05.11.2014 Views

The EVA Challenge: Implementing Value-Added Change in an ...

The EVA Challenge: Implementing Value-Added Change in an ...

The EVA Challenge: Implementing Value-Added Change in an ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>The</strong> Problem 9<br />

signific<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d grow<strong>in</strong>g number of otherwise high-grade m<strong>an</strong>agers—<br />

CEOs you would be happy to have as spouses for your children or<br />

trustees under your will—have come to the view that it’s okay to m<strong>an</strong>ipulate<br />

earn<strong>in</strong>gs to satisfy what they believe are Wall Street’s desires.<br />

Indeed, m<strong>an</strong>y CEOs th<strong>in</strong>k this k<strong>in</strong>d of m<strong>an</strong>ipulation is not only<br />

okay, but actually their duty.” He praised Levitt’s campaign to curb<br />

the abuses.<br />

It will be difficult, however, to end this gimmickry as long as so<br />

m<strong>an</strong>y comp<strong>an</strong>ies tie executive bonuses, <strong>in</strong> whole or <strong>in</strong> part, to improvements<br />

<strong>in</strong> EPS. <strong>The</strong> problem with that l<strong>in</strong>kage, however, has<br />

long been recognized. A number of corporate compensation committees<br />

have sought to escape the EPS trap by bas<strong>in</strong>g bonuses, at<br />

least <strong>in</strong> part, on different earn<strong>in</strong>gs-based measurements such as return<br />

on equity (ROE), return on <strong>in</strong>vestment (ROI), or return on<br />

net assets (RONA). <strong>The</strong>se are better <strong>in</strong>dicators of corporate perform<strong>an</strong>ce<br />

because they <strong>in</strong>clude the bal<strong>an</strong>ce sheet, but they all share a<br />

basic flaw: they too c<strong>an</strong> be m<strong>an</strong>ipulated. If return on equity is the<br />

target, there are two ways to improve it. One is by better corporate<br />

perform<strong>an</strong>ce over time. But if that is not possible, there is <strong>an</strong>other<br />

strategy: reduce the equity <strong>in</strong> the comp<strong>an</strong>y by buy<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong> shares,<br />

either with cash on h<strong>an</strong>d or with debt to f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce the repurchase.<br />

With fewer shares outst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d the same level of profit, the return<br />

on equity obviously rises. <strong>The</strong> executive suite is well served,<br />

but not necessarily the shareholders.<br />

If the bonus is l<strong>in</strong>ked to return on net assets, the same k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />

m<strong>an</strong>ipulation is possible. Some assets might be sold, even though<br />

they might be worth more if kept, if their loss does not proportionally<br />

reduce the profitability of the enterprise. <strong>The</strong> result will be<br />

a higher return on the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g assets. If this tack is not taken, a<br />

bonus dependent on RONA c<strong>an</strong> still be <strong>in</strong>sidious by discourag<strong>in</strong>g<br />

profitable future growth. A promis<strong>in</strong>g acquisition, for example,<br />

might not be made because the effect would be to lower the return<br />

on assets by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the asset base, even though the total profitability<br />

of the enterprise would be enh<strong>an</strong>ced.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!