Relevance of - United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Kenya are among well-known examples where decisions are largely made in a consensual
manner of one kind or another. The Teso and Lango of Uganda, the Tonga of Zambia,
and the Nuer of Southern Sudan are other examples. The local self-governance system
of various Berber ethnic and clan groups also falls within the decentralized consensual
systems (Montagne, 1931; Aplort, 1954; Alport, 1964). Despite some variations between
Berber groups, all adult males are eligible to participate in an assembly (jmaa) although
decisions are made in a consensual manner by a council of notables (inflas or ait arbain).
Among some groups in the High Atlas region, the council elects in rotation and in a
complementary manner, a leader (moqaddem) who presides over the execution of the
council’s decisions for a fixed term of one year. In some cases, however, the moqaddem
has stayed in power longer and has even established dynasties. Other groups, such as
those in the Suss and the Anti-Atlas areas, do not appoint moqaddem. Instead, all male
adults assemble and assist the council in adjudicating disputes and passing sentences
upon criminals.
• Centralized systems
Other parts of Africa established centralized systems of governance with kings and
monarchs. The level of centralization and concentration of power in the hands of the
leaders varied from place to place. In some cases, such as Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and
Rwanda, the rulers enjoyed absolute power. In most other cases, the power of the rulers
was restrained by various arrangements, including the institution of councils (Beattie,
1967; Osaghae, 1989). The level of development of the mechanisms of checks and
balances, however, differed widely from place to place.
In some cases, such as the Buganda of Uganda and the Nupe in Nigeria, the formal
institutions of checks and balances and accountability of leaders to the population were
rather weak (Beattie, 1967). In other cases, such as the Ashanti of Ghana, Lesotho, the
Tswana of Botswana, and the Busoga of Uganda, the systems of checks and balances were
relatively better defined with constitutional provisions and customary laws authorizing a
council of elders, religious leaders, and administrative staff of the chiefs to check the power
of the leaders and keep them accountable (Busia, 1968; Jones, 1983; Coplan, 1997).
Viewed from the perspective of contemporary democracy, the formal mechanisms of
accountability in the centralized African traditional institutions were rather weak, since
chiefs often combined both executive and judicial powers and the councils, when they
existed, were often composed largely of members of the nobility or close relatives of the
chiefs. There were, however, various informal mechanisms that also fostered accountability.
The ability of common people to shift their allegiance away from a despotic chief to
other chiefs was, for instance, an important mechanism that mitigated the autocratic
tendencies of chiefs.