Relevance of - United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

As post-election conflicts in many countries, such as Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia,
and Togo show, elections hardly settle the contest for power when the contestants do not
even agree on the constitutional framework for state-building, or even the laws governing
elections.
Many African countries also have to contend with border conflicts, which are likely to
increase and intensify with the growing demand for resources. Again, traditional conflictresolution
mechanisms can be extremely valuable tools in dealing with such conflicts, in
conjunction with arbitration efforts by actors such as the African Union (AU).
The traditional conflict resolution and consensual decision-making mechanisms can, thus,
enhance state-building by creating possibilities for accommodating the interests of different
sub-state entities and the protection of minority interests. Decentralization of decisionmaking
and adherence to term limits of leaders are other mechanisms with traditional
roots that can facilitate state-building. Incorporation of traditional values also makes it
possible for the adoption of power-sharing arrangements as a strategy of state-building.
This strategy was effective in the transition to post-apartheid South Africa. In addition,
the traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms can be applied in order to deal with the
growing problem of post-election inter-party conflicts. The coercive approach African
States have adopted to suppress political parties often exacerbate the state-building crisis,
as political parties often tend to have ethnic or regional affiliations.
4.2. State reconstitution and accountability of leadership
Another critical aspect of the crisis of state-building is the nature of the post-colonial
State. Many observers view the despotic and self-serving nature of the African State to
be a major hindrance to Africa’s political and economic transformation (Ayoade, 1988;
Keller, 1991; Ayittey, 1993; Ake, 1996; Samatar, 2002). The African State, in most cases,
inherited the extractive (rentier) production relations and repressive security apparatus of
the colonial state (Musah, 2002: 915; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). It also
remained largely outside the control of its citizenry, advancing private interests at the
expense of public interests.
As a result, the general population often perceives the State to be an apparatus of
exploitation and oppression, while the élite see it as a source of power for control and
self-enrichment. A State that is perceived in this manner and lacking internal legitimacy
cannot provide accountable leadership or be an agent for the empowerment of citizens.
It also cannot mobilize the general population for social development. Transforming
the African State into an agent of empowerment of citizens and political and economic
transformation entails re-conceptualizing the State anew, in order to establish a system of
governance with mechanisms that enable the population to control decision-making and
thereby coordinate policy with broad social interests.
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