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<strong>EDHEC</strong>-<strong>Risk</strong> Days 2012<br />

London, March 27th, 2012, 16:45-18:00<br />

Investing in New Forms of Equity Indices<br />

Lionel Martellini<br />

Professor of Finance, <strong>EDHEC</strong> Business School<br />

Scientific Director, <strong>EDHEC</strong> <strong>Risk</strong> Institute<br />

lionel.martellini@edhec.edu<br />

www.edhec-risk.com<br />

2


Inefficient i <strong>Portfolios</strong> in Efficient i Markets<br />

• For more than 50 years, the asset management industry has<br />

mainly focused on a single source of added-value:<br />

outperforming commercial indices through security selection.<br />

• This approach is based on two implicit assumptions:<br />

– Equity markets are inefficient markets;<br />

– Equity indices are efficient benchmarks.<br />

• Academic research has questioned these two assumptions:<br />

– Weak evidence of persistence in (positive) abnormal performance<br />

(alpha) by active managers => emergence of index funds;<br />

– Strong evidence of inefficiency of cap-weighted indices =><br />

emergence of alternative benchmarks.<br />

3


Managing Investments t in Alternative ti Indices<br />

• Once regarded as exotic curiosities, non CW equity indices have<br />

now made it into the mainstream.<br />

• This acceptance raises a new set of questions, and one may<br />

expect that adopting these non CW indices as benchmarks should<br />

require at least as much attention as investing in active managers.<br />

• Investors face in particular the following challenges:<br />

– Selecting alternative indices (vs. managers): in search for robustness<br />

– ad-hoc schemes versus schemes consistent with portfolio theory;<br />

– Diversifying alternative indices (vs. managers): different schemes<br />

perform differently in different market conditions;<br />

– Managing tracking error of alternative indices (vs. managers):<br />

diversification is not effective at managing extreme relative risk.


