his claim that the world is, essentially, a 

normative, 

meaningful structure. It is often presented as an account of our most fundamental relation to 

the 

world—one which makes Husserlian intentionality possible. 

53

Heidegger’s view might be criticised by questioning his claim that the ready-to-hand is prior 

to the 

present-at-hand, by arguing that the phenomena he unearths do not make intentionality 

possible, 

but in fact presuppose it, or by arguing that it neglects the role of the body in skilled activity. 

The Reading 

This is a classic section from Heidegger’s seminal work Being and Time. The tone is very 

different 

to the reading from last week. Heidegger’s fundamental philosophical interest is in the nature 


the meaning of being. How are the different ways of being—the what of things—of entities 

made 

manifest to us? This signals a departure from Husserl. Indeed, Heidegger is often interpreted 

as 

presenting a position deeply at odds with Husserlian phenomenology. He does, however, 

refer to 

his own work as ‘phenomenology’ and his conception of phenomenology as the disclosing of 

‘that 

which shows itself’ as it shows itself, is clearly closely related to Husserl’s ‘science of 

phenomena’. 

On Heidegger’s view, the fact that we inhabit a world is so fundamental to us (Heidegger 

refers to 

us as ‘Dasein’—literally ‘being-there’), that he calls our mode of being ‘being-in-the-world’. In 

this 

section, Heidegger coins lots of terminology (especially in the difficult §14) and it is easy to 

get lost 

in this. Nevertheless, one can still get some sense of the phenomena (the world, or 

environment 

and the entities within it) that Heidegger is keen to elucidate. Try to keep a focus on the idea 

that 

Heidegger is concerned with the question of how the world, and the entities within it, is 

presented 

to us in every day, practical experience. Although there is important material throughout the 

reading, much of the vital claims are to be found in §§15-16, so you might want to skip the 

lengthy 

§17 and the obscure §18. 


1. In §15 Heidegger introduces the notion of the ‘ready-to-hand’ which is encountered in a 

special 

kind of awareness ‘circumspection’. This is distinguished from the merely ‘present-at-hand’ 

which is the object of theoretical inquiry and investigation. How does Heidegger characterise 

the ready-to-hand? 

2. Towards the end of §15, Heidegger claims that the ready-to-hand is prior to the presentathand. 

What do you think he means by this, and does he give adequate reasons? 

3. In §16 Heidegger claims that it is when equipment becomes unusable that ‘the world 

announces itself’. What does he have in mind? Do you think that he is right? 

20 

Lecture 7 (Week 8): Perception III – perceptual constancy (Merleau-Ponty) 


Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. Phenomenology of Perception, translated by C. Smith. London: 

Routledge, 1962, Part 2, Chapter 3, 'The Thing and the Natural World', pp.299-317 [S] 



54

Kelly, S. 1999. What do we see (when we do)? Philosophical Topics 27 (1999) 



*Carman, T. 2008. Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge, Ch.2 [S] 

*Kelly, S. 2005. Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty. In T. Carman & M. Hansen, eds. The 

Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [O] 

Kennedy, M. J. 2007. Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological 

Research 75 (2007) [O] 

Madary, M. 2008. Specular Highlights as a Guide to Perceptual Content. Philosophical 

Psychology 28 (2008) [O] 

*Madary, M. 2010. Husserl on Perceptual Constancy. European Journal of Philosophy. [O] 

Noë, A. 2005. Real Presence. Philosophical Topics 33 (2005) 

Also available at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/ 

Overgaard, S. 2010. On the Looks of Things. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2010) [O] 

Siewert, C. 2006. Is Shape Appearance Protean? Psyche 12 (2006) [O] 

21 

The Topic 

In perceptual experience we are not only aware of objects and events, we are also aware of 

the 

ways these things are. That is, we are aware of properties. How are properties given in 

experience? In particular, how is it, if at all, that an object’s properties (shape, size, colour) 

are 

given as constant despite the fact that the object is presented from constantly changing 

perspectives, in constantly changing ‘adumbrations’? A number of different answers to this 

question have been proposed by philosophers and psychologists, amongst them Merleau- 

Ponty. 

Merleau-Ponty presents his philosophy as situated between two extremes, that he calls 

‘empiricism’ and ‘intellectualism’. Rejecting both ‘empiricist’ and ‘intellectualist’ accounts of 

perceptual constancy, Merleau-Ponty presents his own view that constancy is a 

consequence of 

the fact that the perception of objects is, in a certain sense, normative and always situated 

within a 

perceptual context. 

Merleau-Ponty’s account can be criticised by arguing that not all objects are perceived in 

relation 

to a norm, or by arguing that he imposes too stringent requirements on the alternative views 

that 

he considers. 

The Reading 

This week’s reading, the first part of ‘The Thing and the Natural World’, is a selection from 

Merleau-Ponty’s main work Phenomenology of Perception. Like the rest of the book, it is 

dense 

and can be difficult to follow, partly due to its literary style (Merleau-Ponty, like Sartre, took 

the 

view that an accurate description of phenomena often demands such language), partly due 

to the 

complexity of the discussion. Merleau-Ponty first deals with shape and size. The views that 

he 

rejects—the ‘empiricist’ view of the ‘psychologist’ and the ‘intellectualist’ view associated with 

Kant—are introduced and rejected within the first few pages, his owns view articulated soon 

after. 

Next Merleau-Ponty turns to the case of colour—about which he has a good deal more to 

say. 

Much of this discussion is difficult, especially the lengthy account of lighting. 

55


1. On p.299 Merleau-Ponty introduces the view of the ‘psychologist’, according to which the 

constant (true) shape and size of an object is that which is most frequently presents. 

Merleau- 

Ponty criticises the view by claiming that it presupposes that which it is supposed to explain. 

What exactly do you think he has in mind here? What is the account supposed to explain 

and 

does the ‘psychologist’ really presuppose it? 

2. Merleau-Ponty introduces the ‘Kantian’ view of shape and size constancy on p.300. What 

is 

this view supposed to be? What problems does Merleau-Ponty think that it faces? 

3. On p.302 Merleau-Ponty introduces his own account of shape and size constancy, 

according 

to which the constant is that which is associated with a norm. What is the view? How does it 

differ from the two accounts that Merleau-Ponty rejects? 

4. After a lengthy discussion of the relationship between ‘the thing lighted’, ‘the lighting’ and 

‘the 

organisation of the field’, Merleau-Ponty tells us the ‘true significance of the perceptual 

constancies’ (p.313). What do you think this ‘true significance’ is? Do you think that Merleau- 

Ponty has made a convincing case for the claim? 

22 

Lecture 8 (week 9): Embodiment I – the living body (Stein) 


Stein, E. 1917. On the Problem of Empathy. In Moran, D. & Mooney, T. The 

Phenomenology 



De Vignemont, F. 2007. Habeas Corpus: The sense of ownership of one’s own body. Mind 

and 

Language 22 [O] 


*Brewer, B. 1995. Bodily-Awareness and the Self. In J. L. Bermúdez, A. Marcel & N. Eilan, 

eds. The Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 

*Carman, T. 1999. The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophical Topics 27 (1999) 

Also available at http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/188_s05/pdf/Carman_Body.pdf 

Cassam, Q. Forthcoming. The Embodied Self. In S. Gallagher, ed. The Oxford Handbook 


the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Also available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/faculty/cassam/ 

Gallagher, S. 1986. Lived Body and Environment. Research in Phenomenology 16 [O] 

Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily-Awareness and Object Perception. Theoria et Historia 

Scientiarum: 

International Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies 7 (2003) 

Also available at http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gallaghr/ 

MacIntyre, A. 2006. Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue, 1913-1922. Lanham: Rowman 

& 

Littlefield, Ch.9 

Martin, M. G. F. 1995. Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership. In J. L. Bermúdez, A. 

Marcel 

& N. Eilan, eds. The Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 

*Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. Phenomenology of Perception, translated by C. Smith. London: 

Routledge, 1962, Part 1 [S] 


23 

56

The Topic 

Decartes remarked that he was not lodged in his body as is a pilot in a ship. The way in 

which we 

are aware of our bodies is special. Embodiment is a pervasive feature of our experience, yet 

it is 

so familiar that it can easily be overlooked. This topic concerns the awareness that each of 

us has 

of our bodies ‘from the inside’. Can the awareness that one has of one’s own body be 

understood 

on the model of the awareness that one has of other objects? Or is the body given, not as an 

object, but as the subject of experience? And how does the experience of the body ‘from the 

inside’ relate to the experience of it from without? 

The Reading 

Although the title concerns empathy, the real topic of this reading is the experience we have 

of our 

own bodies from the inside – what she, like Husserl, calls the ‘living body’ (Leib). Her central 

aim to 

to account for the fact that we experience ourselves as embodied and her explanation 

focuses on 

the body’s spatial relation to us, its being the location of sensation, and its being the vehicle 


expression. She describes the sense of ownership that each of us has concerning our 

bodies and 

the way in which our bodies take up space. This, she claims, is unlike the spatial location of 

other 

objects. She also offers an account of the way in which we identify the felt body with the 

seen body 

via phenomenal ‘fusion’. Stein goes on to argue that our experience of bodily expression and 


the body’s relation to the will, partly grounds our sense of being a ‘psycho-physical 

individual’. 


1. Does Stein offer an explanation of one’s ‘affiliation’ with one’s body – the sense of 

ownership? 

What is it? 

2. Stein claims that the spatiality of the body differs from that of other objects. Is this 

phenomenologically accurate? 

3. What does Stein mean by ‘fusion’? What role does it play in her account? Does she have 

a 

compelling criticism of the view of fusion as ‘mere association’? 

4. What is the significance of Stein’s description of the experience of emotional expression? 

24 

Lecture 9 (week 10): Embodiment II – the habitual body (Merleau-Ponty) 


Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. The body as Object Mechanistic Physiology. In Moran, D. & 

Mooney, 

T. The Phenomenology Reader. London: Routledge, 2002. [S] 


Carman, T. 1999. The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophical Topics 27 (1999) 

Also available at http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/188_s05/pdf/Carman_Body.pdf 


Bermúdez, J. L. 2005. The Phenomenology of Bodily Awareness. In D. W. Smith & A. L. 

Thomasson, eds. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 

Carman, T. 2008. Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge, Ch.2 [S] 

57

Gallagher. S. 1995. Body Schema and Intentionality. J. L. Bermúdez, A. Marcel & N. Eilan, 

eds. The Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 

*Gallagher S. & Zahavi, D. 2008. The Phenomenological Mind. London: Routledge, Ch.7 

[S] 

*Kelly, S. 2002. Merleau-Ponty on the body. Ratio (New Series) 15 [O] 


*Romdenh-Romluc, K. 2011. Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Perception. 

London: 

Routledge, Ch.3 

Wider, K. 1997. The Bodily Nature of Consciousness. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 

Ch.5 

Zaner, R. 1964. The Problem of Embodiment. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, Part 3, Ch.2 

25 

The Topic 

Merleau-Ponty is perhaps best known for his account of the way in which our embodiment 

shapes 

our experience. We are aware of the world from a perspective, and that perspective is that of 

our 

body. We are aware of objects as affording certain actions, and that refers us back to our 

bodily 

capacities. But how can we best describe the experience of having a body? How ought we to 

think 

about the relation between the physiological aspects of the body and its experiential aspects 

(we 

both feel and feel with our bodies)? 

Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body has many facets. He argues that, in ordinary 

experience, we 

are not aware of our bodies as objects, rather as subjects. And he argues that an account of 

the 

relation between the physiological and the psychological must be given in terms of being-intheworld, 

conceived in explicitly bodily terms. 

Merleau-Ponty’s views might be challenged by arguing that we are, in fact, aware of our 

bodies as 

objects, or by arguing that being-in-the-world is less fundamental than he maintains. 

The Reading 

In ‘The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology’ Merleau-Ponty uses the examples of 

phantom 

limbs and anosognosia to motivate his account of bodily experience as being-in-the-world. 

Merleau-Ponty claims that his account is neither physiological nor psychological, and 

actually 

makes it possible to see how those two are related. He draws an analogy between the way 

in 

which the body ‘understands’ and ‘lives’ its world, and the psychoanalytic concept of 

repression. 

He also includes a discussion of the ‘impersonal’ nature of bodily being. 


1. Merleau-Ponty argues against both purely physiological and purely psychological 

accounts of 

phantom limbs. What do you take his arguments to be and do you find them convincing? 

