second year course outlines 2012-2013 - School of Social Sciences ...

Heidegger’s view might be criticised by questioning his claim that the ready-to-hand is prior
to the
present-at-hand, by arguing that the phenomena he unearths do not make intentionality
possible,
but in fact presuppose it, or by arguing that it neglects the role of the body in skilled activity.
The Reading
This is a classic section from Heidegger’s seminal work Being and Time. The tone is very
different
to the reading from last week. Heidegger’s fundamental philosophical interest is in the nature
of
the meaning of being. How are the different ways of being—the what of things—of entities
made
manifest to us? This signals a departure from Husserl. Indeed, Heidegger is often interpreted
as
presenting a position deeply at odds with Husserlian phenomenology. He does, however,
refer to
his own work as ‘phenomenology’ and his conception of phenomenology as the disclosing of
‘that
which shows itself’ as it shows itself, is clearly closely related to Husserl’s ‘science of
phenomena’.
On Heidegger’s view, the fact that we inhabit a world is so fundamental to us (Heidegger
refers to
us as ‘Dasein’—literally ‘being-there’), that he calls our mode of being ‘being-in-the-world’. In
this
section, Heidegger coins lots of terminology (especially in the difficult §14) and it is easy to
get lost
in this. Nevertheless, one can still get some sense of the phenomena (the world, or
environment
and the entities within it) that Heidegger is keen to elucidate. Try to keep a focus on the idea
that
Heidegger is concerned with the question of how the world, and the entities within it, is
presented
to us in every day, practical experience. Although there is important material throughout the
reading, much of the vital claims are to be found in §§15-16, so you might want to skip the
lengthy
§17 and the obscure §18.
Questions to Consider:
1. In §15 Heidegger introduces the notion of the ‘ready-to-hand’ which is encountered in a
special
kind of awareness ‘circumspection’. This is distinguished from the merely ‘present-at-hand’
which is the object of theoretical inquiry and investigation. How does Heidegger characterise
the ready-to-hand?
2. Towards the end of §15, Heidegger claims that the ready-to-hand is prior to the presentathand.
What do you think he means by this, and does he give adequate reasons?
3. In §16 Heidegger claims that it is when equipment becomes unusable that ‘the world
announces itself’. What does he have in mind? Do you think that he is right?
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Lecture 7 (Week 8): Perception III – perceptual constancy (Merleau-Ponty)
Required Reading:
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. Phenomenology of Perception, translated by C. Smith. London:
Routledge, 1962, Part 2, Chapter 3, 'The Thing and the Natural World', pp.299-317 [S]
Also available at www.archive.org
Recommended Reading:
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