second year course outlines 2012-2013 - School of Social Sciences ...

Priest, S. 2000. The Subject in Question: Sartre's Critique of Husserl in The
Transcendence of
the Ego. London: Routledge.
*Richmond, S. 2004. Introduction in Sartre, J-P. The Transcendence of the Ego, translated
by
A. Brown. London, Routledge, 2004.
Stawarska, B. 2002. Memory and Subjectivity: Sartre in Dialogue with Husserl. Sartre
Studies
International 8 (2002) [O]
*Wider, K. 1997. The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary
Philosophy of
Mind. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Ch.3
Williford, K. 2010. Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness and the Autobiographical Ego. In J.
Webber, ed. Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. London: Routledge.
Zahavi, D. 2000. Self and Consciousness. In D. Zahavi, ed. Exploring the Self. Amsterdam:
John Benjamins.
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The Topic
Phenomenology is intimately bound up with self-consciousness. Husserl makes reflection on
one’s
own experience a central component of phenomenological method. But what is
selfconsciousness?
In particular, is it the consciousness of a self? In Logical Investigations Husserl
thought not, claiming that in reflection one is aware of conscious mental states, but not the
experiencing self, or ‘ego’. However, he changed his mind, coming to argue that
selfconsciousness
involved a consciousness of the self/ego. Furthermore, he argued that the ego was
transcendental. That is, it was a precondition of the possibility of experience. His reason for
believing this was the Kantian one that the ego is a necessary condition of the possibility of
the
unity of consciousness.
Sartre argued against this later position of Husserl’s, claiming that the only sense in which
we
encounter an ego is as transcendent (not transcendental). He argues that the transcendental
ego
is not required to explain the unity of consciousness, and he tells a complex story about the
relation between awareness of the ego, pre-reflective self-awareness, and reflective
experience
(self-consciousness). His position can be summed up by saying that the I is not something in
consciousness but something for consciousness.
Sartre’s view can be criticised by questioning whether he manages to account for the unity of
experience without a reliance on the transcendental ego, and whether his minimal account of
selfawareness
can account for all aspects of self-conscious experience.
The Reading
In this reading Sartre both argues against Husserl’s position and presents his own account
of the
‘transcendence of the ego’. His arguments against the transcendental ego (that it is
‘superfluous’
and that it is ‘a hindrance’) are presented in a rather cursory way. His positive account of the
transcendent ego is presented in much more detail. Sartre draws on a great deal of
Husserlian
material that is not given much of an explanation. It is important to get clear in one’s mind
the
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