2. On p.429 Merleau-Ponty introduces the notion of being-in-the-world as an explanation of 

phantom limbs. How convincing do you find the explanation? 

3. Merleau-Ponty says that being-in-the-world is distinguished from ‘third person processes’ 

(for 

58

which the body is considered as a mere object, like any other) and ‘every cogitatio’ 

(conscious 

acts of thinking) by the fact that it is ‘a preobjective view’. What do you think he means by 

this? 

Does he give a phenomenologically accurate description of being-in-the-world? 

4. Merleau-Ponty describes the body, in its role as the ‘vehicle of being-in-the-world’ as 

‘impersonal’. What do you think he means by this and why is it significant? Do you think that 

he 

is right? 

26 

Lecture 10 (week 11): Imagination – mental images (Sartre) 


Sartre, J-P. 1940. The Imaginary, translated by J. Webber. London: Routledge, 2004, Part 

I, 

Ch.1, ‘Description’ [S] [D] 


McCulloch, G. 1994. Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes. 

London: Routledge, Ch.5 [S] [O] 


Casey, E. 2000. Imagining: A Phenomenological Study. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 

University 

Press. 

*Hannay, A. 1971. Mental Images: A Defence. London: Unwin, Ch.4 [S] 

*Hopkins, R. 1998. Picture, Image and Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 

Ch.7 [S] 

Jansen, J. 2005. On the development of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology of 

imagination and its use in interdisciplinary research. Phenomenology and the Cognitive 

Sciences 4 (2005) [O] 

Peacocke, C. 1985. Imagination, Experience and Possibility: A Berkeleian View Defended. 

In 

J. Foster & H. Robinson, eds. Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentenary Celebration. Oxford: 

Clarendon Press. [S] 

Ricoeur, P. 1981. Sartre and Ryle on Imagination. In P. Schilpp, ed. The Philosophy of 

Jean- 

Paul Sartre. La Salle, IL: Open Court. 

*Stawarska, B. 2005. Defining Imagination: Sartre between Husserl and Janet. 

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2005) [O] 

Tye, M. 1991. The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Chs. 1-2 

27 

The Topic 

Seemingly situated between perceiving and thinking is imagining. In the imagination we can 

bring 

distant objects to mind, as with thinking, yet we do so in a way that seems to possess 

something of 

the immediacy of perceptual experience. A perennial temptation of philosophers and 

psychologists 

alike has been to explain these features by positing ‘mental images’ of which we are aware 

when 

we imagine. Sartre opposes this view, arguing that in imagining, say, the Eiffel Tower I am 

not 

aware of an internal, mental image of the Tower, rather I am intentionally directed towards 

the 

59

Tower itself. Sartre also offers a subtle description of the way in which imagining (and the 

object as 

imagined) differs from perceiving (and the object as perceived), on the one hand, and 

thinking (and 

the object as thought), on the other. 

One might challenge Sartre’s view by arguing that he has underestimated the resources of 

the 

‘mental image’ theory, or by arguing that the objects of imagination are not merely objects 

but 

experiences of objects. 

The Reading 

This reading is from one of Sartre’s early phenomenological studies and contains little of his 

existentialist concerns. It is comparatively clear and requires little by way of introduction. It 

includes 

his rejection of the ‘illusion of immanence’ and his classic discussion of ‘quasi-observation’. 

One 

potentially confusing feature of Sartre’s discussion is that, although he rejects internal, 

mental 

images, he continues to speak of ‘the image’. He is, of course, reinterpreting this term. He 

uses 

‘An image of X’ to mean what we might less confusingly refer to as ‘the act of imagining an 

X’. 


1. In §I Sartre claims that, in reflection, when I am imagining it is cannot be doubted that I am 

doing just that. Much of the ensuing discussion is intended to draw out the ‘marks’ of the 

imagination that could explain such knowledge. Do you think that Sartre is right about this? 

Do 

you think that the characteristics of the image that he describes really could explain such an 

impossibility of doubt? 

2. Sartre’s dismissal of the ‘illusion of immanence’ in §II, seems almost cursory. Do you think 

that 

he is fair to the position? How might the defender of internal, mental images respond to 

Sartre’s claims? 

3. In §III Sartre speaks of the ‘essential poverty’ of the image, and he links this to the idea 

that we 

learn nothing from the image. What do you think he has in mind here? Do you agree with 

Sartre that we can learn nothing from our images? 

4. In describing the ways in which imagining is similar to both perceiving and thinking, Sartre 

describes it as a sort of ‘quasi-observation’. What features of the imagination does he mean 

to 

convey by this term? Do you think that his description is accurate? 

28 

Lecture 11 (Week 12): Self-Consciousness – reflection & the self (Sartre) 


Sartre, J-P. 1936-7. The Transcendence of the Ego. In Moran, D. & Mooney, T. The 

Phenomenology Reader. London: Routledge, 2002. [S] 


Morris, P. S. 1985. Sartre on the Transcendence of the Ego. Philosophy and 

Phenomenological Research 46 (1995) [O] 


*Gardner, S. 2009. Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. London: Continuum, 2009, Ch.2 [S] 

Gennaro, R. 2002. Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness. Canadian 

Journal 

of Philosophy 32. [O] 

60

Priest, S. 2000. The Subject in Question: Sartre's Critique of Husserl in The 

Transcendence of 

the Ego. London: Routledge. 

*Richmond, S. 2004. Introduction in Sartre, J-P. The Transcendence of the Ego, translated 

by 

A. Brown. London, Routledge, 2004. 

Stawarska, B. 2002. Memory and Subjectivity: Sartre in Dialogue with Husserl. Sartre 

Studies 

International 8 (2002) [O] 

*Wider, K. 1997. The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary 

Philosophy of 

Mind. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Ch.3 

Williford, K. 2010. Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness and the Autobiographical Ego. In J. 

Webber, ed. Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. London: Routledge. 

Zahavi, D. 2000. Self and Consciousness. In D. Zahavi, ed. Exploring the Self. Amsterdam: 

John Benjamins. 

29 

The Topic 

Phenomenology is intimately bound up with self-consciousness. Husserl makes reflection on 

one’s 

own experience a central component of phenomenological method. But what is 

selfconsciousness? 

In particular, is it the consciousness of a self? In Logical Investigations Husserl 

thought not, claiming that in reflection one is aware of conscious mental states, but not the 

experiencing self, or ‘ego’. However, he changed his mind, coming to argue that 

selfconsciousness 

involved a consciousness of the self/ego. Furthermore, he argued that the ego was 

transcendental. That is, it was a precondition of the possibility of experience. His reason for 

believing this was the Kantian one that the ego is a necessary condition of the possibility of 

the 

unity of consciousness. 

Sartre argued against this later position of Husserl’s, claiming that the only sense in which 

we 

encounter an ego is as transcendent (not transcendental). He argues that the transcendental 

ego 

is not required to explain the unity of consciousness, and he tells a complex story about the 

relation between awareness of the ego, pre-reflective self-awareness, and reflective 

experience 

(self-consciousness). His position can be summed up by saying that the I is not something in 

consciousness but something for consciousness. 

Sartre’s view can be criticised by questioning whether he manages to account for the unity of 

experience without a reliance on the transcendental ego, and whether his minimal account of 

selfawareness 

can account for all aspects of self-conscious experience. 

The Reading 

In this reading Sartre both argues against Husserl’s position and presents his own account 

of the 

‘transcendence of the ego’. His arguments against the transcendental ego (that it is 

‘superfluous’ 

and that it is ‘a hindrance’) are presented in a rather cursory way. His positive account of the 

transcendent ego is presented in much more detail. Sartre draws on a great deal of 

Husserlian 

material that is not given much of an explanation. It is important to get clear in one’s mind 

the 

61

difference between unreflected, reflected and reflective consciousness and their relation to 

the I 

(the self, the ego). 

Although both parts of Sartre’s article are worth reading, we will focus on Part i. “The I and 

the 

me”. 


1. Sartre says, in i.A, that the transcendental I is often thought to be required to explain both 

the 

unity and individuality of consciousness (the ‘classic position’). He argues, however, that 

consciousness ‘unifies itself’. What do you think the ‘classic position’ means by saying that 

the 

transcendental I unifies experience? And how do you think we ought to understand Sartre’s 

alternative account? Is it plausible? 

2. In i.A Sartre says that the “transcendental I is the death of consciousness”. This is 

obviously 

figurative language. What do you think his point is? Why is it so important for Sartre that 

there 

by nothing ‘in’ consciousness? 

3. In i.B Sartre makes a great deal of the difference between unreflected, reflected and 

reflecting 

consciousness. He claims that unreflected consciousness lacks an I, whilst reflective 

consciousness is aware of an I, but as a transcendent object (which would not survive the 

phenomenological reduction). Do you think that these claims are phenomenologically 

accurate? 

4. What, then, is the difference between the Husserl’s transcendental ego and Sartre’s 

transcendent ego? 

62



PHILOSOPHY 


PHIL20951 Aesthetics 


Lecturer(s): Dr. Catharine Abell 


Telephone: 0161 275 1283 

Email: 

catharine.abell@manchester.ac.uk 

Office Hours: Monday 10-11am, Wednesday 2-3pm 


Tutors: 


Tutorials will be taken by Teaching Assistant: Phil Letts 

Caroline Harmer, UG Office, G.001 Arthur Lewis Building 


Lectures: Mondays 1-3pm in Humanities Bridgeford Street G.33 

Tutorials: 

Tuesdays 




2,500 word essay – 33% 

Reading week: Week 6: Monday 29 th October to Friday 2 nd November 2012 






63

Examination period: Monday 14 th January 2013 – Friday 25 th January 2013 








Summary 

This course unit is concerned with central questions in analytical aesthetics: questions in 

areas (e.g. the philosophy of mind, ontology and the philosophy of language) that are 

themselves at the core of analytical philosophy. Topics covered include: what is an artwork?; 

are there correct and incorrect evaluations of works of art?; what is involved in interpreting a 

work of art?; what, if anything, is wrong with forgery?; how can works of music express 

emotions?; is cinema a particularly realistic art form and, if so, in what does its realism 

consist? 

Aims 

This course unit aims to: 

• Enable students to analyse and develop their own reasoned opinions on some of the most 

central and enduring problems in analytical aesthetics. 

• Enhance students' powers of critical analysis, reasoning and independent thought. 

• Familiarise students with some of the most interesting and provocative texts in analytical 

aesthetics 



• Knowledge and understanding of a range of central texts in analytic aesthetics. 

• Some in-depth critical knowledge of some of the most important theories in the areas 

covered by the course. 

• The ability to critically reflect on those theories, and to articulate and defend their own 

views. 

64


Lectures: Mondays 1-3pm in Humanities Bridgeford Street G.33 

Tutorials: 


Tuesday 9-10am 

Tuesday 10-11am 

Tuesday 1-2pm 

Tuesday 2-3pm 

Coupland 3 LG13 

WK 2-3 Dover St BS5 

WK 4&5 Uni Place 3.205 

WK 7-12 Uni Place 4.214 

Coupland 3 LG12 

WK 2-3 Dover St BS8 

WK 4-5 and 7-12 Samuel Alexander Class 

Wing A214 

Phil Letts 










another reason you should tell your tutor or the Philosophy Administrator, Caroline 

Harmer as soon as possible – if possible, before the tutorial. 











65


There is no recommended textbook for this course. 



site. 


Study budget 




Lectures 

Tutorials 




TOTAL: 

10 x 2 = 20 hours 

10 hours 


40 hours 

80 hours 

200 hours 





4. ASSESSMENT 





EXAMINATION 





66












Presentation 











as follows: 






Or: 


67







etc. 

















this will be made available on the Blackboard site for the course, see: 





Deadline 

The submission date for the assessed essay is Tuesday 27 th November 2012. All essays 

will be submitted to the Undergraduate Office, G.001, in the Arthur Lewis building and must 

be submitted by 2pm on the hand in day. 




68















Feedback 










hours; e-mailing questions to the lecturer/tutor; asking questions from the lecturer (before 

and after lecture); presenting a question on the discussion board on Blackboard; and 

obtaining feedback from your peers during tutorials. 


1. What is an artwork? 

2. What is the relationship between a work’s aesthetic properties and its non-aesthetic 

properties? 