Outline<br />

• Alternatives to Cap-Weighted Indices<br />

• Diversifying the Diversifiers<br />

• Tracking the Tracking Error<br />

5


• Alternatives to Cap-Weighted Indices<br />

• Diversifying the Diversifiers<br />

• Tracking the Tracking Error<br />

6


Comparing Alternatives<br />

• A (non-exhaustive) list of recently implemented alternative<br />

weighting schemes :<br />

– Equally-weighted<br />

– Fundamentally-weighted<br />

– Maximum-diversification-weighted<br />

– <strong>Risk</strong>-parity-weighted<br />

it i – Diversity-weighted<br />

– Minimum-variance-weighted<br />

– Efficient-weighted<br />

• As opposed to focusing on past performance (track records -by<br />

definition- all look pretty good), we provide a summary of the<br />

objectives of, and assumptions behind, the various approaches.<br />

7


Indices versus Benchmarks<br />

• The words « index » and « benchmark » are often used<br />

interchangeably; yet they define a priori very different concepts.<br />

• Market perspective: an index is a portfolio that should<br />

represent the performance of a given segment of the market.<br />

=> focus on representativity<br />

• Investor perspective: a benchmark is a reference portfolio that<br />

should represent the fair reward expected in exchange for risk<br />

exposures that an investor is willing to accept.<br />

=> focus on efficiency<br />

• CW portfolios have long been portrayed as representative and<br />

efficient, but have faced increased criticism on both fronts.<br />

8


Cap-Weighting for Representativity?<br />

• A market cap weighted scheme is the obvious default option<br />

when it comes to representing a given segment of the market.<br />

– Market cap weighted indices provide by construction a fair<br />

representation of the stock market;<br />

– In the end, cap-weighting is nothing but an ad-hoc weighting<br />

scheme that t achieves some form of representativity.<br />

ti it<br />

• Cap-weighted indices, however, may not provide a fair<br />

representation of the underlying economic fundamentals.<br />

• Some have argued that t they represent well the stock market but<br />

not the economy.<br />

9


Fundamental Weighting for Representativity?<br />

• Rather than using the market cap, fundamental indices use<br />

firm attributes such as book value, dividends, sales or cash<br />

flows as measures of size.<br />

• These indices aim at better representing the economy.<br />

Arnott (2007): “The Fundamental Index weights companies in<br />

accordance to their footprint in the broad economy […] you wind up<br />

with a portfolio that mirrors the economy”.<br />

• Whether or not fundamentally weighted indices better<br />

represent the economy is actually an open question, if only<br />

because representativity is not a concept that is linked to clear<br />

measures.<br />

• Conditions under which fundamental benchmarks would be<br />

optimal are unclear.<br />

10


Efficiency is Related to Diversification<br />

• In any case, it is not clear why investors would care about their<br />

portfolios representing the economy; from the investor’s<br />

perspective, the focus should be on efficiency: obtaining fair<br />

rewards for given risk budgets.<br />

• Efficiency is intimately related to diversification: it is by<br />

constructing ti well-diversified ifi d portfolios thatt one can achieve a<br />

fair reward for a given risk exposure.<br />

• CW portfolios appear to be rather inefficient and poorly<br />

diversified portfolios, and several approaches have been<br />

developed so as to improve diversification compared to CW.<br />

• Some benchmark construction approaches simply avoid this<br />

concentration without aiming for “optimality”; other approaches<br />

are grounded d in portfolio theory.<br />

11


Scientific Approaches: Towards the Efficient Frontier<br />

• Scientific diversification aims at reaching a high risk/return<br />

objective through portfolio construction techniques.<br />

• Two remarkable portfolios on the efficient frontier:<br />

– The MSR generates the highest reward per unit of portfolio<br />

volatility: needed optimization inputs are expected returns,<br />

correlations and volatilities.<br />

– The GMV generates the lowest possible portfolio volatility: needed<br />

optimization inputs are correlations and volatilities.<br />

• In what follows, we focus on these two approaches, and discuss<br />

some of the challenges involved in robust optimization.<br />

• Ad-hoc approaches can generally be regarded as specific cases<br />

under some particular assumptions.<br />

12 12


MSR versus GMV<br />

Expected<br />

Return<br />

w<br />

−1<br />

( μ − re)<br />

( μ − re)<br />

Σ<br />

= ≡<br />

e'<br />

Σ<br />

( μ , σ , ρ )<br />

MSR −1<br />

i i ij<br />

f<br />

Maximum Sharpe<br />

Ratio (MSR) Portfolio<br />

Global<br />

Minimum<br />

Variance (GMV)<br />

Portfolio<br />

●<br />

−1<br />

1<br />

●<br />

●<br />

( )<br />

Σ e<br />

w GMV = ≡ g σ ,<br />

1<br />

e'<br />

e<br />

i ρ<br />

−<br />

Σ<br />

ij<br />

●<br />

Equally-weighted index<br />

Cap-weighted index<br />

Volatility<br />

13


Implementing the Diversifiers<br />

• Estimating covariance matrix parameters is a serious<br />

challenge, but a number of statistical techniques can prove<br />

effective in addressing this challenge.<br />

• If statistical techniques are useful for estimating risk<br />

parameter, statistics on the other hand does not allow us to<br />

estimate expected returns reliably.<br />

• Direct estimation of expected returns from past returns is close<br />

to useless (Merton (1980)).<br />

• What can we do in practice?<br />

– Give up “naïvely” on expected return estimation<br />

– Give up “smartly” on expected return estimation<br />

14


Giving Up Naïvely – Global Minimum Variance <strong>Portfolios</strong><br />

• The only scientifically diversified portfolio that relies only on risk<br />

parameters is the minimum risk portfolio (GMV in MV setting).<br />

• In its purest form, “magic” of diversification is not working<br />

properly with GMV portfolios because low volatility stocks are<br />

not penalized and therefore over-weighted.<br />

• We need to penalize low volatility stocks to avoid concentration<br />

in such stocks through weight constraints (flexible norm<br />

constraints versus rigid weight constraints – DeMiguel,<br />

Garlappi, Nogales and Uppal (2009)).<br />

15


Giving Up Smartly – MSR<br />

• How to penalize low volatility stocks based on economic theory?<br />

• Theory unambiguously confirms the existence of a positive<br />

risk/return relationship:<br />

– Systematic risk is rewarded (APT);<br />

– Specific risk is also rewarded (Merton (1987));<br />

– Total volatility (model-free) should therefore be rewarded;<br />

– Higher moment risk is also rewarded (many references).<br />

• This justifies the use of the risk-return relationship to build<br />

efficient portfolios: magic of diversification is about mixing highrisk-and-therefore-high-return<br />

