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2205 final report.pdf - Agra CEAS Consulting

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IMPACT OF THE EU SUGAR REGIME ON BCCCA MEMBER COMPANIES<br />

S1. Executive Summary<br />

S1.1. Objective of the research<br />

The current EU sugar regime, which has remained largely unchanged since its inception in 1968,<br />

expires in June 2006. The European Commission is currently in the process of preparing a new<br />

proposal to reform the EU sugar regime, which is due to be published in June 2005. This research<br />

provides an objective analysis of the impact of the current EU sugar regime on one of the UK<br />

industrial sugar using sectors (namely biscuit, cake, chocolate and confectionery (BCCC)<br />

manufacturing companies) and assesses the likely impact of a number of possible reform options on<br />

the commercial viability of the sector.<br />

Impact of the current EU sugar regime<br />

The Common Market Organisation (CMO) for sugar has had an important impact on the price of<br />

sugar for industrial use. As a result of the CMO, sugar using industries in the EU have to buy sugar<br />

at a relatively high price compared to prices on the world market. The CMO for sugar largely<br />

isolates the EU sugar market via high import duties on sugar.<br />

As a result of the generally higher internal EU price for sugar, a system of export refunds maintains a<br />

reasonably level playing field for EU industrial sugar users when exporting onto the world market by<br />

compensating them for the higher sugar procurement price vis-à-vis non-EU manufacturers.<br />

However, for EU exporters of Non-Annex 1 (i.e. further processed) sugar containing products, it is<br />

acknowledged that these export refunds do not entirely cover the difference between EU market<br />

and world market prices. For these industrial sugar users, the CMO for sugar is more likely to be<br />

perceived as creating distortions between EU and non-EU manufacturers, with regard to the price of<br />

sugar.<br />

Similarly, within the EU the CMO for sugar has not resulted in a level playing field between Member<br />

States, with regard to the price of sugar. In a single (common) sugar market, it would be expected<br />

that prices would converge between Member States. However, analysis of price data demonstrates<br />

that the UK ex-factory delivered price for sugar for use in the production of chocolate, biscuits and<br />

confectionery is higher than in any other EU Member State. From a market clearing perspective, this<br />

finding is difficult to explain, particularly given that sugar is typically in surplus in the UK, and this<br />

therefore calls into question the assumption of a competitive environment.<br />

While there is insufficient information to draw an unequivocal conclusion as to why the UK sugar<br />

price for industrial use in the UK is higher than in any other Member State, it is clear that along with<br />

production quotas, the high sugar price has tended to accelerate and amplify the process of<br />

structural change within the BCCC sector. This has resulted in a series of merger and acquisition<br />

activities and divestment of production facilities out of the UK. These divestments have resulted in<br />

reduced production and export of BCCC products and for the first time in 2002 a negative trade<br />

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