3. Evaluate aesthetic empiricism. 


Week 1 (beginning 24 th Sep): 

Week 2 (beginning 1 st Oct): 

Defining Art 

Against Defining Art 

69

Week 3 (beginning 8 th Oct): 


Week 5 (beginning 22 nd Oct): 


Week 7 (beginning 5 th Nov): 




Week 11 (beginning 3 rd Dec): 

Week 12 (beginning 10 th Dec): 

Aesthetic Properties 

Aesthetic Empiricism 

Interpretation 

READING WEEK 

Evaluation 

Musical Expression 

Photography and Vision 

Photography as an Art 

Cinema 

Revision and Exam Preparation 

Weekly tutorials (starting in Week 2) will address issues raised in the previous week’s 

lecture. 












General introductory texts 

Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley, The Philosophy of Art: Readings Ancient and Modern (McGraw- 

Hill, 1995) 

Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley, Arguing about Art (McGraw-Hill, 1995) 

Noel Carroll, Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 1999) 

David Cooper (ed.), A Companion to Aesthetics (Blackwell, 1995) 

Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics (Routledge, 

2001) 

Matthew Kieren (ed) Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art 

(Blackwell, 2006) 

Gordon Graham, Philosophy of the Arts (Routledge, 1997) 

Jerrold Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics (OUP, 2003) 

Oswald Hanfling (ed.), Philosophical Aesthetics (Open University, 1992) 

Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen (eds.), Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic 

Tradition (Blackwell, 2005). 

Additional Sources 

The specialist journals are well worth a browse: The British Journal of Aesthetics 

(‘BJA’) and the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (‘JAAC’) 

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (on the web) contains some good entries 

Copies of my seminar overheads will be placed on the course unit’s web page. 

70

WEEK-BY-WEEK READING LIST 

 

 

This list is not intended to be exhaustive; you are also encouraged to browse 

and find your own articles and books to read. 

Photocopies of emboldened items are available in the Short Loan section of 

the JRULM. 

WEEK 1: DEFINING ART 

Tutorial Texts 

Dickie, George (1969), 'Defining Art', The American Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (3), 253- 

56. 

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Defining Art Historically’, BJA 19 (1979). 

Further Reading 

Catharine Abell (2011) Art: What it Is and Why it Matters, Philosophy and Phenomenological 

Research, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291933- 

1592/earlyview 

Noel Carroll, The Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction, Ch. 5. 

Arthur C. Danto, ‘The Artworld’, Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964); 

Arthur Danto (1986), The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (New York: Columbia 

University Press). 

--- (1995), 'The Artworld', in Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (eds.), The Philosophy of Art: 

Readings Ancient and Modern (Boston: McGraw Hill), 202-13. 

--- (2000), 'Art and Meaning', in Noel Carroll (ed.), Theories of Art Today (Madison: 

University of Wisconsin Press), 130-40. 

Davies, Stephen (1991), Definitions of Art (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press). 

Dickie, George (1971), Aesthetics: An Introduction (Indianapolis: Pegasus). 

--- (1984). The Art Circle: a Theory of Art (New York: Haven Publications). 

--- (2000), 'The Institutional Theory of Art', in Noel Carroll (ed.), Theories of Art Today 

(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press). 

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Refining Art Historically’, JAAC 47 (1989). 

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Extending Art Historically’, JAAC 51 (1993). 

Robert Stecker, ‘Definition of Art’, in Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. 

WEEK 2: AGAINST DEFINING ART 


Morris Weitz, ‘The Role of Theory in Aesthetics’, JAAC 15 (1956) 

Berys Gaut (2000), ''Art' as a Cluster Concept', in Noel Carroll (ed.), Theories of Art 

Today (25-44; Madison: University of Wisconsin Press). 

71


Berys Gaut, “The Cluster Account of Art Defended”, The British Journal of Aesthetics, 2005 

Maurice Mandelbaum, ‘Family Resemblances and Generalizations Concerning The Arts’, 

American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965). 

WEEK 3: AESTHETIC PROPERTIES 


Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); 

Frank Sibley, “Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic”, The Philosophical Review 74 (1965), No. 2 

(Apr., 1965), pp. 135-159 


Marcia Eaton, ‘The Intrinsic, Non-Supervenient Nature of Aesthetic Properties’, JAAC 52 

(1994). 

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Aesthetic Supervenience’ in his Music, Art and Metaphysics (Cornell U. P., 

1994). 

John MacKinnon, ‘Scruton, Sibley, and Supervenience’ JAAC 59 (2000): 383-92. 

John MacKinnon, ‘Aesthetic Supervenience: For and Against’ BJA 41 (2001): 59-75. 

Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic’, Philosophical Review 74 (1965). 

WEEK 4: AESTHETIC EMPIRICISM 


Kendall L. Walton. “Categories of Art” Philosophical Review, Vol. 79 (1970), No. 3, 334- 

367. 

Brian Laetz “Kendall Walton’s Categories of Art: A Critical Commentary” British Journal 

of Aesthetics (2010) 50 (3): 287-306. 


David Davies, 'Against Enlightened Empiricism', in Matthew Kieran (ed.), 

Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (Oxford: 

Blackwell, 2006), pp. 22–34 

Daniel O. Nathan, Categories and Intentions, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 

Vol. 31, No. 4. (Summer, 1973), pp. 539-541. 

72

WEEK 5: INTERPRETATION 

Tutorial Text 

Richard Wollheim, “Criticism as Retrieval”, in Neill and Ridley (eds), The Philosophy of 

Art: Readings Ancient and Modern, McGraw Hill (1995), pp404-414. 

W.K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley, ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ Sewanee Review 54 (1946); 

reprinted at http://faculty.smu.edu/nschwart/seminar/Fallacy.htm. 


Monroe Beardsley, ‘Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived’; reprinted in Lamarque 

and Olsen. 

Noel Carroll, ‘Interpretation and Intention: The Debate between Hypothetical and Actual 

Intentionalism’, Metaphilosophy 31 (2000). 

Frank Cioffi, ‘Intention and Interpretation in Criticism’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 

64 (1964). 

Gergory Currie, ‘Interpretation in Art’, in Levinson (ed.), The Oxford handbook of Aesthetics. 

Gregory Currie, ‘Interpretation and Objectivity’, Mind 102 (1993). 

Stephen Davies, ‘The Aesthetic Relevance of Authors’ and Painters’ Intentions.’ JAAC 41 

(1982). 

Sherri Irvin, ‘Authors, Intentions and Literary Meaning’, Philosophy Compass 1 (2006): 

http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.resourceproxy.manchester.ac.uk/cgibin/fulltext/118557777 

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Hypothetical Intentionalism: Statement, Objections and Replies’, in his 

Contemplating Art (O.U.P., 2002). 

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Intention and Interpretation in Literature,” in his The Pleasures of 

Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays (Cornell U.P., 1996). 

Paisley Livingston, ‘Intention in Art’, in Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. 

Paisley Livingston, ‘Intentionalism in Aesthetics’, New Literary History 29 (1998). 

Colin Lyas, .Anything Goes: The Intentional Fallacy Revisited’, BJA 23 (1983). 

Alexander Nehemas, The Postulated Author: Critical Monism as Regulative Ideal’, Critical 

Inquiry 8 (1981). 

Stein Olsen, ‘The “Meaning” of a Literary Work’ in Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen (eds.), 

Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition (Blackwell, 2005). 

Robert Stecker, ‘Moderate Actual Intentionalism Defended’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art 

Criticism 64 (2006). 

73

Robert Stecker “Interpretation and The Problem of the Relevant Intention” Chapter 17 in 

Matthew Kieren (ed) Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art 

(Blackwell, 2006) 

William Tolhurst, ‚On What a Text Is and How it Means’, BJA 19 (1979). 

Richard Wollheim, ‘Criticism as Retrieval’, in Art and Its Objects (C.U.P., 1980). 

Daniel Nathan “Art, Meaning and Artist’s Meaning” in Matthew Kieren (ed) Contemporary 

Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (Blackwell, 2006) 

WEEK 7: EVALUATION 


 

 

George Dickie “Iron, Leather and Critical Principles” (Chapter 20 in Kieran (ed)). 

David Hume, `Of the Standard of Taste', http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/361r15.html. 


Noel Carroll, ‘Hume's Standard of Taste’, JAAC 43 (1985). 

Theodore Gracyk, ‘Rethinking Hume's Standard of Taste’, JAAC 52 (1994). 

Peter Kivy, ‘Hume's Standard of Taste: Breaking the Circle’, BJA 7 (1967). 

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Hume’s Standard of Taste: The Real Problem’, JAAC 60 (2002). 

John McDowell, ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and 

Objectivity: A Tribute to John Mackie (Routledge, 1981); reprinted in his Mind, Value 

and Reality (Harvard U.P., 1998). 

Philip Pettit, ‘The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism’, in Eva Schaper (ed.), Pleasure, 

Preference and Value (C.U.P, 1983); reprinted in Lamarque and Olsen. 

Nick Zangwill, ‘Aesthetic Realism 1’, in Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. 

John Bender, ‘Aesthetic Realism 2’, in Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. 

Alan Goldman “There are No Aesthetic Principles” (Chapter 19 in Kieran (ed)). 

John McDowell, ‘Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World’, Eva Schaper 

(ed.), Pleasure, Preference and Value (C.U.P, 1983); reprinted in his Mind, Value and 

Reality (Harvard U.P., 1998). 

WEEK 8: MUSICAL EXPRESSION 


 

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Musical Expressiveness as Hearability-as-Expression’, in Matthew 

Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (Blackwell, 

2005); 

Derek Matravers, ‘Musical Expressiveness’, Philosophy Compass 2 (2007), 

http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.resourceproxy.manchester.ac.uk/cgi-bin/fulltext/117982800 


Paul Boghossian, ‘On Hearing the Music in the Sound,” JAAC 59 (2001). 

74

Malcolm Budd, ‘Music and the Communication of Emotion’, JAAC 47 (1989). 

Malcolm Budd, Values of Art (Penguin, 1995), 133-57. 

Noel Carroll, The Philosophy of Art (Routledge, 1999), Ch. 2, esp. 79-105. 

Stephen Davies, ‘Music’, in Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. 

--- (1994), Musical Meaning and Expression (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 

--- (2006) “Artistic Expression and The Hard Case of Pure Music” (Chapter 11 in Kieran (ed)). 

Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music (O.U.P., 2002), Ch 3. 

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Musical Expressiveness’, in his The Pleasures of Aesthetics (Cornell U.P., 

1996). Reprinted in his Contemplating Art (available through Oxford Scholarship 

Online). 

Dominic Lopes (2005), Sight and Sensibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press), Chapter 2. 

Derek Matravers, ‘The Experience of Emotion in Music’, JAAC 61 (2003). 

Aaron Ridley, The Philosophy of Music: Themes and Variations (Edinburgh U.P., 2004), 

Introduction, Ch. 3. 

Sircello, Guy (1995), 'Expressive Properties of Art', in Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (eds.), The 

Philosophy of Art: Readings Ancient and Modern (Boston: McGraw Hill), 164-82. 

Jenefer Robinson, ‘The Expression and Arousal of Emotion in Music’, JAAC 52 (1994) 

Roger Scruton, ‘The Nature of Musical Expression’ in his The Aesthetic Understanding 

(Methuen, 1983). 

Stecker, Robert (1984), 'Expression of Emotion in (Some of) the Arts', Journal of Aesthetics 

and Art Criticism, 42 (4), 409-18. 

--- (2001), 'Expressiveness and Expression in Music and Poetry', Journal of Aesthetics and 

Art Criticism, 59 (1), 85-96. 

WEEK 9: PHOTOGRAPHY AND VISION 

Tutorial texts 

Walton, Kendall. "Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism." Critical 

Inquiry 11 (1984): 246-77. 

Currie, Gregory. "Photography, Painting and Perception." Journal of Aesthetics and Art 

Criticism 49 (1991): 23-29 

Further reading 

Abell, Catharine. “The Epistemic Value of Photographs” in Abell and Bantinaki (eds) 

Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 

75

Cohen, Jonathan, and Aaron Meskin. "On the Epistemic Value of Photographs." Journal of 

Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62, no. 2 (2004): 197-210. 

Gregory Currie (1999), 'Visible traces: Documentary and the contents of Photographs', 

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 57 (3), 285-97. 

Dretske, Fred. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981. 