stocks so as to generate low risk<br />

portfolios through a smart use of correlations.<br />

16


Ad-Hoc Approaches: EW and ERC (<strong>Risk</strong>-Parity)<br />

• Naïve de-concentration:<br />

– Equal-weighting simply gives the same weight to each of N stocks<br />

in the index (“1/N rule”)<br />

).<br />

– Equal-weighting is the naïve route to constructing well diversified<br />

portfolios<br />

– EW is optimal (e.g., MSR) if all stocks are identical.<br />

• Semi-naïve de-concentration:<br />

ti<br />

– Equal risk contribution (ERC) takes into account contribution to risk.<br />

– Contribution to risk is not proportional to dollar contribution.<br />

– Find portfolio weights such that contributions to risk (volatility) are<br />

equal (Maillard, Roncalli and Teiletche (2010)).<br />

– ERC is optimal (e.g., MSR) if all Sharpe ratios and all pairwise<br />

ERC is optimal (e.g., MSR) if all Sharpe ratios and all pairwise<br />

correlations are identical.<br />

17 17


Ad-Hoc Approaches: Maximum Diversification<br />

• Statistical de-concentration:<br />

– Define a diversification index and try and maximize it.<br />

– Maximum Diversification aims at generating portfolios with the<br />

highest possible diversification index (Choueifaty and Coignard<br />

(2008)):<br />

⎛ n<br />

⎞<br />

⎜<br />

⎟<br />

⎜∑<br />

wiσ<br />

i<br />

⎟<br />

DI = Max⎜<br />

i=<br />

1<br />

⎟<br />

w ⎜<br />

n ⎟<br />

⎟<br />

⎜ ⎜ ∑ w i w jσ<br />

ij<br />

⎟<br />

⎝<br />

i,<br />

j= 1 ⎠<br />

– MD is optimal (e.g., MSR) if all Sharpe ratios are identical.<br />

The weighted average risk (in the numerator) will be high compared<br />

to portfolio risk (in the denominator) and thus DI will be high if the<br />

portfolio weights exploit well the correlations.<br />

18


• Alternatives to Cap-Weighted Indices<br />

• Diversifying the Diversifiers<br />

• Tracking the Tracking Error<br />

19


Selection <strong>Risk</strong> – Relative Returns<br />

• Depending on market conditions, different strategies work<br />

differently; he worst performing strategy in one sub-period can<br />

turn out to be the best performer in subsequent sub-period<br />

period.<br />

Sub­period<br />

MSCI USA Minimum<br />

Volatility Index<br />

FTSE <strong>EDHEC</strong> <strong>Risk</strong><br />

Efficient US Index<br />

2003 (Jan­Jun) ‐4.72% 2.46%<br />

2003 (Jul­Dec) ‐2.93% 3.46%<br />

2004 (Jan­Jun) 0.05% 3.28%<br />

2004 (Jul­Dec) 2.64% 3.18%<br />

2005 (Jan­Jun) 4.58% 3.95%<br />

2005 (Jul­Dec) ‐3.85% 2.04%<br />

2006 (Jan­Jun) ‐0.70% 0.82%<br />

2006 (Jul­Dec) ‐2.54% ‐2.30%<br />

2007 (Jan­Jun) ‐1.63% 2.06%<br />

2007 (Jul­Dec) 1.51% ‐3.31%<br />

2008 (Jan­Jun) 0.38% 1.46%<br />

2008 (Jul­Dec) 10.10% ‐2.40%<br />

2009 (Jan­Jun) ‐4.10% 7.58%<br />

2009 (Jul­Dec) ‐3.75% 6.96%<br />

2010 (Jan­Jun) 1.67% 3.73%<br />

2010 (Jul­Dec) ‐2.06% 2.26%<br />

2011 (Jan­Jun) 4.01% 3.39%<br />

2011 (Jul­Dec) 6.36% ‐2.32%<br />

The table shows excess return over the cap‐weighted index (the S&P 500 index) of MSCI USA Minimum Volatility Index and FTSE <strong>EDHEC</strong> <strong>Risk</strong> Efficient US Index computed over<br />

16 half yearly sub‐periods. Weekly return data from 3 January 2003 to 30 December 2011 is used for the analysis.<br />

