A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use

REGULATED OPEN ACCESS RESOURCE USE 15
FIG. 4.
Quota rule targets.
Area 3 due to its remoteness and this is the case for fixed costs. Fixed cost
estimates suggest a twofold difference, with gear up cost estimates about $1,030 per
unit of gear in Area 2 and $2,100 in Area 3. The War also had the expected effect
of increasing the implicit opportunity cost of participating in the fishery. The
implicit opportunity costs added by the hazards of war amount to an extra $790 per
unit of gear in Area 2 and almost $9,700 in the Bering Sea. Variable costs are
about $56 and $78 per gear set Ž skate soak.
in Areas 2 and 3, respectively. This
suggests that operating costs are lower in the more accessible region.
5. IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS
The predictions generated from this model of regulated open access are significantly
different from those from the standard open access paradigm. In view of the
fact that most fisheries are regulated rather than pure open access, we should also
expect that they are closer to what we observe in real fisheries. In this section we
compare the predictions of our new model with those that would be generated
using the basic H. S. Gordon model of open access equilibrium. The issue to be
examined is: what are the implications of Ž correctly, we would argue.
including the
regulatory sector in a model of a fishery? To examine this question we calculate
the steady state for two alternatives, using parameter estimates described above.
As discussed in the Introduction, the dominant paradigm in the renewable
resource literature is the Gordon model of pure open access. We take this model
to be represented by a zero rent condition together with a biological dynamics
equation which describes how the species evolves. We thus assume instantaneous
rent dissipation or fast dynamics for the entryexit of fishing capacity, and slow
dynamics for the biology. Since we have also brought into the analysis the concept
of a season length, a question arises as to what to assume about TŽ.
t . We assume
that the industry ends up fishing for a period equal to T max, which is the rent
dissipating season length also. In Fig. 1, the industry reaches a temporary equilib-