Lopes, Dominic. Understanding Pictures. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 

Walton, Kendall. "Looking at Pictures and Looking at Things." In Philosophy and the Visual 

Arts: Seeing and Abstracting, edited by Andrew Harrison, 277-300. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 

Publishing Company, 1987. 

WEEK 10: PHOTOGRAPHY AS AN ART 


 

 

Roger Scruton, "Photography and Representation" in Neill and Ridley (eds.), Arguing 

about Art, 1st and 2nd eds., and in his The Aesthetic Understanding 

Nigel Warburton, "Individual Style in Photographic Art", Arguing about Art, 2nd ed. (SL, 

DL); also British Journal of Aesthetics, 36, 1996, pp. 389-97 (DL). 


Dominic McIver Lopes, "The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency", Mind, 112, 2003, pp. 

433-48. 

William King, "Scruton and Reasons for looking at Photographs" in Neill and Ridley (eds.), 

Arguing about Art, 1st and 2nd eds. (SL, DL). 

Patrick Maynard, “Photography”, in Gaut and Lopes (eds) The Routledge Companion to 

Aesthetics, pp477-490. 

Robert Wicks, "Photography as a Representational Art", British Journal of Aesthetics, 29, 

1989, pp. 1-9 (DL). 

WEEK 11: CINEMA 


Noel Carroll, “The Power of Movies”, in Lamarque (ed) Aesthetics and the Philosophy of 

Art, 2004, pp485-497. 

Robert Hopkins, 'What do we see in film?', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66:2 

(2008) pp.149-159 


Catharine Abell, “Cinema as a Representational Art”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 50, 2010. 

Berys Gaut, "Cinematic Art", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 60, 2002, pp. 299-312. 

Berys Gaut, “Film”, in Levinson (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, Oxford University 

Press, 2005. 

Murray Smith, “Film”, in Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (eds.), The Routledge Companion to 

Aesthetics 

76

8. SAMPLE EXAM PAPER (for guidance only) 

PH20951: AESTHETICS 

2 Hours 

Candidates should answer TWO questions. 

1. Does conceptual art manifest a challenge to traditional definitions of art, and if so, 

why? 

2. What role do listener’s responses play in determining what a musical passage 

expresses? 

3. What does cinematic realism consist in? 

4. What role do an artist’s intentions play in determining the meaning of her works? 

5. Do we literally see things through photographs of them? 

6. Is photography an independent art form? 

7. Are artworks objectively either good or bad? 

77



PHILOSOPHY 


PHIL20022 Philosophy of Religion 


Lecturer(s): Dr. Michael Scott 


Telephone: 0161 275 3875 

Email: 

michael.scott@manchester.ac.uk 

Office Hours: Thurs 10-11 and Thurs 11-12pm 


Tutors: 

Office Hours: 


Tutorials will be taken by Teaching Assistants: Phil Brown and Rob 

Knowles 

Phil Brown: Friday 1-2pm 

Rob Knowles: Thursdays 10-11am 

Joseph Barrett, UG Office, G.001 Arthur Lewis Building 

Tel: 0161 275 3204, Email: joseph.barrett@manchester.ac.uk 

Lectures: 

Tutorials: 

Wednesdays 12-1pm and Thursdays 12-1pm in Coupland 3 Theatre A 

Thursdays and Fridays. 




2,500 word essay – 33% 

Easter Vacation: Monday 25 th March to Friday 12 th April 2013 


Pre-requisite(s): 

None 

78




Examination period: Monday 13 th May 2013 – Friday 7 th June 2013 








Summary 

This course provides a detailed introduction and analysis of the central problems and issues 

in contemporary philosophy of religion. 

The questions that we will consider include: Can we prove God’s existence by reason alone? 

Is the evidence of ‘fine tuning’ conditions in the universe a good reason to believe that God 

created it? Is it either consistent or plausible to believe that there is a God given the amount 

of evil in the world? Can we ever be justified in believing that a miracle has occurred? Is 

religious belief rational if there is no evidence in its favour? What is the relationship between 

scientific and religious belief? 

In the course of examining these topics we will look at major 20th century and contemporary 

writings on religious belief and language, including work by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alvin 

Plantinga and Richard Swinburne. 

Aims 

- Engagement with some of the most central and enduring problems in philosophy of religion; 

- Enhance your power of critical analysis, reasoning and independent thought, and your 

ability to bring those powers to bear on important philosophical issues; 

- Familiarise you with some of the most interesting and provocative texts in contemporary 

work on philosophy of religion. 


79

- Knowledge and understanding of a range of central 20th century texts on philosophy of 

religion; 

- Some in-depth critical knowledge of the most important modern and contemporary theories 

in the areas covered by the course; 

- The ability to critically reflect on those theories, and to articulate and defend your own 

views. 


Lectures: Wednesdays 12-1pm and Thursdays 12-1pm in Coupland 3 Theatre A 

Tutorials: 


Thursday 2-3pm Roscoe 1.008 

Thursday 3-4pm Roscoe 3.3 

Friday 10-11am Uni Place 3.209 

Phil Brown 

Friday 11-12pm Alan Turing G.109 

Friday 12-1pm Uni Place 3.213 

Friday 2-3pm Roscoe 2.8 

Rob Knowles 

Friday 3-4pm 

Dover St BS5 










another reason you should tell your tutor or the Philosophy Administrator, Joseph 

Barrett as soon as possible – if possible, before the tutorial. 




80









Reading Philosophy of Religion by Graham Oppy and Michael Scott (Blackwell-Wiley: 2010). 

There are two lecture each week. The first (Wednesday) lecture will cover a particular topic 

in general terms and online reading (available on Blackboard) will be provided for each week. 

The second lecture will focus in more detail on one or two texts relating to the topic. These 

wil be taken from Reading Philosophy of Religion. 



site. 


Study budget 




Lectures 

Tutorials 




TOTAL: 

10 x 2 = 20 hours 

10 hours 


40 hours 

80 hours 

200 hours 





4. ASSESSMENT 


81




EXAMINATION 
















Presentation 







82





as follows: 






Or: 








etc. 
















You must also submit your essay electronically to ‘Turnitin’ via Blackboard. Further 

instructions on this will be made available on the Blackboard site for the course, see: 


83




Deadline 

The submission date for the assessed essay is March 19 th 2013. All essays will be submitted 

to the Undergraduate Office, G.001, in the Arthur Lewis building and must be submitted by 

2pm on the hand in day. 


















Feedback 








84







1. Is there a defensible analysis of divine timelessness? 

2. Evaluate Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. 


References (on the right) are to sections and author in Reading Philosophy of Religion by 

Graham Oppy & Michael Scott (Wiley-Blackwell: 2010). For the Thurs lecture, you should 

work through the reading in bold print and do the exercises. The reading in light print is also 

relevant. 

Week 1 (beginning 28 th Jan): Organisation 

Week 2 (beginning 4 th Feb): Divine Properties 4: Boethius, Savage 

Week 3 (beginning 11 th Feb): Ontological Argument 2: Anselm 

Week 4 (beginning 18 th Feb): Argument for Design 2: Paley, Hume 

Week 5 (beginning 25 th Feb): Problem of Evil 2: Mackie 

Week 6 (beginning 4 th Mar): Pascal’s Wager 2: Pascal 

Week 7 (beginning 11 th Mar): Faith and Reason 3: Clifford, James 

Week 8 (beginning 18 th Mar): Basic Belief 3: Plantinga 

EASTER VACATION 

Week 9 (beginning 15 th Apr): Divine Foreknowledge 4: Pike 

Week 10 (beginning 22 nd Apr): Religion and Morality 4: Kretzmann 

Week 11 (beginning 29 th Apr): Religious Diversity 5: Hick, Plantinga 

Week 12 (beginning 6 th May): 

Revision 


The course book is Reading Philosophy of Religion by Graham Oppy & Michael Scott 

(Wiley-Blackwell: 2010) 

Detailed supplementary reading lists will be provided on Blackboard for each topic. 





following your hunches, and so on. Please email Michael Scott for any questions or further 

ideas about reading or discuss with your tutor. 

85



PHILOSOPHY 


PHIL20042 Formal Logic 


Lecturer(s): Dr. Graham Stevens 


Telephone: 0161 275 4886 

Email: 

graham.p.stevens@manchester.ac.uk 

Office Hours: Monday 10-11; Thursday 12-1. 


Tutors: 

Office Hours: 


Tutorials will be taken by Teaching Assistants: Chris Ovenden and 

Tom Connor. 

Chris Ovenden: Monday 2-3pm Arthur Lewis Common Room 

Tom Connor: Friday 1-2pm Arthur Lewis, 4 th Floor Reception 



Lectures: 

Tutorials: 

Wednesday 11-12pm Schuster Bragg Theatre and 

Thursday 2-3pm Coupland 3 theatre B 

Mondays. 






Pre-requisite(s): 

PHIL10041 Critical Thinking 

86












Summary 

The course will cover the syntax and semantics of a propositional logic PL. Next, a natural 

deduction system will be introduced for proving the validity of sequents and theorems in PL. 

Subsequently the course will extend the grammar and proof procedure developed for PL to 

encompass a language of first-order predicate logic with identity, QL. 

Aims 

 

Introduce students to the elements of formal propositional and first-order predicate logic. 

The course will introduce two systems of logic and provide a proof-procedure for each. 


Students should be able to construct formulas of propositional and predicate logic, translate 

English sentences into these formulas, and prove sequents within a natural deduction 

system for these two formal languages. 

Knowledge and Understanding: 

Knowledge of elementary propositional and first-order logic and their associated proof 

procedures. 

87

Intellectual skills: 

As above. 

Practical skills: 

The ability to formalise patterns of argument in an abstract and rigorous form. 

Transferable skills and personal qualities: 

Improved argumentation skills. 


Lectures: Wednesdays 11-12pm Schuster Bragg theatre and 

Thursdays 2-3pm Coupland 3 Theatre B 

Tutorials: 


Monday 10-11am Arthur Lewis G.019 Chris Ovenden 

Monday 11-12pm Arthur Lewis G.019 Chris Ovenden 



Monday 3-4pm Dover Street BS1 Tom Connor 










88














Essentials of Symbolic Logic, R.L Simpson, Broadview Press, 3 rd edition 2008 



site. 


Study budget 




Lectures 

Tutorials 



TOTAL: 

10 x 2 = 20 hours 

10 hours 


120 hours 

200 hours 





4. ASSESSMENT 


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MID-TERM TEST 

An optional mid-term test (non-assessed) will be offered in the lecture notes. Answers are 

available in an appendix. This provides additional formative feedback for the course. 

EXAMINATION 

One three-hour exam will be set at the end of semester one, in which you must answer ALL 

questions. This provides all of your assessment for the course. 


Feedback 







course are verbal feedback responses to tutorial work and exam answers. 







Week1 (beginning 28 th Jan) 

Week 2(beginning 4 th Feb) 

Week 3 (beginning 11 th Feb) 



Week 6 (beginning 4 th Mar) 



Easter 

PL: Truth-functions and Formation Rules 

Truth Tables and Validity 

Proof (I) 

Proof (II) 

Proof (III) 

QL 

Identity and Quantifier Restriction in QL 

Proof in QL (I) 

25 th March – 12 th April 

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Week 9 (beginning 15 th April) 

Week 10 (beginning 22 nd April) 

Week 11 (beginning 29 th April) 

Week 12 (beginning 6 th May) 

Proof in QL (II) 

Revision: PL 

Revision: QL 

Revision: general 


The only required reading for this course is the Lecture notes (provided on Blackboard), and 

these may be supplemented by the Simpson book (details above) if desired. No other texts 

are needed. 

91



PHILOSOPHY 


PHIL20212 Locke, Berkeley & Hume 


Lecturer(s): Dr. Ann Whittle 


Telephone: 0161 275 1760 

Email: 

ann.whittle@manchester.ac.uk 

Office Hours: Monday 11-12 

Wednesday 1-2 


Tutors: 

Office Hours: 


Tutorials will be taken by Teaching Assistant Ben Matheson 

Thursdays 12-1pm 



Lectures: 

Tutorials: 

Mondays 1-3pm – Humanities Bridgeford Street G7 

Thursdays. 




2,500 word essay – 33% 




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Summary 

This course is devoted to studying the empiricist philosophies of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, 

focusing on the core texts by each. The issues raised by these philosophers have been 

profoundly important in shaping the landscape of contemporary analytical philosophy and many 

of the problems they raised and addressed are as relevant to philosophy today as they were then. 