20


Selection <strong>Risk</strong> – Relative Perspective<br />

• Periods of very pronounced underperformance occurred for each<br />

of these indices, as can be seen from extremely high values for<br />

max relative drawdowns and extreme annual tracking error.<br />

<strong>Risk</strong> Measures<br />

MSCI USA<br />

Minimum<br />

Volatility Index<br />

FTSE <strong>EDHEC</strong><br />

<strong>Risk</strong> Efficient US<br />

Index<br />

Max relative drawdown 12.23% 8.43%<br />

Start date 21‐nov‐08 21‐apr‐06<br />

End date 23‐apr‐10 21‐nov‐08<br />

Annualised excess Return over<br />

cap­weighted index<br />

1.21% 3.75%<br />

Tracking Error (TE) 5.69% 3.82%<br />

Extreme Tracking Error (95 th<br />

percentile of rolling one year TE)<br />

7.42% 6.72%<br />

21


Diversifying the Diversifiers – Long-Term Analysis<br />

• Both diversifiers add value, as can be seen from the improvement<br />

in Sharpe ratio (without impact on extreme risk levels), but not<br />

necessarily under the same market conditions.<br />

Cap­Weighted<br />

Minimum<br />

Volatility<br />

Maximum Sharpe<br />

Ratio<br />

Ann Return 9.60% 10.89% 11.02%<br />

Ann Std 15.46% 14.10% 14.53%<br />

Ann Semi Dev 11.28% 10.39% 10.73%<br />

Tracking Error 0.00% 2.76% 2.77%<br />

Market β 1.00 0.90 0.93<br />

Sharpe Ratio 0.27 0.39 0.39<br />

Sortino Ratio 0.39 0.55 0.55<br />

Information Ratio ‐ 0.47 0.51<br />

Treynor Ratio 0.04 0.06 0.06<br />

Max Drawdown 53.83% 50.42% 51.72%<br />

95% VaR 3.31% 3.02% 3.14%<br />

99% VaR 7.77% 7.64% 7.77%<br />

Skewness ‐0.34 ‐0.50 ‐0.52<br />

Kurtosis 8.06 9.09 8.82<br />

95% Value­at­Tracking at Error <strong>Risk</strong><br />

(VaTER)<br />

‐<br />

3.89% 3.96%<br />

The period of analysis is from 2nd January 1959 to 31st December 2010. All statistics are annualized and performance ratios that involve the average returns are<br />

based on the geometric average.<br />

22


Relative Performance Across Market Conditions<br />

• Robust proxies for the GMV portfolio provide defensive exposure<br />

to equity that does well in adverse market conditions, while robust<br />

proxies for Max Sharpe Ratio portfolios provide a higher access<br />

to the upside of equity markets.<br />

Diversified (50% Minimum<br />

Minimum Volatility Maximum Sharpe Ratio Volatility + 50% Maximum<br />

Sharpe Ratio)<br />

Conditioning Variable Regime Excess Return over S&P 500 index<br />

Annualised Equity Market Excess<br />

Returns (Market –risk free rate)<br />

Low 3.20% 2.06% 2.63%<br />

2 2.62% 1.95% 2.29%<br />

3 0.78% 0.98% 0.88%<br />

4 ‐0.50% 0.94% 0.22%<br />

High ‐2.62% ‐0.10% ‐1.36%<br />

Conditioning Variable Regime Excess Return over S&P 500 index<br />

Annualised Market Volatility (of<br />

Excess Market Return)<br />

Low 1.40% 2.53% 1.96%<br />

2 1.01% 1.03% 1.02%<br />

3 ‐0.10% ‐0.07% ‐0.08%<br />

4 1.64% 2.05% 1.85%<br />

High 2.24% 1.58% 1.91%<br />

23


Tracking Error Across Market Conditions<br />

• A combination of both approaches is expected to lead to a<br />

smoother conditional performance, and a lower relative risk with<br />

respect to the cap-weighted index.<br />

Minimum Volatility<br />

Maximum Sharpe Ratio<br />

Diversified (50% Minimum<br />

Volatility + 50% Maximum<br />

Sharpe Ratio)<br />

Conditioning Variable Regime Tracking Error with S&P 500 index<br />

Annualised Equity Market Excess<br />

Returns (Market –risk free rate)<br />

Low 3.28% 3.30% 3.23%<br />

2 2.12% 2.17% 2.10%<br />

3 1.81% 1.82% 1.77%<br />

4 2.21% 21% 2.18% 2.14%<br />

High 2.37% 2.54% 2.41%<br />

Conditioning Variable Regime Tracking Error with S&P 500 index<br />

Annualised Market Volatility (of<br />

Excess Market Return)<br />

Low 1.55% 1.72% 1.59%<br />

2 1.78% 1.78% 1.73%<br />

3 1.99% 2.08% 1.99%<br />

4 2.45% 2.50% 2.42%<br />

High 3.97% 3.89% 3.87%<br />

24


Extreme Tracking Error Across Market Conditions<br />

• In 7 out of 10 cases, the diversified strategy does not lower<br />

VaTER compared to the individual strategy with the lowest<br />

VaTER; this is hardly surprising: diversification is not meant to<br />

address extreme risk, and we should turn to hedging.<br />

Diversified (50% Minimum<br />

Minimum Volatility Maximum Sharpe Ratio Volatility + 50% Maximum<br />

Sharpe Ratio)<br />

Conditioning Variable Regime 95% Value at Tracking Error <strong>Risk</strong><br />

