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16 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN AUGUST 2002<br />

minimise our footprint on the<br />

environment” ix . As such although<br />

the <strong>Navy</strong> is not legally bound to<br />

comply with the regulations it is<br />

morally obligated to ensure every<br />

effort is made to comply with the<br />

Erika amendments to MARPOL.<br />

If Australia wishes to maintain its<br />

Afloat Support capability for use<br />

in international operations the<br />

timetable for Project Sea 1654<br />

needs to be accelerated.<br />

Although the modern trends in<br />

the building of auxiliary naval<br />

vessels to commercial standards<br />

can reduce construction times,<br />

building ships still takes<br />

considerable time.<br />

The Strategic Implications<br />

The Defence White Paper details<br />

Australia’s Commitment to the<br />

support of regional and world<br />

stability. This requires the ability<br />

to support <strong>Australian</strong> Forces<br />

Offshore and cooperation with<br />

allied forces, in particular the<br />

United States of America x . Also<br />

Australia’s Maritime Doctrine<br />

indicates our forces may be<br />

required to operate far from<br />

Australia “ sea control operations<br />

will be required whenever<br />

Australia’s national freedom of<br />

action at sea is threatened” xi .<br />

Due to Australia’s geographic<br />

location “practically every<br />

conceivable operation must be<br />

conducted at considerable<br />

distances from shore bases and<br />

which will therefore require<br />

reach." xii An essential element of<br />

reach is the ability to re-fuel and<br />

re-supply ships at sea which<br />

requires an afloat support<br />

capability. The utility of afloat<br />

support is not limited to ships at<br />

sea but also to land and air units<br />

deployed from established bases.<br />

This is particularly so in the initial<br />

deployment before the single<br />

service logistic support units are<br />

fully deployed and established xiii .<br />

As has been detailed above<br />

Afloat Support is essential to<br />

Australia’s strategic objectives.<br />

Where operations are undertaken<br />

uni-laterally Australia will require<br />

its own Afloat Support capability.<br />

Should this capability not comply<br />

with international standards set<br />

down in MARPOL it may make it<br />

more difficult to establish forward<br />

logistic support. Neighbouring<br />

States will be able to deny entry<br />

to the Afloat Support ships on the<br />

grounds of non-compliance with<br />

MARPOL while still offering their<br />

full support to Australia’s military<br />

objectives. The inability to<br />

establish forward support bases<br />

would substantially increase the<br />

logistic lead time and reduce the<br />

ability of the <strong>Navy</strong> to maintain a<br />

presence in an operational area<br />

remote from Australia.<br />

In addition with decommissioning<br />

of the last Destroyers the <strong>Navy</strong>’s<br />

anti-air combat power has been<br />

seriously degraded. Although<br />

still able to make a significant<br />

contribution to lower level<br />

operations such as the current<br />

sanction enforcement operations<br />

in The Gulf, Australia is not<br />

capable of the same level of<br />

support to higher level<br />

operations. Should there be<br />

another conflict of similar<br />

intensity to the 1990/91 Gulf<br />

War, where there was a perceived<br />

air threat, <strong>Australian</strong> units would<br />

not be able to contribute to the<br />

air defence effort of the United<br />

States carrier battle groups as<br />

was achieved in 1990/91. As<br />

with all capabilities the<br />

competency of the people is as<br />

important as the hardware. Once<br />

this capability is lost it will take<br />

years after the hardware is<br />

available again to regain the<br />

same level of proficiency.<br />

The provision of logistic support<br />

is one area where Australia can<br />

contribute meaningful to a<br />

coalition effort for higher level<br />

conflict in the near term.<br />

However even this will be beyond<br />

Australia’s ability if the support<br />

ships do not comply with the<br />

double hull requirements of<br />

MARPOL. In modern conflict,<br />

where diplomacy is as vital as<br />

combat power non-compliance<br />

with minimum international<br />

standards is likely to cause much<br />

hindrance to the movements of<br />

the ship. A claim of sovereign<br />

immunity will probably do more<br />

harm to the diplomatic effort than<br />

it contributes to the combat<br />

power of the coalition.<br />

The National Interest<br />

Not only does this issue effect<br />

military matters but also other<br />

areas of national interest such<br />

as environmental protection,<br />

particularly the Great Barrier<br />

Reef Marine Park. Australia’s<br />

Oceans policy states “ Australia<br />

will continue to take a<br />

leadership role in the<br />

International Maritime<br />

Organisation (IMO) to develop<br />

and promote a strong<br />

international regulatory<br />

framework for ship safety and<br />

the prevention of pollution.” xiv<br />

Australia’s case for<br />

environmental protection will be<br />

seriously hampered if the<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> has ignored<br />