Questions about, for example, the possibility of innate ideas, the nature of perception, the 

existence of a reality independently of our minds, and the laws of nature, have all been handed 

down to us, in part, as a legacy of empiricism. 

The course will approach the subject both by examining the philosophical works of Locke, 

Berkeley and Hume, and by looking at the ways in which their insights and concerns have been 

inherited by current analytical philosophers. 

Aims 


• Help students gain an in-depth knowledge and understanding of some of the central 

questions raised, and the positions taken, by the classical British empiricists; 

• Enable students to critically evaluate the positions taken and the arguments offered by 

Locke, Berkeley and Hume; 

• Enable students to appreciate the extent to which some of the central themes of modern 

analytical philosophy have their origins in the work of Locke, Berkeley and Hume; 

• Contribute towards giving students the requisite knowledge and analytical skills to tackle 

courses in modern analytical philosophy. 

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• A thorough knowledge and understanding of the texts studied; 

• A considered critical perspective on some of the central questions and disputes raised by 

the texts; 

• An ability to write concisely, relevantly and analytically about the questions raised by the 

classical British empiricists, both in an essay and under exam conditions. 


Lectures: Mondays 1-3pm – Humanities Bridgeford Street G7 

Tutorials: 


Thursday 10-11am Williamson 2.06 Ben Matheson 

Thursday 11-12pm Roscoe 1.008 Ben Matheson 

Thursday 1-2pm Sam Alex Class Wing A213 Ben Matheson 




















94




Fortunately, all the primary historical texts are free to download from the internet. So there is 

no need to buy any of these texts if you don’t want to. 

Note - Please avoid Bennett’s modernization of the primary texts at Early Modern Texts and 

stick to the original. The reason for this is that it is extremely questionable whether he 

succeeds in preserving the original meaning. 

The website Archive is very good. I have found PDFs of all the primary readings here 

(sometimes you need to scroll down a bit to find a link which gives you a PDF of the book, 

but they are there). 

The primary readings are taken from: 

Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 

Berkeley, G. Principles of Human Knowledge. 

Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. 

Hume, D. A Treatise on Human Nature, book 1. 

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 

Alternatively, if you look at the free kindle e-books on Amazon, you can download free e- 

books of all the primary reading onto your PC, I-Pad etc. For instance, see Locke’s Essay 

here. 

If you do want to buy a secondary text, consider buying one of the starred secondary texts 

on the general reading list at the end of this course guide. (They are starred because I think 

they are particularly accessible and/or useful.) 



site. 


Detailed reading list and tutorial questions for each week, as well as 

lecture slides, will be posted on Blackboard. 

Study budget 

95




Lectures 

Tutorials 




TOTAL: 

10 x 2 = 20 hours 

10 hours 


40 hours 

80 hours 

200 hours 





4. ASSESSMENT 





EXAMINATION 












96





Presentation 











as follows: 






Or: 








etc. 



97




















Deadline 

The submission date for the assessed essay is March 12 th 2013. All essays will be submitted 













98








Feedback 














1. How successful are Locke’s arguments against innate speculative principles? 

2. What, if anything, do ideas of primary qualities resemble? 

3. Are there defects in Locke’s account of substance? If so, has he the resources to remedy 

them? 

4. Is Locke right to think that we only classify substances via their nominal essences? 


Week 1 (28 Jan): 

Week 2 (4 Feb): 




Week 6 (4 March): 



Organisation and Introduction 

Empiricism and Innate Ideas 

Primary and Secondary Qualities 

Locke on Substance and Real/Nominal Essences 

Personal Identity 

Abstract Ideas 

Berkeley’s Defence of Immaterialism 

Hume’s Way of Ideas 

99

EASTER HOLIDAY 

Week 9 (15 April): 



Week 12 (6 May) 

Hume on Induction 

Hume on Causation 

Hume and the External World 

Revision - Bank Holiday Monday so no lecture. Drop in session 

8 May for revision queries. 

Weekly tutorials (starting in Week 2) will address issues raised in each lecture. Week-byweek 

tutorial questions and reading list will be posted up on BLACKBOARD before 

lecture/tutorial. 












PLEASE NOTE: A more detailed, week by week reading list will be posted on 

BLACKBOARD before the lecture/tutorial. But here are some of the key texts which 

shall appear on those reading lists. Starred items in the secondary texts are those 

that I think are particularly helpful. 

Primary Texts 

Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 

Berkeley, G. Principles of Human Knowledge. 

Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. 

Hume, D. A Treatise on Human Nature, book 1. 

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 

Secondary Texts 

Woolhouse, R.S. The Empiricists, (OUP, 1998). 

Bennett, J. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, (OUP, 1971). 

**Lowe, E.J. Locke on Human Understanding, (Routledge, 1995). 

**Mackie, J. L. Problems from Locke, (OUP, 1976). 

100

Ayers, M. R. Locke, (Routledge, 1991). 

Tipton, I. (ed.) Locke on Human Understanding, (OUP, 1977). 

Chappell, Vere (ed.) Locke (OUP, 1998) 

Newman, L. The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding, CUP, 

2007. 

**Grayling, A.C. Berkeley: The Central Arguments, (Duckworth, 1986). 

Pitcher, G. Berkeley, (Routledge, 1977). 

Tipton, I. Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, (Thommes Press, 1994). 

Stoneham, T. Berkeley’s World, (OUP, 2002). 

Winkler, K. The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, (CUP, 2006). 

**Stroud, B. Hume, (Routledge, 1977). 

**Noonan, H. Hume on Knowledge, (Routledge, 1999). 

Dicker, G. (1998) Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, (Routledge, London)/ 

Pears, D. Hume’s System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise, (OUP, 1990). 

Fate Norton, D. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Hume, (CUP, first edition 1993, second 

edition 2009). 

Millican, P. (ed.) Reading Hume on Human Understanding, (OUP, 2002). 

101



PHILOSOPHY 


PHIL20232 Ethics 


Lecturer(s): Dr. Thomas Smith 


Telephone: 0161 275 7886 

Email: 

thomas.smith@manchester.ac.uk 

Office Hours: Mondays 9.30-10.30, Wednesdays 12.00-13.00 


Tutors: 

Office Hours: 


Tutorials will be taken by Teaching Assistants: 

Dr. Tom Connor & Dr Terence Edward 

Dr. Tom Connor: Fridays 1-2pm. Arthur Lewis 4 th floor reception 

Dr. Terence Edward: Fridays 3-4pm Arthur Lewis 3 rd Floor reception 



Lectures: 

Tutorials: 

Mondays 4-6pm in Coupland 3 Theatre A 

Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. 




2,500 word essay – 33% 







102









Summary 

This course will focus on four questions of ethics: (i) which sorts of things are of ethical value 

and disvalue? (people? their actions? their intentions? their characters? the situations that 

they get themselves into?), (ii) what does their possessing this value demand of us? (e.g. 

that we bring about the greatest happiness of the greatest number? that we treat others as 

ends, not means? that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us?), (iii) how do 

these demands motivate our actions (e.g. by arousing our passions, or our reason?), and (iv) 

why does it matter to us that these demands are met (i.e. why do we care about the 

demands that are made by morality)? 

Aims 


• Guide students’ development in thinking philosophically about ethics. 

• Familiarise students with some important writings in contemporary philosophical ethics. 

• Enhance students’ ability to present and discuss philosophical issues orally, and their 

ability to present philosophical ideas and arguments in written work. 



• Knowledge and understanding of some of the main texts and ideas in contemporary ethics. 

• The ability to critically engage with these texts and ideas. 

• The ability to present and discuss orally the examined ideas. 

103

• The ability to present in writing clear, cogent, sustained philosophical arguments, based on 

relevant background research. 


Lectures: Mondays 4-6pm in Coupland 3 Theatre A 

Tutorials: 


Tuesday 1-2pm Coupland 3 LG13 Tom Connor 

Tuesday 2-3pm Coupland 3 LG 9 Tom Connor 

Tuesday 3-4pm Coupland 3 LG9 Tom Connor 

Thursday 10-11am Alan Turing G.114 Tom Connor 

Friday 10-11am Dover St BS3 Tom Connor 

Friday 11-12pm Roscoe 2.8 Terence Edward 

Friday 12-1pm University Place 3.214 Terence Edward 






















104


It is not essential that you buy any text. Tutorial readings will be made available on 

Blackboard, and the reading lists at the end of this guide list many additional texts available 

from the library, and in many cases online. 

However, to students who do wish to purchase a text, I recommend, 

 

Ethical theory: an anthology (2 nd edition) ed. R. Shafer-Landau, Wiley- 

Blackwell. 

This doesn’t cover every aspect of the course (and it covers some topics that we do not 

cover) but it is excellent value – £22.99 at the University branch of Blackwell’s, £23.74 on 

Amazon – for 82 classic essays, with useful section introductions. The University branch of 

Blackwell’s should already have copies – if they run out, they can order further copies at 

short notice. Tom Jenkins, the philosophy buyer at Blackwell’s, is contactable at 

science.manchester@blackwell.co.uk. 



site. 


Study budget 




Lectures 

Tutorials 




TOTAL: 

10 x 2 = 20 hours 

10 hours 


40 hours 

80 hours 

200 hours 





4. ASSESSMENT 

105





EXAMINATION 
















Presentation 







106





as follows: 






Or: 








etc. 



















107




Deadline 

The submission date for the assessed essay March 19 th 2013. All essays will be submitted 




















Feedback 







course are written feedback responses to assessed essays and exam answers. You can 

also request feedback on your exam by meeting the course convenor. We also draw your 

attention to the variety of generic forms of feedback available to you on this as on all SOSS 

courses. These include: meeting the lecturer/tutor during their office hours; e-mailing 

108


and obtaining feedback from your peers during tutorials, and through discussion boards. 


1. What sort of mistake, if any, does an amoralist make? 

[see reading list below for lecture 2 – morality and self-interest] 

2. Can you have reason to do something if no amount of deliberation will motivate you to do 

it? 

[see reading list below for lectures 3 and 4 – reasons, and reasons and values] 

3. What is Scanlon’s contractualism? Critically assess one objection to it. 

[see reading list below for lecture 5 – contractualism] 

- As you will see, the assessed essay questions cover topics studied in weeks 1 

to 5. 

- To ensure that there is no overlap between essays and exam answers, *only* 

topics studied in weeks 6 to 11 will be covered in the exam. (There is no 

guarantee, however, that *every* topic studied in weeks 6 to 11 will feature in 

the exam). 


Week 1 (beginning 28 th Jan): Introduction. 

Week 2 (beginning 4 th Feb): Morality and self-interest. 

Week 3 (beginning 11 th Feb): Reasons. 

Week 4 (beginning 18 th Feb): Reasons and Values. 

Week 5 (beginning 25 th Feb): Contractualism. 

Week 6 (beginning 4 th Mar): Kant’s formula of universal law. 

Week 7 (beginning 11 th Mar): Kant’s formula of humanity. 

Week 8 (beginning 18 th Mar): Virtue ethics. 

EASTER VACATION 

Week 9 (beginning 15 th Apr): The ethics of promising. 

Week 10 (beginning 22 nd Apr): The ethics of groups. 

Week 11 (beginning 29 th Apr): The ethics of blame and guilt. 

Weekly tutorials (starting in Week 2) will address issues raised in each lecture. 

There will be no lecture or tutorial in week 12 (as the Monday is a bank holiday). 

6. READING LISTS 

All tutorial readings will be placed on Blackboard. It is mandatory that you read these texts. 

Below are listed additional texts, listed according to their relevance to the lecture topics. 

Many (but by no means all) are available on-line. To access many of these, you will need 

109

either to be on-site, or to log-in in using either Shibboleth or Athens. It is also very easy to 

download VPN software to an off-campus computer, which then gives you access to 

resources available on-site – for details see http://www.itservices.manchester.ac.uk/vpn). 

The lists are not exhaustive: you are encouraged to find your own texts to read by following 

up footnotes, browsing real and virtual libraries etc. 

Useful on-line browsing resources include: 

The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory (especially Part II: Normative ethics) 

Accessible at http://www.blackwellreference.com 

The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (especially Part II: Normative ethical theory) 

Accessible at: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com//oso/public/index.html 

Philosophy Compass http://philosophy-compass.com/sections/ethics/ 

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/ 

PhilPapers http://philpapers.org/ 

Google scholar http://scholar.google.co.uk/ 

‘*’ means ‘especially recommended’. 

