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44 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN AUGUST 2002 and we have yet to get over the shock. We fight hard to retain any deep skills we may have, and must fight even harder to get back the skills which we need at sea. We proceeded down this path because we predicted (wrongly) that with the advanced technology promised in our new vessels, the need for deep maintenance specialists was no longer a sound argument for the apparent overtraining and expense in building trades-competent sailors. Additionally, we also incorrectly presumed that we could trim the manpower bill especially in the face of dwindling recruiting numbers.That with in-built redundancies and systems designed to degrade ‘gracefully’, we would be able to make it home and then have the subject matter experts (SMEs) fix our problems. However this would presume fighting an opponent whom would allow us to get home, or that we would be deployed in an AO convenient to our own logistics lines. Neither may be true; just look at where our ships are today. In the end, and no matter how smart our ships may get, or “sophisticated” the design, the craft of engineering and the art of warfare are entwined, and the need for our engineers and engineering sailors to be suitably armed with the capability to diagnose and fix at sea and away from home, remains as relevant today as ever before. Should we forget the engineering lessons of the past, of the need to ensure our engineering capability (and capacity) goes no lower, or be seduced in believing in the argument that technology dispenses with the need to have specialists at sea, we do so at our peril. Warfare Engineering It is true that naval engineers practise a very non-descript type of engineering. We are leaders, planners and managers, and find it difficult to equate to any civil counterparts. We do not manage production lines, nor are we purely maintenance bent and we certainly have long forgotten how to hold a slide-rule let alone use one at the design table. We are however meant to apply our engineering know-how and facilitate between the limitations and operating parameters of our beasts to meet the operational requirements of Command. We engineer the plant for warfare ends. The last NEB provided insight into the links between naval engineering and the characteristics of maritime power. All of these characteristics were spoken to, however the ones which demonstrate most powerfully those links, and which our engineering sailors still today display great tenacity at, despite the woes of TTP or inadequate systems engineering, are flexibility, adaptability, poise & persistence, and most certainly resilience. In 107 days on station in the North Arabian Gulf (NAG) last year, the whole ship displayed all these characteristics. A fine crew, which tackled the weeks of uncertainty that followed September 11th in their stride. From my perspective as the MEO, it was with unending pride to witness the best display of operational engineering determination and effort I had the privilege of being a part of. But what this operational environment also served to do was expose and quicken the understanding of the engineering limitations and its impact on the ship’s warfare posture. Granted that while our task of intercepting oil smugglers may appear far removed from traditional naval warfare, the methodologies, principles and approach used to conduct MIO (maritime interception operations) in a threat environment, are in fact the building elements of traditional warfare outputs. The elements of stealth, deception, tracking and target analyses, tactical picture compilation, navigation, surprise, ROE, intelligence, C2, surveillance, speed and engagement, are all cornerstones of naval warfare, and were crucial skills employed and practised in our operations. The difference is that instead of missiles and shells ultimately being delivered, it was our boarding parties, inserted by either RHIB or fast rope. The science and engineering to support either warfare ends remains the same however. A Case in Point During the fourth patrol conducted by ANZAC last year in the Gulf (the second patrol after September 11th), the ship displayed that engineering flexibility and adaptability so crucial in ensuring that the US 5th Fleet could still effectively execute the MIO mission. With the need to release Tomahawk capable units from MIO in support of initial strikes in the War against Terror,ANZAC found herself being the sole remaining MIO platform in the NAG. While faced with this responsibility, ANZAC suffered a catastrophic failure of the port diesel engine main exhaust system.A circumferential crack some 5mm wide around the main uptake meant that running the port PDE was both dangerous in terms of CO production in the space, and also pointless given the loss of exhaust back pressure and load output. The primary mode of propulsion for an ANZAC (DE Mode) was now denied Command. While Gas Turbine mode and Starboard ECO mode (starboard main engine driving both shafts) remained available, further defects ensured that the use of the remaining propulsion redundancy would be severely hampered. At about the same time as the port diesel exhaust defect, the HP air compressor also suffered a catastrophic failure of the 1st stage cylinder which upon intrusive inspection revealed the need for a complete top end re-build; spares for which are not catered for under the ANZAC COB inventory. Spares had to be ordered under URDEF action from Australia. Despite the outstanding logistics replenishment infrastructure of the USN in area, lead times for stores from home meant that we were also denied the use of the HP air compressor for the time being. Given the requirement for at least 170 bar of air to start the GT and
NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN AUGUST 2002 45 then to ensure reasonable motoring capability during its operation in the event of an emergency shutdown, the need for sustaining HP air was uncompromising.A fall back option was then to cross-connect the electric diving air Baueras to the HP air wingman, however this was shortlived as in order to maintain diving air quality the operation of the Bauers mandated the use of the associated Securus moisture and contaminant filters. The performance of these filters under continuous use was below that expected and hence the change out rate was such that after only 72 hours, the full complement of Securus filters was consumed. HP air availability was now mission critical as GT mode relied upon it. To exacerbate matters our remaining diesel engine mode (starboard ECO) was also faltering as it has since leaving Australia owing to unreliable power transmission through a fluid coupling which was slipping. Command’s propulsion flexibility was now well under threat as reliable diesel propulsion and GT sprint availability could not be guaranteed. Throughout all of this, ANZAC still represented as the only viable interception vessel in the NAG at a time of heightened oil smuggling activity out of Iraq. With little options remaining, the emergency diesel Bauer had to be connected in some way to the HP air system. Although not normally used with the ship’s fixed HP system but with a little ingenuity it was crossconnected to the breathing air system via the re-compression connection in the forward part of the hanger. Running the diesel Bauer in the hanger however posed some very real safety concerns particularly noting the intense aviation activity during the deployment. A makeshift exhaust trunk was established taking the diesel fumes from the Bauer to the flight-deck, but noting the distance and the slow exhaust flow, a DC ram fan was needed to assist in the extraction. All was set to ensure that at the very least GT mode could now be relied upon with the availability of a continuous HP air supply. However noting the lowpressure discharge of the diesel Bauer, it required to be run continuously to ensure the appropriate HP air in the GT air start bottles.This led to further needs such as watchkeepers (on a department already heavily burdened with contributions to boarding parties, security teams, steaming parties and not to mention continuous corrective maintenance on other systems) and vigilant monitoring and correction of the HP air system to ensure there was no loss to system leaks. The final blow came when the ram fan used for extraction seized. With only four carried on board, of which one was already unserviceable, another was required for heat extraction from the crane HPU compartment (another mission critical equipment for RHIB operations) and now a third having seized, the sole remaining ram fan was brought into use. With the port diesel engine down, the starboard diesel engine performance made unreliable because of a slipping fluid coupling and GT mode reliant on reduced HP air availability, Command’s propulsion flexibility and redundancy was severely degraded and down to effective dependence on a single DC ram fan. The situation was bleak. However the engineering resilience and determination to ensure HP air production, coupled with the continual ‘handraulic’ intervention in operating the starboard fluid coupling, meant that the ship could remain on station for a further three days until relieved by a US destroyer and hence completing the required patrol period. Meanwhile, the strip down of the HPAC and the insulation and cladding on the port diesel engine progressed in readiness for the imminent and much needed rectification period alongside Bahrain prior to a return to patrol. Good Dit But So What! The above is not recited to showcase our particular tenacity in ANZAC, for it is certain that similar stories can be told across the fleet in all ships. I tell it here as a poignant illustration of how the need to bear engineering skill, determination, persistence, flexibility, adaptability and solutions is very real at sea today as it has always been. The implicit understanding by engineers of the Command requirements and to focus engineering effort accordingly, and conversely the tactical adjustments by warfare officers to compensate for technical limitations, is what made ANZAC able to fulfil its obligation and maintain true to its mission. The fear is not in our will to do so, although much could be said about the feelings of some whom question that will, but in our remaining ability to carry out such actions and hence to meet our combat readiness even in the face of such adversity. Despite the smart technology, the embedded design redundancy and the sophistication of the ANZAC propulsion control system, the example demonstrates that total reliability will always depend on applied engineering and technical leadership at sea, to
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