what is a very important<br />

environmental protection<br />

section of MARPOL 73/78 by<br />

continuing to operate single<br />

hulled tankers.<br />

Conclusion<br />

As a result of the pollution<br />

caused by the sinking of the<br />

Erika amendments to MARPOL<br />

73/78 were agreed to in April<br />

2001 which accelerated the<br />

phase out of single hulled<br />

tankers. The new amendment<br />

requires the withdrawal from<br />

international operations of the<br />

<strong>Navy</strong>’s two Afloat Support ships<br />

WESTRALIA and SUCCESS in<br />

2006 and 2012 respectively.<br />

A key requirement of Australia’s<br />

maritime doctrine is to be able<br />

to operate far from <strong>Australian</strong><br />

support bases. This requires<br />

the provision of forward logistic<br />

support of which the Afloat<br />

Support ships are essential. In<br />

addition the degradation of the<br />

<strong>Navy</strong>’s Air Warfare capability<br />

limits the ability to meaningfully<br />

support high-level coalition<br />

action other than by the<br />

provision of afloat support.<br />

However to maintain our<br />

international standing and<br />

prevent damage to other<br />

international objectives such as<br />

the strengthening of<br />

international pollution<br />

prevention agreements our<br />

Afloat Support ships need to<br />

comply with the Erika<br />

amendments to MARPOL<br />

73/78. To achieve compliance<br />

with the MARPOL requirements<br />

the Afloat Support project<br />

needs to be brought forward<br />

and fast tracked.<br />

Notes i IMO: Prevention of Pollution by Oil,<br />

www.imo.org/environment/mainframe.asp?<br />

topic_id=231<br />

ii ibid<br />

iii R.M. Gishubl, LEUT RAN, The Implications<br />

of Revised MARPOL Regulations on RAN<br />

Tankers, Naval Engineering Bulletin June<br />

2001 pp 63<br />

iv MARPOL 73/78 Annex I Regulation 13G<br />

as adopted 27 April 2001<br />

v MARPOL 73/78 Annex I Regulation 13G<br />

para 3(a) as adopted 27 April 2001<br />

vi MARPOL 73/78 Annex I Regulation 13G<br />

para 4 as adopted 27 April 2001<br />

vii Commonwealth of Australia: Defence<br />

Capability Plan 2001-2010 Public Version,<br />

www.dmo.defence.gov.au/id/dcp/dcp_publ<br />

ic.pdf, pp261-262<br />

viii United Nations Convention on the Law Of<br />

the Sea 1982, article 236<br />

ix Commonwealth of Australia, Defence<br />

Environmental Policy, December 2001<br />

x Commonwealth of Australia, Defence<br />

2000, Our Future Defence Force, para<br />

8.53-8.54 pp88<br />

xi Commonwealth of Australia, <strong>Australian</strong><br />

Maritime Doctrine, Defence Publishing<br />

Service Canberra ACT, pp 40<br />

xii Commonwealth of Australia, <strong>Australian</strong><br />

Maritime Doctrine, Defence Publishing<br />

Service Canberra ACT, pp100<br />

xiii Commonwealth of Australia, <strong>Australian</strong><br />

Maritime Doctrine, Defence Publishing<br />

Service Canberra ACT, pp85<br />

xiv Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s<br />

Oceans Policy, Environment Australia,<br />

pp 27<br />

Bibliography Commonwealth of Australia,<br />

Defence Environmental Policy, December<br />

2001<br />

Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000,<br />

Our Future Defence Force<br />

Commonwealth of Australia, <strong>Australian</strong><br />

Maritime Doctrine, Defence Publishing<br />

Service Canberra ACT<br />

Commonwealth of Australia: Defence<br />

Capability Plan 2001-2010 Public Version,<br />

www.dmo.defence.gov.au/id/dcp/<br />

dcp_public.pdf<br />

Gishubl R.M., LEUT RAN, The Implications<br />

of Revised MARPOL Regulations on RAN<br />

Tankers, Naval Engineering Bulletin June<br />

2001<br />

IMO, Prevention of Pollution by Oil,<br />

www.imo.org/environment/mainframe.asp?<br />

topic_id=231<br />

Janes Defence Weekly<br />

MARPOL 73/78 Annex I Regulation 13G as<br />

adopted 27 April 2001<br />

Marine Engineering Review, Institute of<br />

Marine Engineers London UK<br />

United Nations Convention on the Law Of<br />

the Sea 1982

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