‘!’ means ‘will be hard to understand, if you have not read some of the other material first’. 

Lecture 1: Introduction 

No reading specific to this lecture. 

Lecture 2: Morality and self-interest 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Foot P. (1972) ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical 

Imperatives’ Philosophical Review Vol. 81(3) pp. 305-316. Also in several collections. 

Other readings: 

Plato Republic Bks I and II (various editions and translations). 

* Williams B. (1972) ‘The amoralist’ in his Morality: An introduction to ethics Cambridge: CUP. 

Lenman J. (1999) ‘The Externalist and the Amoralist’ Philosophia Vol. 27 pp. 441–57. 

! Raz J. (1997) ‘The Amoralist’ in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.) Ethics and Practical 

Reasoning Oxford: OUP, also in Engaging Reason Oxford: OUP (a collection of Raz’s 

papers). 

110

Raz J. (1999) ‘The central conflict: morality and self-interest’ in R. Crisp and B. Hooker (eds.) 

Well Being and Morality: Essays in honour of James Griffin Oxford: OUP, also in 

Engaging Reason OUP (a collection of Raz’s papers). 

* Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch. 6 ‘Morality’. 

If you search for this via the JRUL catalogue, you’ll find an e-book version viewable 

online. 

! Parfit D. (1984) Reasons and Persons Oxford: OUP ch. 2. 

Gauthier D. (1991) ‘Why contractarianism?’ in P. Vallentyne (ed.) Contractarianism and 

Rational Choice Cambridge CUP; also in Rachels J. (ed.) Ethical Theory 2: Theories 

about How We Should Live Oxford: OUP (and in the double-volume edition called simply 

Ethical Theory). 

Railton P. (1984) ‘Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality’ Philosophy 

and Public Affairs Vol. 13 pp. 134-171 See secs. VIII and IX Reprinted in various 

collections. 

Nagel T. (1997) ‘From The Possibility of Altruism’ in S. L. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton 

(eds.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches New York: 

OUP pp. 323–339 (If you want to look at the book from which these selections are taken, 

Nagel’s The Possibility of Altruism was published by Princeton University Press in 1970). 

Smith M. (1994) The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell ch. 3. 

! McDowell J. (1978) ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ Proceedings of 

the 

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 pp.13-29. Also in Mind, Value and 

Reality Cambridge, Mass.: HUP (a collection of McDowell’s papers). 

! Pink T. (2004). ‘Moral obligation’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Vol. 54 pp. 159- 

185. 

Lecture 3: Reasons 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Williams B. (1981) ‘Internal and external reasons’ in his 

Moral Luck Cambridge: CUP pp. 101-113. Also in several collections. 


Hooker B. (1987) ‘Williams’ Argument against External Reasons’ Analysis 47 no. 1 pp. 42-4. 

! Parfit D. (1997) ‘Reasons and Motivation’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 

Supplementary Vol. 71 pp. 99–130. 

Smith M. (1994) The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell pp. 155-161, pp. 164-174. 

111

Darwall S. L. (1997) ‘Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction’. In 

S. L. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton (eds.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some 

Philosophical Approaches New York: Oxford University Press pp. 305–12. 

* Scanlon T. M. (1998) ‘Appendix: William on Internal and External Reasons’ in his What We 

Owe to Each Other Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 

* Hurley S. (2001) ‘Reason and motivation: the wrong distinction?’ Analysis Vol. 61.2 pp. 

151–55. 

Dancy J. (2000) Practical Reality Oxford: OUP Ch. 1 especially pp. 15-19, ch. 2 pp. 26-31. 

Lecture 4: Reasons and values 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Quinn W. (1993) ‘Putting rationality in its place’ in his 

Morality and Action (ed. P. Foot) Cambridge: CUP pp. 228-255. 


* Millgram E. (1997) Practical Induction Cambridge, Mass.: HUP. Chs. 1 and 2. (See also ch. 

6). 

Nagel T. (1998) ‘Value’ in Rachels J. (ed.) Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity 

Oxford: OUP (and in the double-volume edition called simply Ethical Theory). 

Scanlon T. M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other Cambridge, Mass.: HUP Ch. 1 (see also 

ch. 2). 

Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 chs. 1, 2 and 3. 


online. 

! Raz J. (1999) Engaging Reason Oxford: OUP. Chapter 3. See also chapter 2. 

Korsgaard C. (1983) ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’ Philosophical Review Vol. 92 No. 2 and 

in her 

Creating the kingdom of ends Cambridge: CUP. 

* Dancy J. (2000) Practical Reality Oxford: OUP Chapter 2 (See also chapter 1). 

112

Velleman J. D. (1992) ‘The Guise of the Good’ Noûs Vol. 26 No. 1 pp. 3-26. It is also 

collected in 

Self to Self Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (a collection of Velleman’s 

papers). 

Smith M. (1994) The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell ch. 5. See also ch. 6. 

Lecture 5: Contractualism 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Scanlon T. (1982) ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in A. 

Sen, B. Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond Cambridge: CUP. Also in several 

collections. 


* Scanlon T. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other Cambridge, Mass.: HUP. Ch. 5. See also 

ch. 4. 

Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch. 15 ‘Contractualism’. 


online. 

* Pettit P. (2006) ‘Can Contract Theory Ground Morality?’ in J. Drier (ed.) Contemporary 

Debates in Moral Theory Oxford: Blackwell pp. 77-96. 

Rawls J. (1971) A Theory of Justice various editions. Secs. 3, 4, 11, 20, 24, 26. These 

sections are collected in S. Darwall (ed.) Contractarianism/Contractualism Oxford: Blackwell. 

Darwall S. (2002) ‘Introduction’ S. Darwall (ed.) Contractarianism/Contractualism Oxford: 

Blackwell. 

Watson G. (1998) ‘Some considerations in favor of contractualism’ in C. Morris, J. Coleman 

(eds.) Rational commitment and morality Cambridge CUP, also in S. Darwall (ed.) 

Contractarianism/Contractualism Oxford: Blackwell. 

Matravers M. (ed.) (2003) Scanlon and Contractualism London: Frank Cass. 

Stratton-Lake P. (ed.) (2004) On What We Owe to Each Other Oxford: Blackwell. 

! Wallace R. J. (2002) ‘Scanlon's Contractualism’ Ethics Vol. 112 pp. 429-70. See especially 

pp. 449 onwards: sec. III ‘Moral Reasons’ and sec. IV ‘The Unity of Morality’. 

Stratton-Lake P. (2003) ‘Scanlon’s contractualism and the redundancy objection’ Analysis 63 

No. 1 pp. 70–76. 

113

Ridge M. (2003) ‘Contractualism and the new and improved redundancy objection’ Analysis 

63 No. 4 pp. 337-42. 

Frei T. (2008) ‘The Redundancy Objection, and Why Scanlon is Not a Contractualist’ pp. 47- 

65 Journal of Political PhilosophyVol. 17 pp. 47-65. 

Lecture 6: Kant’s formula of universal law 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch. 

12 ‘Universal Laws’. 


* Kant I. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (sometimes translated as Groundwork of 

the Metaphysics of Morals, not to be confused with his Metaphysics of Morals). Esp. 

sec. II. 

* Korsgaard C. (1985) ‘Kant’s formula of universal law’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 

66. pp. 24-47. Also in her (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends Cambridge: CUP. 

Korsgaard C. (1986) ‘The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil’ Philosophy and Public 

Affairs Vol. 15 No. 4. Also in her (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends Cambridge: CUP. 

Dietrichson P. (1964) ‘When is a Maxim Fully Universalisable?’ Kant-Studien Vol. 55 pp. 

143-70. 

Herman B. (1993) The Practice of Moral Judgment Cambridge, Mass.: HUP ch. 3. 

Nell O. (1975) Acting on Principle: an Essay on Kantian Ethics New York: Columbia 

University Press. 

O’Neill O. (1989) ‘Consistency in Action’ in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of 

Kant's Practical Philosophy Cambridge: CUP. (In various other places too). 

(By the way, O. Nell and O. O’Neill are the same person…) 

Wood A. (1999) Kant's Ethical Thought Cambridge: CUP ch. 3. 

Sullivan R. (1994) An Introduction to Kant's Ethics. Cambridge: CUP. Ch. 3. 

Sullivan R. (1989) Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory Cambridge: CUP Chs. 11-13. 

Lecture 7: Kant’s formula of humanity 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Thompson J. (1985) ‘The Trolley Problem’ Yale Law 

Journal Vol. 94 pp. 1395-1415. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) Deontology Oxford: Blackwell. 


114

Kant I. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (sometimes translated as the Groundwork 

of the Metaphysics of Morals, not to be confused with his Metaphysics of Morals). Esp. 

sec. II. 

* Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch. 9. See also chs. 8 and 10. 


online. 

Foot P. (1978) “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect” in her Virtues 

and 

Vices and other essays in moral philosophy Oxford: Blackwell. 

! Kamm F. (1989) ‘Harming some to save others’ Philosophical Studies Vol. 57 pp. 227-60. 

Also in S. Darwall (ed.) Deontology Oxford: Blackwell. 

! Kamm F. (2000) ‘The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent need not Intend 

the Means to his End’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. 74 pp. 

21-. 

Quinn W. (1989) ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect’ 

Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 18 pp. 334-51. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) Deontology 

Oxford: Blackwell. 

Bratman M. (1987) Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason Cambridge, Mass.: HUP ch. 10. 

Wood A. (1999) Kant's Ethical Thought Cambridge: CUP ch. 4. 

Wood A. (1998) ‘Humanity as an end in itself’ in P. Guyer, (ed.) Kant's Groundwork of the 

Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 

Sullivan, R. (1989) Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory Cambridge: CUP Ch. 14. 

* Thomson, J. (2008) ‘Turning the Trolley’ Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 36 pp. 359-374. 

(Thomson here changes her view from the one she expressed in the 1985 

paper!) 

Lecture 8: Virtue ethics 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Harman G. (1999) ‘Moral Philosophy Meets Social 

Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the fundamental attribution Error’ Proceedings of the 

Aristotelian Society Vol. CXIX pp. 316-31. 


Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (various editions and translations). 

Doris J. (1998) ‘Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics’ Nous Vol. 32:4 pp. 504-30. 

* Sreenivasan G. (2002) ‘Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution’ Mind Vol. 

111 pp. 47-68. 

115

McDowell J. (1979) ‘Virtue and Reason’ Monist Vol. 62, pp. 331–50. Also in Mind, Value and 

Reality Cambridge, Mass.: HUP (a collection of McDowell’s papers). 

* Annas J. (2006) ‘Virtue Ethics’ D. Copp (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory Oxford: 

OUP 

Driver J. (1996) ‘The Virtues and Human Nature’ in R. Crisp (ed.) How Should One Live? 

Oxford: Clarendon Press. 

* Hursthouse R. (2006) ‘Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?’, and Driver J. 

(2006) 

‘Virtue Theory’, both in J. Drier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory Oxford: 

Blackwell. 

* Hursthouse R. (1996) ‘Normative Virtue Ethics’ in R. Crisp (ed.) How Should One Live? 

Oxford: Clarendon Press. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) (2003) Virtue Ethics Oxford: 

Blackwell. 

Hursthouse R. (1999) On Virtue Ethics Oxford: OUP. 

Slote M. (1995) ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 20. Also in S. 

Darwall (ed.) (2003) Virtue Ethics Oxford: Blackwell, and in various other collections 

too. 

! Watson G. (1990) ‘On the Primacy of Character’, in A. O. Rorty et al (eds.) Identity, 

Character and Morality Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Also in D. Statman (ed.) (1997) 

Virtue Ethics Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) (2003) Virtue 

Ethics Oxford: Blackwell. 

Pincoffs E. (1971) ‘Quandary Ethics’ Mind Vol. 80 pp. 552-71. Also in Rachels J. (ed.) 

Ethical 

Theory 2: Theories about How We Should Live Oxford: OUP (and in the doublevolume 

edition called simply Ethical Theory). 

Trianosky G. (1986) ‘Supererogation, Wrongdoing, and Vice’ Journal of Philosophy Vol. 83. 