Annualised Equity Market Excess<br />

Returns (Market –risk free rate)<br />

Low 5.13% 4.99% 5.13%<br />

2 2.92% 3.11% 2.89%<br />

3 3.18% 3.03% 2.99%<br />

4 3.65% 3.50% 3.52%<br />

High 4.95% 4.66% 4.71%<br />

Conditioning Variable Regime 95% Value at Tracking Error <strong>Risk</strong><br />

Annualised Market Volatility (of Excess<br />

Market Return)<br />

Low 2.39% 2.83% 2.54%<br />

2 3.02% 2.86% 2.86%<br />

3 3.33% 3.59% 3.50%<br />

4 4.06% 4.05% 3.90%<br />

High 7.10% 6.77% 7.11%<br />

25


• Alternatives to Cap-Weighted Indices<br />

• Diversifying the Diversifiers<br />

• Tracking the Tracking Error<br />

26


Tracking the Tracking Error<br />

• Even with a combination of a minimum volatility portfolio and a<br />

maximum Sharpe ratio portfolio, extreme tracking error risk<br />

remains substantial.<br />

• This extreme relative risk is a severe concern for a Chief<br />

Investment Officer who has made the choice of adopting an<br />

alternative weighting scheme.<br />

When such underperformance occurs with active managers, the failure of a<br />

third-party manager, which is a risk inherent to the very logic of the delegation<br />

process of portfolio management, typically translates into the termination of<br />

the manager.<br />

In the case of underperformance of an alternative ti equity index, however, it<br />

would be difficult for the CIO to blame anyone but himself/herself for the<br />

selection of this index.<br />

27


Tracking Error Constraints<br />

• If we subject active managers to TE control, why not expect the<br />

same requirements from alternative benchmarks?<br />

• To control tracking error, one may perform a maximum Sharpe<br />

ratio or minimum variance portfolio optimization subject to<br />

tracking error constraints.<br />

• This is an inefficient approach, inconsistent with the fund<br />

separation theorems that lie at the foundation of asset pricing<br />

theory, and which suggests instead to use a core-satellite<br />

approach.<br />

• In fact, the two approaches are not strictly mutually exclusive.<br />

28


“Fund Separation Theorem” Approach to TE Control<br />

• Fund separation theorems recognize that t risk and performance<br />

are conflicting objectives that are best managed when managed<br />

separately.<br />

• In simple words, the optimal solution in the presence of TE<br />

constraints is a mixture of some proxy for a well-diversified MSR<br />

portfolio and the CW benchmark, here the risk-free asset:(*)<br />

w<br />

⎛ ⎞<br />

= −<br />

CW MSR<br />

⎟<br />

w<br />

t = c<br />

t w<br />

t + 1<br />

⎝ γσ<br />

14243 144<br />

243<br />

⎠ 4<br />

* λt<br />

MSR λt<br />

t w<br />

t +<br />

1<br />

γσ<br />

⎜<br />

t<br />

t<br />

speculative demand<br />

HD w.r.t. benchmark risk<br />

( − c<br />

CW<br />

t ) w<br />

t<br />

• The risk-aversion parameter γ is calibrated to as to reach a<br />

target TE level; for a given γ, the weight allocated to the<br />

improved vs. CW portfolio is a function of market conditions.<br />

29<br />

(*) Result based on constrained maximization of expected CRRA utility of terminal wealth relative to CW benchmark.


