second year course outlines 2012-2013 - School of Social Sciences ...

Brentano, F. 1874. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena. In Moran, D.
&
Mooney, T. Eds. The Phenomenology Reader. London: Routledge, 2002. [S]
Recommended Reading:
Crane, T. 1998. Intentionality as the mark of the mental. In O’Hear, A. Ed. Contemporary
Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Also available at: www.timcrane.com
Further Reading:
Bartok, P. J. 2005. Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and
Phenomenological Readings. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 [O]
Brandl, J. L. The Immanence Theory of Intentionality. In D. W. Smith & A. L. Thomasson,
eds.
Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
*Crane, T. 2006. Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence. In M. Textor, ed. The
Austrian
Contribution to Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Also available at www.timcrane.com
Fish, W. 2005. Emotions, moods and intentionality. In Forrai, G. & Kampis, G. Eds.
Intentionality Past and Future. Amsterdam: Rodolpi.
Also available at www.massey.ac.nz/massey/learning/departments/schoolhistoryphilosophyclassics/staff/william-fish.cfm
*Jacquette, D. 2004. Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality. In Jacquette, D. Ed. The
Cambridge
Companion to Brentano. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
*Moran, D. 1996. Brentano’s Thesis. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary
Volume 70 [O]
Moran, D. 2000. Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of
Intentionality.
Inquiry 43 [O]
Ness, A. 2008. Are only mental phenomena intentional? Analysis 68 [O]
11
The Topic
Intentionality (not to be confused with intensionality) is ‘aboutness’, and it is commonplace
that
many of our mental states are about things. Brentano considers intentionality to be the
defining
feature of the psychological realm – all and only mental entities possess intentionality. He
also
offers a particular, and controversial, account of intentionality as ‘intentional inexistence’.
It is difficult to underestimate the significance of intentionality for phenomenology, as it is the
basis
of almost all subsequent phenomenological analyses, from Brentano Husserl onwards.
Brentano might be criticised by claiming that not all mental phenomena are intentional, that
not all
intentional phenomena are mental, or that the intentional inexistence account of intentionality
is
false.
The Reading
In this classic text, Brentano sets himself the task of finding a principle that distinguishes
mental
from non-mental phenomena. He considers a number of proposals, rejecting some and
tentatively
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