Also in 

116

Rachels J. (ed.) Ethical Theory 2: Theories about How We Should Live Oxford: OUP 

(and in the double-volume edition called simply Ethical Theory). 

Solomon D. (1988) ‘Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 

XIII pp. 428-41. Also in D. Statman (ed.) (1997) Virtue Ethics Edinburgh: Edinburgh 

University Press. 

Foot P. (1978) ‘Virtues and Vices’ in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral 

Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Reprinted in various collections. 

Swanton C. (2001) ‘A virtue ethical account of right action’ Ethics Vol. 112 pp. 32-52. 

Swanton C. (2003) Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View Oxford: OUP. 

Lecture 9: The ethics of promising 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Warnock J.G. (1971) The Object of Morality London: 

Metheun; Ch. 7 ‘Obligations’. 


Austin J. L. (1975/1955) How To Do Things With Words. Edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina 

Sbisà. London: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition. 

Cupit G. (1994) ‘How Requests (and Promises) Create Obligation’ Philosophical Quarterly 

Vol. 44 pp. 439-455. 

Downie R. S. (1985) ‘Three Accounts of Promising’ Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 35 pp. 259- 

271. 

Gilbert M. (2004) ‘Scanlon on Promissory Obligation’ Journal of Philosophy Vol. 101 pp. 83- 

109. 

Hare R. M. (1979) ‘The Promising Game’ in Theories of Ethics, Philippa Foot (ed), Oxford: 

OUP. 

Hume D. A Treatise on Human Nature (various editions) Bk. 3 Pt. II sec. v ‘Of the obligation 

of promises’. 

! Kolodny N. and Wallace R.J. (2003) ‘Promises and Practices Revisited’ Philosophy & 

Public Affairs Vol. 31 pp. 119-154. 

MacCormick N. (1972) ‘Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers ’ (with a reply by 

Joseph Raz) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. 46 pp. 59-78. 

* Owens D. (2006) ‘A Simple Theory of Promising’ Philosophical Review Vol. 115 pp. 51–77. 

117

Peetz V. ‘Promises and Threats’ Mind Vo. 86 pp. 578-581. 

Pratt M. (2001) ‘Scanlon on Promising’ Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol 14 

pp. 143–154. 

Pratt M. (2002) 'Promises and perlocutions', Critical Review of International Social and 

Political Philosophy Vol 5 pp. 93 - 119 

Prichard H. A. (2002/1940) ‘The Obligation to Keep a Promise’ in his Moral Writings, J. 

MacAdam (ed), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 257–266. 

Rawls J. A Theory of Justice (various editions) Ch. 6 sec. 52 ‘The arguments for the principle 

of fairness’. 

Raz J. (1977) ‘Promises and Obligations’ in Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honor of 

H.L.A. Hart. P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 210–228. 

Raz J. (1982) ‘Promises in Morality and Law’ Harvard Law Review Vol. 95 pp. 916-. 

Robins M. (1976) ‘The Primacy of Promising’ Mind Vol. 85 pp. 321-340. 

* Scanlon T.M. (1990) ‘Promises and Practices’ Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 19 pp. 

199–226. This is reprinted (in a revised form) as ch. 7 of Scanlon T.M. (1999) What We 

Owe To Each Other Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 

Searle J. R. (1969) Speech Acts, Cambridge: CUP. chs. 3 and 8 

Searle J. R. (1964) ‘How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’’ Philosophical Review Vol. 73 pp. 43-58. 

Thomson J. J. (1990) The Realm of Rights Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ch. 12 

‘Giving one’s word’. 

Vitek W. (1993) Promising Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 

! Vallentyne P. (2006) ‘Natural Rights and Two Conceptions of Promising’ Chicago-Kent law 

review Vol 81 p. 9-. 

* Rivera-Lopez E. (2006) ‘Promises, expectations, and rights’ Chicago-Kent law review Vol 

81 pp. 21- 

* Pink T. (2009) ‘Promising and Obligation’ Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 23 pp. 389- 

Lecture 10: The ethics of groups 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Jackson F. (1987) ‘Group Morality’, in P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, 

and J. Norman (eds.) Metaphysics & Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart Oxford: 

Basil Blackwell pp. 92-110. 


118

! Parfit D. (1984) Reasons and Persons Oxford: OUP. Ch. 3. See also ch. 4. 

* Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch.13 sec. 43 ‘Each-we dilemmas’. 


online. 

* Parfit D. ‘What we together do’ (1988). Never published but available in draft form at: 

http://individual.utoronto.ca/stafforini/parfit/parfit_-_what_we_together_do.pdf 

Held V. (1970) ‘Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible?’ Journal of 

Philosophy Vol. 67 No. 14 pp. 471-481. 

Feinberg J. (1968) ‘Collective responsibility’ Journal of Philosophy Vol. 65 No. 21 pp. 674- 

688. Also in his (1970) Doing and Deserving Princeton NJ: University Press. 

Tannssjo T. (1989) ‘The Morality of Collective Actions’ Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 

155 pp. 221-228. 

Pettit P. (2007) ‘Responsibility Incorporated’ Ethics Vol. 117 No. 2 pp. 117-201. 

Petersson B. ‘Collective omissions and responsibility’ at 

http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/PeterssonBjorn.pdf 

Petersson B. (2004) ‘The Second Mistake in Moral Mathematics is not about the Worth of 

Mere 

Participation’ Utilitas Vol. 16 pp. 288-315 

Lecture 11: The ethics of blame and guilt 

Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Smart J. J. C. (1961) ‘Free will, praise and blame’ Mind 

Vol. 70, pp. 291-306. 


Entry on Moral Responsibility in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

119

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/ 

* Scanlon T. M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other ch. 6 secs. 4, 5 Cambridge, Mass.: 

Harvard University Press. 

Scanlon T. M. (2008) Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame Cambridge, Mass.: 

Harvard University Press. Ch.4 ‘Blame’. 

Mason M. (2011) ‘Blame: Taking it Seriously’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 

Vol. 83 pp. 472-81. 

Hieronymi P. (2004) ‘The force and fairness of blame’ Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 18(1) 

pp. 115–148. 

Velleman J. D. (2003) ‘Don’t Worry, Feel Guilty’ in A. Hatzimoysis (ed.) Philosophy and the 

Emotions (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement No. 52) pp. 235–48. It is also 

collected 

in Self to Self Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (a collection of Velleman’s 

papers). 

! Strawson P. F. (1974) ‘Freedom and resentment’ in his Freedom and resentment and other 

essays London: Methuen (Methuen, London). Collected in various other 

places too. 

Watson G. (1996) ‘Two faces of responsibility’ Philosophical Topics, Vol. 24(2) pp. 227–248. 

Also in his Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays Oxford: OUP. 

Kennett J. (2001) Agency and Responsibility Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 7 

Feinberg J. (1970) Doing and deserving Princeton NJ: University Press. Chs. 4 and 8. 

! Korsgaard C. (1992) ‘Creating the Kingdom of Ends’ Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 6 and 

in her Creating the kingdom of ends Cambridge: CUP. 

Gibbard A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: a theory of normative judgement Cambridge, 

Mass.: HUP (check the index for references to blame, blameworthiness and guilt). 

120



PHILOSOPHY 


PHIL20262 Philosophy of Science 


Lecturer(s): Prof. Helen Beebee 

Office: Arthur Lewis Building 4.048 

Telephone: 0161 275 1755 

Email: 

helen.beebee@manchester.ac.uk 

Office Hours: Tuesdays 2-3pm; Wednesdays 10-11am. 


Tutors: 


Tutorials will be taken by a Teaching Assistants, Dr. Michael Rush. 

Email: michael.d.rush@manchester.ac.uk 

Office hours: Wednesdays, 11am-12pm, 4.051 Arthur Lewis. 

NB on 27 Feb (Week 5) ONLY: 3.040, Arthur Lewis. 


Tel: 0161 275 3204, Email : joseph.barrett@manchester.ac.uk 

Lectures: 

Tuesdays 10-11am University Place 6.206 and 

Tuesdays 4-5pm University Place 5.212 

Tutorials: Mondays (see §3), beginning in Week 2. 

Allocate yourself to a tutorial group using the Student System(this is 

compulsory and on a first come, first served basis) 

Assessment: 2-hour exam – 67% 

2,500-word essay – 33% 




121












Summary 

This course introduces several major controversies in the philosophy of science and uses 

them to investigate the nature of science, its methods, and its accomplishments. We discuss 

the following: 

What is science? How do scientific theories differ from other kinds of theory, for example 

religious or philosophical theories? 

The problem of induction: why believe that any pattern of events which has been observed 

will occur again? Can the past behaviour of things give reason to predict how they will 

behave? Are such predictions unjustified and irrational? 

The nature of confirmation: what counts as evidence for a theory? Is any true 

consequence of a theory evidence for it? 

Falsificationism: instead of taking observations to confirm theories, should we take 

observations only to refute theories? This is Popper's methodology of 'trial and error'. 

Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions: what is a scientific revolution, and why do such 

revolutions occur? Can such revolutions have rational grounds or are they cases of 'mob 

psychology'? 

122

Scientific realism: should we believe what scientific theories claim about things we cannot 

observe? 

The nature of explanation: what is it for a scientific theory to explain an event? Is it enough 

that the theory entails that the event occurs? 

Laws of nature: what is a law of nature? What is the difference between it and any 

widespread uniform series of events? 

Natural kinds: what is a ‘natural’ kind, and why is the existence (or not) of natural kinds of 

interest to science? 

The ethics of scientific enquiry: is scientific knowledge a good in itself, no matter what its 

subject matter? Or are there areas of potential research that we should not pursue? What 

ethical constraints are there on how scientific research is conducted? 

Aims 


• Introduce students to key issues in the philosophy of science. 

• Enhance their skills at understanding and evaluating philosophical problems. 

• Acquaint students with some of the special concepts used in characterising scientific 

methodology. 


By the end of the course, students should have: 

• Knowledge of some central problems in the philosophy of science and of certain possible 

solutions to them. 

• The ability to assess some received wisdom about the nature and purpose of science and 

of scientific method. 

• An understanding of key philosophical concepts such as inductive reasoning, empirical 

refutation, confirmation, law of nature, and natural kind. 


Lectures: Tuesdays 10-11am University Place 6.206 and 4-5pm University Place 5.212 

Tutorials: 

123


Mondays 11-12pm Roscoe 1.002 Michael Rush 

Mondays 12-1pm University Place 4.212 Michael Rush 

Monday 3-4pm Alan Turing G.109 Michael Rush 

Tutorials are weekly, from Week 2 to Week 11. Attendance at and preparation for tutorials 

is compulsory. It is students’ responsibility to ensure that they have been allocated to a 

tutorial group. Students may not change group without permission. 



• Attend all tutorialsIf you are absent from a tutorial through illness you should inform your 

tutor and fill in a Certification of Student Ill Health (available from your department or from 

the SoSS UG Office; see you degree programme handbook for further details). If you are 

absent for another reason you should tell your tutor or the Philosophy Administrator, Joseph 


• Prepare adequately for tutorialsYou will be set preparatory work for tutorials; see the study 

budget below for a guide to roughly how long you should spend on this. 

• Complete written work on time Failure to complete assessed work by the due date 

constitutes a violation of the work and attendance requirement. 





Compulsory purchase: 

Lisa Bortolotti, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 

This is available from Blackwell’s on campus at £15.99. 


Lecture notes and presentations will appear on the course’s 

Blackboard site, normally the day before the lecture. The site also 

contains downloads of all the required seminar readings.Log in to 

Blackboard at: https://login.manchester.ac.uk/cas/login 

Study budget 

124




Lectures 

Tutorials 




TOTAL: 

10 x 2 = 20 hours 

10 hours 


40 hours 

80 hours 

200 hours 






4. ASSESSMENT 




EXAMINATION 




Past exam papers: Please note that the course has changed significantly this year, so there 

is not much point looking at past exam papers. Examples of the kinds of question you might 

be asked will appear on the Blackboard site towards the end of the course. 










125



Presentation 











as follows: 






Or: 








etc. 





126


















Deadline 

The submission date for the assessed essay is March 12 th 2013. All essays will be 


submitted by 2pm on the hand in day. 














127





Feedback 














1. For one of the following – homeopathy, creationism, parapsychology, psychoanalysis – 

which of the following claims is true? 

(a) It’s good science; (b) It’s bad science; (c) It’s pseudoscience. 