What Separation Theorems Say and Do not Say<br />

• This approach is sometimes known as core-satellite investing,<br />

and in essence strictly similar to LDI when the benchmark is a<br />

liability-driven benchmark.<br />

• Now, this approach works even better when the TE of the<br />

satellite portfolio is “well-behaved”; a concern over VaTER in<br />

particular would lead to a severe opportunity cost.<br />

• Therefore, when designing the alternatively weighted satellite<br />

part, it is still useful to maximise the Sharpe ratio subject to<br />

suitably defined (relatively loose, e.g., 5%) TE constraints.<br />

• Adding beta constraints (with respect to a number of betas<br />

that may vary as a function of market conditions) is<br />

particularly effective in controlling for VaTER.<br />

30


Impact of Relative <strong>Risk</strong> Control<br />

• Extreme tracking error is markedly lower for the relative risk<br />

controlled portfolios (ex-ante TE target: 3%).<br />

Minimum<br />

Volatility<br />

Without Relative <strong>Risk</strong> Control<br />

Maximum Sharpe<br />

Ratio<br />

Diversified (50%<br />

Minimum<br />

Volatility + 50%<br />

Maximum Sharpe<br />

Ratio)<br />

Minimum<br />

Volatility<br />

With Relative <strong>Risk</strong> Control<br />

Maximum Sharpe<br />

Ratio<br />

Diversified (50%<br />

Minimum<br />

Volatility + 50%<br />

Maximum Sharpe<br />

Ratio)<br />

Expected Return over CW 1.29% 1.42% 1.35% 0.79% 1.18% 0.99%<br />

Information Ratio 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.52 0.54<br />

Modified IR 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.30<br />

Median Relative Return 1.06% 1.46% 1.35% 0.67% 1.14% 1.12%<br />

5% Relative Return ‐4.49% ‐4.35% ‐4.32% ‐2.94% ‐3.60% ‐3.15%<br />

Min Relative Return ‐12.01% ‐10.57% ‐11.29% ‐8.45% ‐7.05% ‐7.68%<br />

Median Tracking Error 2.08% 2.15% 2.05% 1.53% 1.87% 1.51%<br />

95% Tracking Error 5.60% 5.09% 5.07% 3.09% 4.03% 3.26%<br />

Max Tracking Error 8.69% 8.36% 8.51% 4.48% 5.20% 4.77%<br />

Max Relative Drawdown 22.96% 21.05% 21.83% 15.78% 14.65% 14.88%<br />

Start t Date 16‐sept‐93 24‐mar‐94 7‐oct‐93 16‐sept‐93 22‐sept‐94 24‐mar‐94<br />

End Date 24‐mar‐00 24‐mar‐00 24‐mar‐00 24‐mar‐00 24‐mar‐00 24‐mar‐00<br />

Weekly Value­at­Tracking<br />

Error <strong>Risk</strong> (VaTER)<br />

‐0,54% ‐0,55% ‐0,54% ‐0,38% ‐0,45% ‐0,38%<br />

Max TUW (weeks) 340 313 337 340 287 313<br />

Prob of Outperformance (1Y<br />

Rel Return)<br />

Prob of Outperformance (3Y<br />

Rel Return)<br />

66.00% 65.03% 67.09% 64.65% 64.95% 67.47%<br />

75.96% 75.84% 76.86% 76.31% 70.84% 76.39%<br />

31


Impact of Relative <strong>Risk</strong> Control<br />

Panel A: Relative Drawdown of Diversified Strategy with and<br />

without relative risk control<br />

0%<br />

Panel B: Rolling One­year Tracking Error of Diversified Strategy<br />

with and without relative risk control<br />

9%<br />

8%<br />

‐5%<br />

‐10%<br />

‐15%<br />

‐20%<br />

7%<br />

6%<br />

5%<br />

4%<br />

3%<br />

2%<br />

1%<br />

‐25%<br />

0%<br />

Diversified ifi (with RR control) Diversified ifi (without t RR control) Diversified ifi (with RR control) Diversified ifi (without t RR control)<br />

The plot shows relative drawdown of diversified portfolios (50% Minimum Volatility + 50% Maximum Sharpe Ratio) with and without relative risk<br />

control as compared to the S&P 500 index. Panel B ‐ The plot shows 1‐year trailing tracking error for Diversified (50% Minimum Volatility + 50%<br />

Maximum Sharpe Ratio) portfolios with and without relative risk control as compared to the S&P 500 index. The period of analysis ranges from 2nd<br />

January 1959 to 31st December 2010.<br />

32


Improved Benchmarks in Investors’ <strong>Portfolios</strong><br />

• CW indices are macro-consistent, relatively transparent,<br />

systematic and come with low-cost, and will arguably remain the<br />

ultimate references; on the other hand, they provide severely<br />

inefficient risk/reward properties due to their high concentration.<br />

• Active managers come with less transparency and higher h costs<br />

but have difficulties in persistently outperforming even inefficient<br />

CW indices due to a focus on stock selection.<br />

• More efficient equity benchmarks can be designed, which may<br />

be used as substitutes for active managers in attempts to add<br />

value with respect to the CW index, while allowing for an explicit<br />

control of downside relative risk through diversification and<br />

hedging.<br />

33

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