NOTE ON QUESTION 1. You’re welcome to make use of websites to find examples of 

specific claims put forward by proponents of homeopathy etc. and attempts to defend the 

relevant area as good science. However in all other respects you should treat this as a 

normal philosophy essay and treat web sources accordingly (e.g. just because someone 

says something on a website, it doesn’t mean they have any expertise or authority!). 

2. Is there ever a good reason to believe a scientific theory? 

3. Under what circumstances, if any, does an observation confirm a scientific theory? 

4. Does falsificationism provide a better account of the rationality of scientific enquiry than 

inductivism? 


Week Beginning Topic 

Reading (for the 

following Monday) 

1 28 Jan Introduction & Bortolotti 2008, Ch.1 

Relevant 

chapter of 

textbook 

128

organisation 

2 4 Feb What is science? Lakatos 1973; Thagard 

1978 

3 11 Feb The problem of induction Shand 2001 2 

4 18 Feb The nature of 

confirmation 

Goodman 1979 3.1, 3.2 

5 25 Feb Falsificationism Popper 1972 (Ch.1) n/a 

6 4 March Scientific revolutions Kuhn 1962 (excerpts) 5 

7 11 March Scientific realism Van Fraassen 1980 

(Chs.1 & 2) 

ESSAY DEADLINE: 12 MARCH 

8 18 March The nature of explanation Lipton 2000 3.3 

EASTER HOLIDAYS 

9 15 April Laws of nature Beebee 2000 n/a 

10 22 April Natural kinds Dupré 1981 4.1, 4.2 

11 29 April The ethics of scientific 

enquiry 

12 6 May Revision session/wholegroup 

tutorial* 

Milgram 1962* 6 

n/a 

1 

4.3 

n/a 

* No tutorials in Week 12 because the Monday is a bank holiday. Instead, please do the 

reading and preparation as usual and we will run a whole-group tutorial session in the 

second lecture hour (Tuesday 4-5). 

Tutorial preparation: You must do the assigned reading (as above – all available to 

download from the Blackboard site), answer the questions on the reading (these will be put 

up on the Blackboard site a few days in advance), and bring your answers with you. As 

per the study budget, you should be spending around 5 hours on preparation for each 

tutorial. 

Anyone who fails to comply with the above may be required to leave the tutorial. 

Preparation for Week 2 tutorials: See the document on the Blackboard site, under ‘Week 

1’ in Course Content. 

A note on the lectures: Normally the first hour (10-11) will be a straightforward lecture, with 

the second hour (4-5) a guided discussion session aimed at consolidating understanding of 

the material we covered earlier in the day. This general pattern is subject to alteration, 

however; e.g. I might not get through all the material in the first hour, or I might get through it 

in less than an hour. 


129






Please note! 

1. There are lots additional references for each week’s topic at the back of the course text 

book. Additional references will sometimes be included in the lecture notes as well. 

2. The reading list linked to on the front page of the Blackboard site is NOT the reading list 

for this course! (It’s for last year’s version.) However it does contain a lot of relevant readings 

for some of the topics – where this is so, it’s flagged in the reading list below. 

3. In addition to Bortolotti 2008, there are lots of other textbooks that cover some of the 

same material. These might help you if you are finding a particular topic difficult. For 

example: 

Alexander Bird, Philosophy of Science (London: UCL Press, 1998) 

 

Alan Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science? Milton Keynes: Open University 

Press, 1982 – or any later edition) 

James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, London: Routledge, 2002. 

Available through the library as a Dawson e-book, either to read online or to 

download for up to 5 days. 

Relevant chapters of the Ladyman appear in the reading list below. 

4. The reading list is divided into original sources and textbooks/encyclopedia entries. The 

latter are there to provide a general overview and suggestions for further avenues to explore; 

they are not a substitute for original sources. In your essay and exam you will be expected to 

engage with original sources and not simply rely on textbook/encyclopedia material. 

5. All of the journal articles listed are available online through the University’s e-library. If 

you’re having difficulty, please consult 

www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/intranet/ug/philosophy/ resources/online/ for some 

advice. NB you may have to hunt around for a link that says ‘institutional login’ or ‘login via 

Shibboleth’. 

6. Many of the articles/book chapters (or extracts from them) – plus others that will be 

relevant – are also to be found in: 

J. A. Cover & M. Curd, Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues (New York: W. W. 

Norton, 1998) 

A couple of copies of this should appear in High Demand in due course. 

Original sources 

Week 2: What is science? 

Kuhn, T. S. 1970. ‘Logic of discovery or psychology of research?’, in Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, 

A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: CUP, 1970) [there are 

photocopies of this chapter in High Demand] 

Lakatos, I. 1973. ‘Science and pseudoscience’, Lecture; also in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 

1 (Cambridge: CUP). [On Blackboard site] 

130

Thagard, P. 1978. ‘Why astrology is a pseudo-science’, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial 

Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1: 223-34. [On Blackboard site] 

There are lots of additional references at the back of the course textbook and in Hansson 

2012. 

Textbooks/encyclopedia entries 

Hansson, S. O. 2012. ‘Science and pseudo-science’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 

Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, 

plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/pseudo-science/ 

Ladyman 2002 (see above), §3.1 


Week 3: The problem of induction 

Beebee, H. 2006. Hume on Causation (Abingdon: Routledge), Ch.3 

Beebee, H. 2011. ‘Necessary connections and the problem of induction’, Nous, 45 (2011): 

504-27. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00821.x/abstract 

Howson, C. 2000. Hume’s Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief (Oxford: OUP). 

E-book available from the Library. 

Hume, D. 1739-40 (any edition), A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, §6. 

www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705 

Hume, D. 1748. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (any edition), §§4 & 5. 

18th.eserver.org/hume-enquiry.html 

Mill, J. S. 1882. A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (any edition), Book III, Chs. 

1-4. www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27942 

Okasha, S. 2001. ‘What did Hume really show about induction?’ The Philosophical Quarterly, 

51: 307-27. www.bris.ac.uk/philosophy/department/staff/so/hume 

Papineau, D. 1992. ‘Reliabilism, induction, and scepticism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 42: 1-20. 

Russell, B. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy (any edition), Chapter 6 (‘On induction’). 

www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html 

Shand, J. 2001. ‘Induction: the problem solved’, Philosophy Now, 31, 

philosophynow.org/issues/34/Induction_The_Problem_Solved [On Blackboard site.] 


Ladyman 2002, Chs. 1 & 2 

Vickers, J. 2012. ‘The problem of induction", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

(Winter 2012 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, 

plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/induction-problem/ 

See §1 of the reading list on the Blackboard site for lots more suggestions. 

Week 4: The nature of confirmation 

131


Goodman, N. 1979. ‘The new riddle of induction’, in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast 

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [On Blackboard site.] 

Lipton, P. 2007. ‘The ravens revisited’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 61: 75-95. 

Swinburne, R. 1971. ‘The paradoxes of confirmation: a survey’, American Philosophical 

Quarterly, 8: 318-30. 


Vickers 2012 (see Week 3), §5 


Week 5: Falsificationism 


Popper, K. R. 1972. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: OUP), Ch.1 

[on Blackboard site] and Ch.3 (‘Epistemology without a knowing subject’). 

Schilpp, P. A. 1974 (ed.) The Philosophy of Karl Popper, 2 vols. Lots of papers discussing 

Popper’s view; see especially those by Maxwell, Putnam and Levison (in Book 1). 


Ladyman 2002, §§3.2-3.6. 

Thornton, S. 2011. ‘Karl Popper’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 

Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/popper/ 


Week 6: Scientific revolutions 


Hacking, I. 1981. (ed.) Scientific Revolutions (Oxford: OUP) 

Kuhn, T. S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (any edition). [Excepts to appear 

on the Blackboard site in due course] 

Kuhn, T. S. 1990. ‘The road since Structure, Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the 

Philosophy of Science Association, 1990: 3-13. 

Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. 1970 (eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: 

CUP) 


Nickles, T. 2011. ‘Scientific revolutions’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 

2011 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/scientificrevolutions/ 

Oberheim, E. & Hoyningen-Huene, P. 2012. ‘The incommensurability of scientific theories’, 

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, 

plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/incommensurability/ 

Ladyman 2002, Ch.4. 

Bird, A. 2000. Thomas Kuhn (Chesham: Acumen) 

132


Week 7: Scientific realism 


Cartwright, N. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: OUP), Chs.4 & 5 

Churchland, P. M. & Hooker, C. A. 1985 (eds) Images of Science: Essays on Realism and 

Empiricism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 

Hacking, I. 1983. Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: CUP), Chs.1 & 16 

Maxwell, G. 1962. ‘The ontological status of theoretical entities’, Minnesota Studies in 

Philosophy of Science III. www.mcps.umn.edu/assets/pdf/3.1_Maxwell.pdf 

Psillos, S. 1989. ‘On van Fraassen’s critique of abductive reasoning’, Philosophical 

Quarterly, 46: 31-47. 

van Fraassen, B. C. 1980. The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press), Chs. 1-5 & 7 

[Ch.2 on Blackboard; whole book available online through the library] 

Worrall, J. 1989. ‘Structural realism: The best of both worlds?’, Dialectica, 43: 99-124. 


Chakravartty, A. 2011. ‘Scientific realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

(Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 

plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/scientific-realism/ 

Monton, B. & Mohler, C. 2012. ‘Constructive empiricism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 

Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 

plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/constructive-empiricism/ 

Ladyman 2002, Chs.5-7. 


Week 8: The nature of explanation 


Carnap, R. 1962. ‘Two models of scientific explanation’, in Y. Balashov & A. Rosenberg, 

Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings (New York: Routledge, 2002), 45-55. 

fitelson.org/woodward/hempel_tm.pdf 

Lewis, D. K. 1986. ‘Causal explanation’ in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford 

University Press). [Available from the Library as an e-book] 

Lipton, P. 2000. ‘Inference to the best explanation’, in W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.), A 

Companion to the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Blackwell). [On Blackboard site] 

Salmon, W. C. 1984. ‘Scientific explanation: three basic conceptions’ in PSA: Proceedings of 

the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1984: 293-305. 

people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/tennant9/salmon_PSA1984.pdf 


Psillos, S. 2002. Causation and Explanation (Chesham: Acumen), *ch nos* 

Woodward, J. 2011. ‘Scientific Explanation’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

(Winter 2011 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), 

plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/scientific-explanation/ 

Ladyman 2002, §§7.1-7.2 

133

NB The topics of Weeks 7 and 8 overlap to some extent so some Week 7 readings are also 

relevant here. 


Week 9: Laws of nature 


Armstong, D. M. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: CUP) 

Armstrong, D. M. 1993. ‘The identification problem and the inference problem’, Philosophy 

and Phenomenological Research, 53: 421–2 

Beebee, H. 2000. ‘The non-governing conception of laws of nature’, Philosophy and 

Phenomenological Research, 56: 571-94. [On Blackboard site] 

Carroll, J. W. 2004 (ed.). Readings in Laws of Nature (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University 

Press) 

Van Fraassen, B. C. 1989. Laws and Symmetry (New York: OUP), Chs.1-5 [available as an 

e-book from the library] 


Carroll, J. W. 2012. ‘Laws of nature’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 

Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/laws-ofnature/ 


Week 10: Natural kinds 


Beebee, H. & Sabbarton-Leary, N. 2010. ‘On the abuse of the necessary a posteriori, in H. 

Beebee & N. Sabbarton-Leary (eds), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds 

(New York: Routledge) [available on Blackboard] 

Dupré, J. 1981. ‘Natural kinds and biological taxa’, The Philosophical Review, 90: 66–90 [on 

Blackboard site] 

Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell), especially about the first half of 

Lecture III. 

Putnam, H. 1962. ‘It ain’t necessarily so’, Journal of Philosophy, 59: 658-71 (esp. §1) 


Bird, A. & Tobin, E. 2012. ‘Natural kinds’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 

2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 

plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/natural-kinds/ 

134

Week 11: The ethics of scientific enquiry 


Clarke, S. 1999. ‘Justifying deception in social science research’, Journal of Applied 

Philosophy, 16: 151-66. 

Milgram, S. 1963. ‘Behavioral study of obedience’, Journal of Abnormal and Social 

Psychology, 67: 371-8 [on Blackboard site] 


Wendler, D. 2012. ‘The ethics of clinical research’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

(Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 

plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/clinical-research/ 

135

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